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CHAPTER 1
Introduction: Critical Theory of 
Communication: New Readings of 
Lukács, Adorno, Marcuse, Honneth and 
Habermas in the Age of the Internet
The task of this book is to provide new readings about how some specific works 
of authors related to the Frankfurt School matter for critically understanding 
communication today. It presents five essays that review aspects of the works 
of Georg Lukács, Theodor W. Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, Axel Honneth and 
Jürgen Habermas and applies these ideas for grounding foundations of a criti-
cal theory of communication in the age of the Internet and social media. Each 
chapter is dedicated to revisiting specific ideas of one of these thinkers. The 
book is intended as a reader on aspects of cultural Marxism in the digital age. 
The chapters can also be read independently. 
The approach this book takes is that it a) discusses elements of specific criti-
cal theories and b) relates them to the topics of communication and the Inter-
net. It thereby wants to contribute to a renewal and sublation of the critical 
theory of communication as a critical theory of society. 
In this introduction, I first discuss elements of a critical theory of society 
(section 1.1). Second, I point out the importance of Karl Marx’s works for criti-
cal theory (section 1.2). Third, I provide some background on the Frankfurt 
School (section 1.3). Fourth, I argue that for a critical theory of communication 
it is a feasible approach to link the works of Frankfurt School to other critical 
cultural and social theories (section 1.4). Fifth, I comment on the relationship 
of the Frankfurt School and Heidegger (section 1.5). Finally, I provide an over-
view of this book’s chapters (section 1.6). 
How to cite this book chapter: 
Fuchs, Christian. 2016. Critical Theory of Communication. Pp. 1–46. London: Uni-
versity of Westminster Press. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.16997/book1.a. License: 
CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0
2 Critical Theory of  Communication
The Frankfurt School is one of the traditions in Marxist theory that has 
drawn our attention to the importance of studying culture. It does so with 
profound engagements with ideology, the culture industry and communica-
tion. In the twenty-first century, digital culture and digital communication 
have become important phenomena. It is therefore an interesting task to revisit 
some of the writings of Frankfurt School thinkers in the light of these develop-
ments. This book is not an introduction to critical theory, a textbook or a his-
torical account. Rather, it focuses on some selected key areas of critical theory 
as building blocks for the foundations of a critical theory of communication 
that goes beyond Habermas.
Werner Bonefeld, Richard Gunn and Kosmas Psychopedis (1992) argue in 
the introduction to the first volume of the three-part collected volume Open 
Marxism, that with the rise of neoliberalism and postmodern thought, it 
became fashionable in the 1980s to turn against Marxism and criticise it as 
outdated, old-fashioned, reductionist, deterministic, and a closed system of 
thought. They question this tendency and argue for open Marxism as a meth-
odological approach. Open Marxism sees the ‘openness of Marxist categories 
themselves’ (Bonefeld, Gunn and Psychopedis, 1992, xi). 
“Closed Marxism” is Marxism which does either or both of two inter-
related things: it accepts the horizons of a given world as its own theo-
retical horizon and/or it announces a determinism which is causalist or 
teleological as the case may be (xii).
They mention Adorno and Lukács as two of the figures in the tradition of open 
Marxism (Bonefeld, Gunn and Psychopedis, 1992, xii). 
The Open Marxism project does not aim to reconstruct Marx’s thought, 
in the sense of presenting an interpretation which masquerades as the 
sole ‘correct’ one. Such an approach would not be helpful, for it would 
presuppose the possibility of a uniform and finished interpretation of 
Marx’s work (Bonefeld, Gunn, Holloway and Psychopedis 1995, 1). 
Comparable to Bonefeld, Gunn, Holloway and Psychopedis, Wolfgang Fritz 
Haug (1985) argues for plural Marxism, a project that is based on the dialectic 
of unity and diversity (Haug 1985, 12). 
Marxism does not simply exist, but is becoming. Marxism can only exist 
as process. Marxism’s truth cannot be organised in a number of phrases, 
but only in the process of the inconclusive engagement of differences 
with each other. […] Marxism is not a given, there are Marxisms. Marx-
ism exists in the plural. […] [Marxism requires] convergence in diver-
gence. (Haug 1985, 20)
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In contemporary society, we have witnessed a certain revitalised interest in 
Marx, the critique of class and capitalism, and socialism. The basic trigger of 
this interest was the global economic crisis. In this situation, we need an open 
cultural Marxism in three respects. If one looks at contemporary Marxist dis-
cussions, publications and conferences, then issues relating to communication 
and culture are often treated as having minor, secondary importance and as 
having mere superstructural character. At the same time, it is, however, difficult 
to deny the significant role of cultural labour and communications in contem-
porary society. Countering dominant trends, I have argued for a media and 
communication studies-focused reading of Marx and Marxism (Fuchs 2016). 
First, open cultural Marxism can revisit some of the contributions to cultural 
Marxism in an open manner. The Frankfurt School is an important tradition in 
cultural Marxism. One should, however, not reify particular traditions or think-
ers, but practice an open conversation between various Marxist approaches. 
Marxists still often like to treat themselves mutually as their worst enemies, 
accusing each other, for example, of interpreting Marx incorrectly, not having 
understood this or that aspect of Marx or another critical approach, not being 
Marxist at all, being orthodox Marxists, etc. They forget who their real political 
and theoretical opponents are. Where one should expect comradely behaviour, 
one sometimes only encounters dogmatism and sectarianism. 
The second dimension of open cultural Marxism is that it is time for Marxism 
to open up further to culture and communication as theoretical and political 
issues that matter in contemporary capitalism. In this book, the focus is on par-
ticular topics and categories in cultural Marxism: Lukács’ concept of cultural 
work and ideological labour (chapter 2), Adorno’s critical dialectical theory of 
knowledge (chapter 3), Marcuse’s dialectics as foundation for the analysis of 
social media’s dialectics (chapter 4), Lukács’ and Honneth’s concepts of aliena-
tion and reification in the context of Facebook (chapter 5), Habermas and the 
dialectical critical theory of communication (chapter 6). The book suggests that 
knowledge, culture, communication, work, labour, ideology, alienation, reifica-
tion and dialectics are some of the key categories for the foundations of a dia-
lectical critical theory of communication. It does not have the aim to formulate 
such a theory, but rather provides readings that contribute to its foundations. 
Critical theory is itself dialectical, which means that each new contribu-
tion relates to older contributions and sublates them in a constructive man-
ner. A critical theory is therefore not a closed universe, but an open endeavour 
that cross-references other critical approaches. The six chapters in this book 
therefore also put some of the discussed approaches into dialogue: chapter 1 
focuses not just on Lukács, but also points out Adorno’s and Lukács’ differ-
ent understandings of ontology, as well as Habermas’ interpretation of Lukács. 
The chapter on Adorno (chapter 2) includes a discussion of how Adorno and 
Lukács’ aesthetic theories differ. It also relates Adorno’s contributions to a the-
ory of knowledge to Habermas’ distinction of three forms of knowledge. The 
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chapter on Honneth (chapter 4) includes a comparison of Honneth’s concept 
of alienation to the ones by Rahel Jaeggi and Hartmut Rosa, two other contem-
porary critical theorists. It shows how Honneth bases his notion of alienation 
on Lukács’ History and Class Consciousness. Based on this discussion, I develop 
multidimensional concepts of alienation and appropriation that are grounded 
in the works of Marx, Lukács and Honneth.
Questioning this approach, this book does not argue for a reification of the 
Frankfurt School, but rather for an open dialogue in cultural Marxism that 
opens up debates and lines of communication between thinkers related to the 
Frankfurt School and other cultural Marxists such as Raymond Williams, Lev 
Vygotsky, Valentin Vološinov, or Ferruccio Rossi-Landi. 
Third, this book also wants to open up Marxist discussion in respect to the 
way we engage with the works of thinkers in cultural Marxism. It argues for 
seeing the rich character of cultural Marxism and to not only focus on sin-
gle works that have acquired a cult status. There are alternative, lesser-known 
works of cultural Marxism that are very rich and can, just like the most recog-
nised writings, inspire contemporary debates. In respect to Lukács and Adorno, 
most readers first and foremost think of History and Class Consciousness 
(Lukács 1923/1971) and The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception 
(Horkheimer and Adorno 2002, 94–136) when hearing these names. Focusing 
only on single works does not do justice to the richness, plurality and complex-
ity of the writings of key figures in cultural Marxism. This book also seeks to 
stimulate the engagement with lesser-known texts in cultural Marxism. 
It should not be a disappointment for the reader to hear that this book is not 
predominantly a re-engagement with these two works. Rather, I want to open up 
the debate by drawing your attention to alternative, lesser-known works, such 
as Lukács’ Ontology of Social Being, Adorno’s Hegel: Three Studies, and Adorno’s 
On Subject and Object. There is a danger that the focus on single, well-known 
works reduces the engagement with cultural Marxism to a one-dimensional, 
reified and stereotypical analysis. In respect to Lukács and Adorno, it is cer-
tainly true that their major works are key readings for understanding ideology. 
My point in the book at hand is that the tradition of the Frankfurt School 
has broader relevance for a critical theory of culture and communication and 
is not limited to ideology critique. For example, Lukács’ alternative works also 
help us to frame cultural labour and Adorno’s alternative works can inspire a 
critical theory of knowledge. Cultural Marxism should be open for an engage-
ment with alternative works. Lukács’ Ontology generalises his theory of reifica-
tion, which he formulated in History and Class Consciousness, into a cultural 
materialist and dialectical critical theory of society. It is a key work for a critical 
theory of culture and communication. Those interested in History and Class 
Consciousness will be pleased to hear that chapter 5 in this book starts off with 
a discussion of this work and engages with the way Axel Honneth interpreted 
Lukács’ concept of reification for a critical theory of recognition.
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1.1. What is Critical Theory?
1.1.1. Definitions of Critical Theory
Lash (2002) distinguishes between dialectical critique based on Hegel 
and Marx and aporetic critique based on Kant and influenced by post-
structuralism. Tyson (2006) identifies the following types of critical theo-
ries: psychoanalytic criticism, Marxist criticism, feminist criticism, new 
criticism, reader-response criticism, structuralist criticism, deconstruc-
tive criticism, new historical and cultural criticism, lesbian, gay and queer 
criticism, African-American criticism, postcolonial criticism. Tallack 
(1995) lists the following critical approaches: Marxism, structuralism/post-
structuralism, psychoanalytical theory, feminism, post-foundational ethics/
politics. Agger (2006) speaks of critical theories in the plural and thereby 
means approaches such as postmodernist theory, the Frankfurt School, 
feminist theory and cultural studies.
Some scholars understand critical theory as the works of the Frankfurt 
School, a tradition of critical thinking that originated in the works of schol-
ars like Herbert Marcuse, Max Horkheimer, and Theodor W. Adorno (Held 
1980; Wiggershaus 1995). Its starting point is the work of Karl Marx (Held 
1980, 15; Macey 2001, 75; Payne 1997: 118; Rush 2004, 9; Wiggershaus 1995, 
5). For Horkheimer and his colleagues, critical theory ‘was a camouflage label 
for “Marxist theory”’ (Wiggershaus 1995, 5) when they were in exile from the 
Nazis in the USA, where they were concerned about being exposed as commu-
nist thinkers and therefore took care in the categories they employed. There are 
definitions of Critical Theory that couple the usage of this term exclusively to 
the Frankfurt School or Habermasian Frankfurt School (see for example: Forst 
1999, 143; Honneth 2007, 72).
1.1.2. Marxist Encyclopaedias 
The entry for Kritische Theorie (Critical Theory) in the Europäische 
Enzyklopädie zu Philosophie und Wissenschaften (European Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophy and Science), a four-volume Marxist encyclopaedia of philosophy 
edited by Hans Jörg Sandkühler (1990), only provides a cross-reference to the 
entry Frankfurter Schule (Frankfurt School), which means that this volume 
assumes an identity of the terms ‘critical theory’ and the ‘Frankfurt School’. A 
second Marxist encyclopaedia has taken a different approach: Gerhard Schwep-
penhäuser and Frigga Haug have written the entry ‘Kritische Theorie’ (Critical 
Theory) in the Historisch-Kritisches Wörterbuch des Marxismus (Historical-
Critical Dictionary of Marxism), the largest encyclopaedic project of Marxist 
thought (see http://www.inkrit.de/hkwm/hkwm-index.htm). 
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Schweppenhäuser and Haug define critical theory as 
emancipatory social philosophy. It tries to unite in one movement of 
thought the analysis and critique of forms of practice as well as types of 
reason and rationality of bourgeois-capitalist societies since the middle 
of the 19th century until today. Its starting point is Marx’s theory of the 
law of value as the foundation of commodity-producing societies that is 
derived from the analysis of the value-form. This theory is at the same 
time a critique of the political economy, i.e. demonstration of the capa-
bility and limit of this science for the explanation of the value-form with 
its social and ideological consequences (Schweppenhäuser and Haug 
2012, 197). 
The two authors stress the status of Critical Theory as critical philosophy and 
critical economics. They understand it as a broad approach that is grounded in 
Marx’s thought and works. They, however, also acknowledge that the Frankfurt 
School introduced the term and therefore draw a distinction between criti-
cal theory as the more general approach and Critical Theory as the Frankfurt 
School-approach. 
1.1.3. Dimensions of Critical Theory
An approach that neither lists approaches nor identifies critical theory only 
with persons associated with the Frankfurt School is to identify dimensions 
of critical theory at the content level. In scholarly writings, critical theory in 
general is often designated in lower-case letters, whereas the Frankfurt School 
is labelled as ‘Critical Theory’. I do not make such a strict separation because I 
think the overall approach of the Frankfurt School is quite generalised. 
We can identify five dimensions of a critical theory of society:
1. Critical ethics.
2. Critique of domination, exploitation and alienation.
3. Dialectical reason.
4. Ideology critique.
5. Struggles and political praxis.
Both Marx and Frankfurt School authors stress all of these dimensions. The 
Frankfurt School should, in my view, not be read as a particularistic approach, 
but as a formulation of general foundations of Marxist philosophy and Marxist 
cultural theory. 
For grounding an understanding of critical theory that specifies dimensions 
of the critique of society, some foundational texts of the Frankfurt School are 
helpful. Marcuse’s (1988/1968, 134–158) essay Philosophy and Critical Theory, 
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Horkheimer’s (2002, 188–252) essay Traditional and Critical Theory, Marcuse’s 
(1988/1968, 43–87) article The Concept of Essence and the section The Founda-
tions of the Dialectical Theory of Society in Marcuse’s (1941a, 258–322) book 
Reason and Revolution. These foundational texts make clear that the project of 
the Frankfurt School’s Critical Theory is not a narrow one focused on particu-
lar authors or approaches, but that Critical Theory should rather be understood 
as Marx-inspired and -influenced enquiries into the realities of power, exploita-
tion and domination. 
1.1.4. Critical Ethics
Critical theory has a ‘concern with human happiness’ (Marcuse 1988/1968, 
135) and uses the Hegelian method of comparing essence and existence because 
in capitalism ‘what exists is not immediately and already rational’ (136). This 
essence can be found in man’s positive capacities (such as striving for freedom, 
sociality, co-operation) and it has the ethical implication that universal condi-
tions should be created that allow all humans to realize these capacities: 
That man is a rational being, that this being requires freedom, and that 
happiness is his highest good are universal propositions whose progres-
sive impetus derives precisely from their universality. Universality gives 
them an almost revolutionary character, for they claim that all, and not 
merely this or that particular person, should be rational, free, and happy 
(Marcuse 1988/1968, 152).
1.1.5. Critique of Domination, Exploitation and Alienation
Critical theory holds that ‘man can be more than a manipulable subject in the 
production process of class society’ (Marcuse 1988/1968, 153). The goal of criti-
cal theory is the transformation of society as a whole (Horkheimer 2002, 219) so 
that a ‘society without injustice’ (221) emerges that is shaped by ‘reasonableness, 
and striving for peace, freedom, and happiness’ (222), ‘in which man’s actions 
no longer flow from a mechanism but from his own decision’ (229), and that 
is ‘a state of affairs in which there will be no exploitation or oppression’ (241).
Marx treated Kant’s fundamental philosophical questions about man and his 
knowledge, activities and hopes (What can I know? What ought I to do? What 
may I hope? What is the human?) in a specific way. He established a critical 
philosophy/theory and critical political economy that ‘demonstrate the con-
crete forces and tendencies that prevented and those that promoted’ the goal of 
a society that benefits all and the historical possibilities of such a society (Mar-
cuse 1941a, 321). So Marx’s reformulation of Kant’s questions was his categori-
cal imperative – the critique of domination and exploitation. 
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1.1.6. Dialectical Reason
In Marx’s works, concepts that describe the existence of capitalism (profit, sur-
plus value, worker, capital, commodity, etc.) are dialectical because they ‘tran-
scend the given social reality in the direction of another historical structure 
which is present as a tendency in the given reality’ and represent the essence of 
man (Marcuse 1988/1968, 86). 
If, for instance, it is said that concepts such as wages, the value of labor, 
and entrepreneurial profit are only categories of manifestations behind 
which are hidden the ‘essential relations’ of the second set of concepts, it 
is also true that these essential relations represent the truth of the mani-
festations only insofar as the concepts which comprehend them already 
contain their own negation and transcendence – the image of a social 
organization without surplus value. All materialist concepts contain an 
accusation and an imperative (Marcuse 1988/1968, 86). 
Marx’s categories ‘are negative and at the same time positive’ (Marcuse 1941a, 295).
The concepts of contradiction (negation) and negation of the negation are 
crucial for critical theory: in capitalism, every fact is ‘a negation and restric-
tion of real possibilities’ (282). ‘Private property is a fact, but at the same time 
it is a negation of man’s collective appropriation of nature’ (Marcuse 1941a, 
282). ‘The historical character of the Marxian dialectic embraces the prevailing 
negativity as well as its negation. […] the negation of the negation […] does not 
steadily and automatically grow out of the earlier state; it can be set free only by 
an autonomous act on the part of men’ (Marcuse 1941a, 315). The dialectic of 
capitalism has a structural-objective part; capital accumulation’s contradictions 
result in crisis. These contradictions can only be overcome by the subjective 
force of the dialectic: political struggle (Marcuse 1941a, 316–319).
1.1.7. Ideology Critique
‘Basic to the present form of social organization, the antagonisms of the capital-
ist production process, is the fact that the central phenomena connected with 
this process do not immediately appear to men as what they are “in reality”, but 
in masked, ‘perverted’ form’ (Marcuse 1988/1968, 70).
1.1.8. Struggles and Political Praxis
For the Frankfurt School, critical theory aims at and supports social struggles for 
a better world: ‘The materialist protest and materialist critique originated in the 
struggle of oppressed groups for better living conditions and remain permanently 
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associated with the actual process of this struggle’ (Marcuse 1988/1968, 141). ‘The 
philosophical ideal of a better world and of true Being are incorporated into the 
practical aim of struggling mankind, where they take on a human form’ (Marcuse 
1988/1968, 142).
1.2. Critical Theory and Karl Marx
The six dimensions of a critical theory of society can also be found in Karl 
Marx’s works, which shows the importance of his thought for any critical theory.
1.2.1. Critical Theory has a Normative Dimension
Criticism ‘measures individual existence against essence’ (Marx 1997, 61–62). 
This means that critical theory is normative and realistic. It argues that it is pos-
sible to logically provide reasonably grounded arguments about what a good 
society is, how the good society relates to conditions that all humans require 
to survive (the essence of humans and society), and how we can judge existing 
societies according to which extent they provide humane conditions or not. 
Marx found it important to not just analyse capitalism academically, but also 
to politically communicate this analysis. This explains his own practice as a 
journalist and political actor.
1.2.2. Critical Theory is a Critique of Domination and Exploitation
Critical theory questions all thought and practices that justify or uphold domi-
nation and exploitation. Marx formulated the categorical imperative of critical 
theory: it is the ‘categoric imperative to overthrow all conditions in which man 
is a degraded, enslaved, neglected, contemptible being’ (Marx 1997, 257–258). 
Critical theory wants to show that a good life is possible for all and that domi-
nation and exploitation alienate humans from achieving such a society. For 
Marx, the ‘task of philosophy […] is to unmask human self-alienation’ (Marx 
1997, 251). In deconstructing alienation, domination and exploitation, criti-
cal theory also makes demands for a self-determined, participatory and just 
democracy. Such a society is not only a grassroots political democracy, but also 
an economic democracy, in which the producers control the production pro-
cess and the means and outcomes of production. Critical theory wants to make 
the world conscious of its own possibilities. The ‘world has long dreamed of 
something of which it only has to become conscious in order to possess it in 
actuality’ (Marx 1997, 214).
One can interpret Marxist approaches and critical theory as a form of political 
communication: they communicate fundamental deformations of society and 
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humanity and potentials for political change and struggles by which humans 
can overcome these deformations.
Critical theory analyses how capital accumulation, surplus value exploitation 
and the transformation of aspects of society into commodities (commodifi-
cation) work and what the contradictions of the capitalist mode of produc-
tion are: ‘In the critique of political economy, therefore, we shall examine the 
basic categories, uncover the contradiction introduced by the free-trade sys-
tem, and bring out the consequences of both sides of the contradiction’ (Engels 
1843/1844, 175).
Critical theory stresses the notions of technological rationality and instru-
mental reasons. In capitalism, there is a tendency for freedom of action to 
be replaced by instrumental decision-making on the part of capital and the 
state so that the individual is expected to only react and not to act. The two 
concepts are grounded in the notion of reification, which is a reformulation 
of Marx’s (1867) concept of fetishism. The media in capitalism are modes of 
reification in a manifold way: first, they reduce humans to the status of con-
sumers of advertisements. Second, culture is in capitalism to a large degree 
connected to the commodity form, in the form of cultural commodities that 
are bought by consumers and in the form of audience and user commodities 
that media consumers/Internet prosumers become themselves. Third, in order 
to reproduce its existence, capitalism has to present itself as the best possible 
(or only possible) system and makes use of the media in order to try to keep 
this message (in all its differentiated forms) hegemonic. The first and the sec-
ond dimension constitute the economic dimension of instrumental reason, the 
third dimension the ideological form of instrumental reason. Capitalist media 
are necessarily means of advertising and commodification and spaces of ide-
ology. Advertisement and cultural commodification make humans an instru-
ment for economic profit accumulation. Ideology aims at instilling the belief 
in the system of capital and commodities into human’s subjectivity. The goal 
is that human thoughts and actions do not go beyond capitalism, do not ques-
tion and revolt against this system and thereby play the role of instruments for 
the perpetuation of capitalism. It is of course an important question to which 
extent ideology is always successful and to which degree it is questioned and 
resisted, but the crucial aspect about ideology is that it encompasses strate-
gies and attempts to make human subjects instrumental in the reproduction of 
domination and exploitation.
1.2.3. Critical Theory uses Dialectical Reasoning as Method of Analysis
The dialectical method identifies contradictions. Contradictions are ‘the 
source of all dialectics’ (Marx 1867, 744). Dialectics tries to show that and 
how contemporary society and its moments are shaped by contradictions. 
Contradictions result in the circumstance that society is dynamic and that 
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capitalism assures the continuity of domination and exploitation by changing 
the way these phenomena are organised. Dialectics ‘regards every historically 
developed form as being in a fluid state, in motion, and therefore grasps its 
transient aspects as well’ (Marx 1867, 103). The ‘movement of capitalist soci-
ety is full of contradictions’ (Marx 1867, 103). In a contradiction, one pole of 
the dialectic can only exist by the way of the opposed pole. They require and 
exclude each other at the same time. In a dominative society (such as capital-
ism), contradictions cause problems and are to a certain extent also the seeds 
for overcoming these problems. They have positive potentials and negative 
realities at the same time. 





use value/exchange value 
concrete labour/abstract labour 
the simple form of value/the relative and expanded form of value
social relations of humans/relations of things
the fetish of commodities and money/fetishist thinking 




labour process/valorisation process 
subject of labour (labour power worker)/the means of production (object)
variable capital/constant capital
surplus labour/surplus product 





productive forces/relations of production. 
The tension between opposing poles can be resolved in a process that Hegel and 
Marx called ‘Aufhebung’ (sublation) and ‘negation of the negation’: a new/third 
quality or a new system emerges from the contradiction between two poles. 
Sublation can take place at different levels of society, either relatively frequently 
in order to enable a dynamic of domination or infrequently in situations of 
revolution when domination is questioned. So in capitalism, contradictions are 
frequently sublated in order to enable capital accumulation:
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use value/exchange value => value
concrete labour/abstract labour => productive force of labour
 the simple form of value/the relative and expanded form of value => the 
money form
 social relations of humans/relations of things => fetishism (the fetish of com-
modities and money/fetishistic thinking)
 the circulation of commodities/the circulation of money => the circulation 
of capital commodities/money => capital
labour power/wages => surplus labour
subject/object => product
 labour process/valorisation process => the production process of commodities
 subject of labour (labour power, worker)/the means of production (object) 
=> labour process/products
variable capital/constant capital => profit
surplus labour/surplus product => surplus value
 necessary labour time/surplus labour time => absolute surplus value produc-
tion + relative surplus value production + class struggle for reduction of the 
working day
 single worker/co-operation => surveillance and control in the production 
process + alienation
single company/industry sector => capital concentration/monopoly
 single capital/competing capitals => capital concentration + monopolies pro-
duction/consumption => crisis
 subject of labour (humans) + object of labour (technology) => technologies 
of means of exploitation
 (Fuchs 2016).
 But there are also contradictions in capitalism that are persistent and not frequently 
sublated. They are at the heart of human misery in capitalism. Their sublation can 
only be achieved by political struggle and means the end of capitalism. These are 
especially the antagonisms between productive forces/relations of production, 
owners/non-owners, the poor/the rich, misery/wealth, workers/capitalists. 
The contradiction between productive forces and relations of production is 
partly sublated in crisis situations, but reconstitutes itself during the course of 
the crisis. Its true sublation can only be achieved by the overthrow of capital-
ism. If in capitalism an important contradiction is the one between the owning 
and the non-owning class, then the goal of critical theory is the representation 
of the interest of oppressed and exploited groups and the overcoming of class-
based society. ‘It can only represent a class whose historical task is the over-
throw of the capitalist mode of production and the final abolition of all classes – 
the proletariat’ (Marx 1867, 98).
In formulating a critique of domination and exploitation, critical theory 
develops ‘new principles for the world out of the principles of the world’ 
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(Marx 1997, 214). Dialectical thinking argues that the foundations of a class-
less  society develop already within capitalism, that capitalism on the one hand 
produces new forms of co-operation that are on the other hand – within class 
relations – forms of domination. The forces of production are in capitalism at 
the same time destructive forces. 
Hegel and Marx’s concept of dialectics can help scholars to understand the 
fundamentally contradictory character of communication in modern society: 
communication doesn’t just communicate interests, but communicates such 
interests due to the antagonistic structure of modern society in opposition to 
somebody. Critical scholarship analyses communication by identifying politi-
cal contradictions and the ways in which these contradictions are communi-
cated in public or ideologically masked and distorted.
1.2.4. Ideology Critique: Critical Theory is a Critique of Ideology
Ideologies are practices and modes of thought that present aspects of human 
existence that are historical and changeable as eternal and unchangeable. Ideol-
ogy critique wants to remind us that everything that exists in society is created 
by humans in social relationships and that social relationships can be changed. 
It wants to bring ‘problems into the self-conscious human form’ (Marx 1997, 
214), which means that it wants to make humans conscious of the problems 
they are facing in society and the causes of these problems. Arguments like 
‘there is no alternative to capitalism, neoliberalism, competition, egoism, rac-
ism, etc. because man is egoistic, competitive, etc.’ forget about the social char-
acter of society. They create the impression that the results of social activity 
are unchangeable things. Critical theory provides an ‘analysis of the mystical 
consciousness that is unclear about itself ’ (Marx 1997, 214).
In modern society, communication regularly takes on ideological forms. 
Such ideologies try to advance specific interests by communicating in ways that 
present certain groups positively, opponents and enemies negatively, play down 
or conceal negative realities about specific groups and overstate or invent nega-
tive dimensions of opponents and enemies.
1.2.5. Critical Theory is Connected to Struggles for a Just and Fair 
Society. It is an Intellectual Dimension of Struggles
Critical theory provides a ‘self-understanding […] of the age concerning its 
struggle and wishes’ (Marx 1997, 315), it can ‘show the world why it actually 
struggles’ and is ‘taking sides […] with actual struggles’ (Marx 1997, 214). 
This means that critical theory can help to explain the causes, conditions, 
potentials and limits of struggles. Critical theory rejects the argument that 
academia and science should and can be value-free. It rather argues that all 
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thought and theories are shaped by political worldviews. The reasons why a 
person is interested in a certain topic, aligns himself/herself with a certain 
school of thought, develops a particular theory and not another one, refers to 
certain authors and not others, are deeply political because modern society 
is shaped by conflicts of interests and therefore for surviving and asserting 
themselves, scholars have to make choices, enter strategic alliances and defend 
their positions against others. 
In conflict-based and antagonistic societies, academic writing and speak-
ing, scholarship and science are always forms of political communication: 
they are not just discovery, knowledge construction or invention, but besides 
knowledge creation also a production and communication of knowledge about 
knowledge – the political standpoints of the scholars themselves. Critical the-
ory holds not only that theory is always political, but also that it should develop 
analyses of society and concepts that assist struggles against interests and ideas 
that justify domination and exploitation. 
1.2.6. Beyond Traditional Marxism and Post-Marxism
Moishe Postone (2015, 4) suggests ‘the importance of a renewed encounter 
with Marx’s critical analysis of capitalism’. Such an encounter would have to 
avoid the mistakes of traditional Marxism and post-Marxism. The new crisis of 
capitalism would have questioned the ‘one-sidedness of what have been termed 
the cultural and linguistic turns’ (5) of postmodernist approaches. One should, 
however, avoid a return to traditional Marxism, an interpretative framework 
of capitalism that foregrounds class, exploitation and that ‘socialism entails the 
historical coming-to-itself of labor’ (7). 
Problems that the traditional framework has encountered would include: 
the non-emancipatory character of “actually existing socialism”, and 
the historical trajectory of its rise and decline which parallels that of 
state-interventionist capitalism (suggesting they were similarly situ-
ated historically); the growing importance of scientific knowledge and 
advanced technology in production (which seemed to call into ques-
tion the labor theory of value); growing criticisms of technological pro-
gress and growth (which opposed the productivism of much traditional 
Marxism), and the increased importance of non-class-based social 
identities (Postone 2015, 8).
A contemporary critical theory needs to be a critical theory of capitalism, but 
requires along with the critique of capitalism also a critical theory of the state, 
labour, knowledge, technology, the environment, and the relationship of class 
and identities (including ethnicity and gender identities). 
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1.2.7. Beyond Labour Fetishism and Cultural Fetishism
Traditional Marxism has been grounded in labour fetishism that glorifies toil 
and wage-labour as long as it is toil and wage-labour in a socialist framework 
under which the means of production are owned collectively. It has advanced a 
Protestant celebration of hard labour. Postmodernism has in contrast been based 
on cultural fetishism: it has dissolved the economy and class into the realm of 
symbols, culture and signification. I discuss this culturalist tendency with the 
example of Jean Baudrillard’s works in this book’s section 6.3 (chapter 6). 
Orthodox Marxism’s labour fetishism is for example evident in article 12 of 
the 1936 Soviet Constitution introduced under Stalin: 
In the U.S.S.R., labour is a duty and a matter of honour for every able-
bodied citizen, in accordance with the principle: “He who does not 
work, neither shall he eat”. The principle applied in the U.S.S.R. is that 
of socialism: “From each according to his ability, to each according to 
his labour”. 
Jan Pakulski and Malcolm Waters (1996) wrote a book called The Death of Class, 
in which they argue that their analysis brings ‘the good news that class has col-
lapsed and is decomposing. […] [Contemporary society] is based on subscrip-
tion to lifestyles that form around consumption patterns, information flows, 
cognitive agreements, aesthetic preferences and value commitments. Material 
and power phenomena are reducible to these symbolically manifested lifestyle 
and value phenomena’ (Pakulski and Waters 1996, 7, 155). The death of class 
has proved to be an illusion in the very realm of culture: there is a high level of 
precarious freelance labour in the media, cultural and digital industries (Fuchs 
2015a). New capital accumulation strategies in the culture industry involve the 
crowdsourcing of labour to unpaid users on the Internet (Fuchs 2014a). The 
culture economy is just like other parts of capitalism a realm that is shaped by 
class and exploitation.
1.2.8. Postmodernism = Stalinism
These are just prototypical expressions of labourism and culturalism. On the 
one hand, postmodernism and Stalinism seem to be quite opposed. On the 
other hand, they have a quite similar logic: they are both reductionist and one-
dimensional. Whereas labourism reduces life to labour and toil, culturalism 
reduces the economy and society to culture. One fetishises labour, the other 
symbols. Both do not have a satisfactory answer to the question of how the 
economy and culture are related. The imperialism and fetishism of labour has 
resulted in political totalitarianism and a lack of understanding of the good 
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life. The imperialism and fetishism of culture has completely neglected that 
there is an economy shaped by class and has resulted in a theoretical cynicism 
that is preoccupied with postmodern language games, in which the postmod-
ern text is a symbolic fetishism. It is devoid of radical politics or a compelling 
vision of a good society. Stalinism and postmodernism converge in the logic 
of  reductionism.
Today we need readings of Marx that rethink the relationship of work and 
communication, labour and ideology, productive forces and language, class and 
identity, the economy and culture (Fuchs 2015a). I suggest that a way forward 
is to bring Frankfurt School’s critical theory into a dialogue with Raymond 
Williams’ approach of Cultural Materialism. Dialectical Cultural Materialism 
can thereby be used for grounding foundations of a dialectical critical theory 
of communication. In response to the overestimation of culture, traditional 
Marxism has often simply neglected engaging with information, communica-
tion and signification although cultural labour and the means of communica-
tion have at the same time become more important in contemporary capital-
ism. A critical theory of communication allows us to think about these topics 
in a dialectical, non-reductionist manner.
1.2.9. The Law of Value in the Computer Age
The rise of computer technology, science and knowledge in production has 
further deepened the antagonism between value and labour time. Marx has 
described this contradiction in the Grundrisse:
What capital adds is that it increases the surplus labour time of the mass 
by all the means of art and science, because its wealth consists directly 
in the appropriation of surplus labour time; since value directly its pur-
pose, not use value. It is thus, despite itself, instrumental in creating the 
means of social disposable time, in order to reduce labour time for the 
whole society to a diminishing’ minimum, and thus to free everyone’s 
time for their own development. But its tendency always, on the one 
side, to create disposable time, on the other, to convert it into surplus 
labour. If it succeeds too well at the first, then it suffers from surplus pro-
duction, and then necessary labour is interrupted, because no surplus 
labour can be realized by capital (Marx 1857/1858, 708).
It is a mistake to assume that the rise of digital capitalism brings about the end 
of the law of value and the labour theory of value. Negri (1991, 172) argues that 
in the Grundrisse the ‘Law of Value dies’. Virno (2004, 100) says that the law of 
value is ‘shattered and refuted by capitalist development itself ’. Hardt and Negri 
(2004, 145) argue that the ‘temporal unity of labor as the basic measure of value 
today makes no sense’. Vercellone (2010, 90) writes that ‘cognitive capitalism’ has 
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resulted in the ‘crisis of the law of value’ and ‘a crisis of measurement that desta-
bilizes the very sense of the fundamental categories of the political economy; 
labor, capital and obviously, value’ (90). Value’s contradictions have been deep-
ened in digital capitalism, but as long as capitalism exists, value is the foundation 
of the economy and there is capital’s exploitation of surplus-value generating 
labour that is expended over time. Postone (2008, 126) stresses, in this respect, 
that the crisis of value in capitalism is ‘not simply superseded by a new form of 
wealth’, but rather value ‘remains the necessary structural precondition of capi-
talist society’. ‘Capitalism does give rise to the possibility of its own negation, but 
it does not automatically evolve into something else’ (Postone 2008, 127). One of 
the theoretical tasks today for a critical theory is to think about the changes of 
value in the digital age (see Fisher and Fuchs 2015). 
1.2.10. Work and Labour
A contemporary critical theory should both avoid labour fetishism and cultural 
fetishism. This does however not mean that we have to read all of Marx’s cat-
egories as being limited to the historical specificity of capitalism. Marx elabo-
rated a critique of capitalism simultaneously with a critical theory of society. 
The dialectic of his categories points out the specificity of capitalism and at 
the same time more general features of realities that point beyond capitalism. 
I have in this respect suggested a reading of Marx that distinguishes between 
work and labour (Fuchs 2014a, 2015a, 2016): work is a general feature of all 
societies. It is human social production that creates goods that satisfy human 
needs. In capitalism, work is value-generating abstract labour that abstracts 
from human needs and organises the economy based on the structural needs of 
capital as self-valorising value through the exploitation of labour. Capitalism’s 
value and commodity form entails an abstraction from human needs, concrete 
social relations and individuals, the social act of production, use-values, and 
from the immediate experience of violence (violence takes on the structural 
form immanent in the dull compulsion of exchange, although also direct forms 
of violence, such as slavery, continue to exist in capitalism) so that ‘society is 
governed by the movement of real economic abstractions’ (Bonefeld 2014, 24). 
Whereas the etymological root of terms such as work and Werktätigkeit 
(German) is creating, acting, doing, the etymological root of words such as 
labour and Arbeit is toil, slavery and hardship (Fuchs 2015a, chapter 2). Arendt 
(1958, 80–81) confirms the etymological distinction between on the one hand 
ergazesthai (Greek)/facere and fabricari (Latin)/work (English)/werken (Ger-
man)/ouvrer (French) and on the other hand ponein (Greek)/laborare (Latin)/
labour (English)/arbeiten (German)/travailler (French). 
The point is that technological development allows us to demand the aboli-
tion of labour, value and class (i.e. of both capital and the proletariat) as the 
potential for the transformation of the entire economy and society. This does, 
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however, not imply the abolition, but rather the transformation of the world of 
work towards a self-determined, self-managed, self-instituting, well-rounded 
and democratic economy free of toil and free to provide a good, pleasurable 
and fulfilling life for all. ‘Labor in capitalism, then, is both labor, as we transh-
istorically and commonsensically understand it, according to Marx, and a his-
torically specific socially mediating activity’ (Postone 2015, 12). As it is confus-
ing to use the term labour for both dimensions, the distinction between labour 
and work is more feasible. 
1.2.11. Werner Bonefeld’s Critical Theory
Werner Bonefeld is a professor of politics at York University. He has been influ-
enced by Adorno and the Frankfurt School and has together with people such 
as John Holloway, Richard Gunn and Kosmas Psychopedis established the open 
Marxism approach. He is one of the thinkers, who have made an interesting 
contribution to the development of contemporary critical theory. In his book 
Critical Theory and the Critique of Political Economy, Bonefeld (2014) provides 
for example a criticism of the logic that the enemy of one’s enemy is one’s friend, 
an analysis of the difference between racism and anti-Semitism, and argues 
that primitive accumulation is a continuous feature of capital because workers’ 
separation from the products and the surplus-value they create is inherent in 
capital accumulation itself. He also makes the point that ‘class is the critical cat-
egory of the entire system of capitalist wealth’ (102) so that labour and capital 
appear ‘on the labour market as equal subjects’, which ‘masks their fundamen-
tal inequality’ (106). ‘Violence hides in the civilized form of the equivalence 
exchange relations as economic compulsion’ (95). 
Bonefeld stresses that abstract labour is a category specific for capitalism 
and cannot be a transhistorical category, because then the double character 
of labour as abstract and concrete labour could not be a defining feature of 
capitalist commodity production. The demand for praxis that is based on the 
insight that the ‘whole has to go’ (223) is for Bonefeld one of critical theory’s 
inherent features. ‘Critical theory demands a praxis that fights barbarism and 
argues that in hell everything is hellish’ (222). Engaging with Bonefeld’s writing 
is an inspiring endeavour for anyone interested in critical theory. 
Critical theory is for Bonefeld anti-reifying thinking that deconstructs fet-
ishisms. ‘The critique of political economy is thus subversive of the reified 
economic categories’ (38). Bourgeois economics would present contemporary 
economic life as natural economic laws and would thereby disregard that such 
laws’ ‘validity is fundamentally social, and they are valid in and through society 
and society is always concrete society’ (26). 
For the critique of political economy the critical issue is thus not the dis-
covery of general economic laws of history. Rather, its object of critique 
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is the existent society, in which definite social relations subsist in the 
form of abstract economic forces, things endowed with an invisible will 
that “asserts itself as a regulative law of nature” (27). 
Bonefeld based on these insights criticises certain Marxist approaches (such as 
Althusser and Balibar’s theory) that assume that capitalism is an expression of 
some general trans-historical economic laws. ‘In sum, instead of thinking out 
of society, worldview Marxism analyses capitalist society to discover the gen-
eral economic laws and then conceives of capitalist society as a manifestation 
of those same general economic laws that its analysis of capitalism established’ 
(35). In contrast to worldview Marxism, Marx would characterise ‘his “materi-
alist method” as a critique of existent social relations, not from the standpoint 
of some abstractly conceived materiality of labour, but from within their own 
conceptuality’ (36). 
1.2.12. Abstract and Concrete Categories in Critical Theory
Such a critique certainly is important in respect to orthodox forms of Marx-
ism that celebrate toil and wage-labour under socialist conditions and imitate 
Protestant labour ethics. Bonefeld leaves open the question whether there are 
any categories in Marx that are not just specific for capitalism, but also for other 
types of society or society in general. One gets the impression that Bonefeld 
tends to see any such assumption as automatically reified thought that denies 
the sociality of the critique of the political economy’s categories. Bonefeld 
(2014, 4) argues that especially the so-called ‘new reading of Marx’ approach 
that goes back to the works of Hans-Georg Backhaus and Helmut Reichelt, 
‘renounced the classical argument about trans-historically valid economic laws 
of development and in its stead, conceptualized the economic appearance of 
society as the necessary manifestation of definite social relations’.
Marx’s (1857/1858, 471–479) thoughts on the ‘Forms which precede capital-
ist production’ in the Grundrisse show that surplus-labour, alienation and the 
appropriation of the surplus product are also features of pre-capitalist socie-
ties. Value is in contrast specific for capitalism: ‘The aim of this work is not 
the creation of value – although they may do surplus labour in order to obtain 
alien, i.e. surplus products in exchange – rather, its aim is sustenance of the 
individual proprietor and of his family, as well as of the total community’ (Marx 
1857/1858, 471–472). Some categories in Marx’s works are characteristic for all 
class-based societies.
Marx also uses categories such as the Gattungswesen (species-being), by 
which he characterises features of all societies. This does not mean that he 
thereby assumes the existence of natural laws in society that take place outside 
of human’s social relations and are transhistorical. Fundamental social features 
of society are those social relations that humans have to enter, in order for the 
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human being and social systems to exist. They do not exist outside of history, 
but are concrete, recurrent social relations in and through which history is 
made. Such necessary social relations include for example social production, 
communication, social relations of production, reproduction, a certain degree 
of co-operation, consumption, the social use of means of production, etc. It is 
in contrast a reification of capitalism to assume that value, abstract labour, capi-
tal, money, exchange, the commodity, the division of labour or class are funda-
mental social features of society. Communication is necessary for all societies. 
One cannot not communicate in a social situation. Even if you do not say any-
thing in a specific situation, then your silence also communicates something to 
others. Social relations are organised in and through communication. In class-
based societies, communication takes on specific forms and has a necessary 
organising role of social relations that are class relations. In capitalism, com-
munication in class relations is then oriented on the capital-labour relation.
The notion of the human as the social species-being is not something that 
is limited to Marx’s early writings, but can also be found in his later works. In 
the Grundrisse, Marx (1857/1858, 496) for example argues: ‘But human beings 
become individuals only through the process of history. He appears originally 
as a species-being’. In Capital, Marx continues his early idea that co-operation 
is a human species activity, but makes clear that it is not a static metaphysical 
category, but that the human species-being capacities (such as co-operation) 
develop historically and take in specific forms under particular societal cir-
cumstances: ‘When the worker co-operates in a planned way with others, he 
strips off the fetters of his individuality, and develops the capabilities of his 
species’ (Marx 1867, 447). Marx’s theory certainly does not contain trans-his-
torical reified categories that describe phenomena assert themselves as natural 
laws in society, but there is a range of general social categories that do not exist 
outside, but in and through history. 
For Marx, all categories of analysis are social categories. There are, how-
ever, some categories that describe phenomena that are necessary for society 
in general. And there are others that describe phenomena that are necessary 
for particular societal formations. Marx’s critique of the political economy of 
capitalism is by being a critical theory of capitalism at the same time a critical 
theory of class-based society and a critical theory of society. A critical theory of 
society needs to distinguish between the levels of society, class-based societies, 
capitalist society, contemporary capitalist society, and the dialectical mediation 
of these levels. Such a theory needs to take into account the dialectical of the 
universal, the particular and the individual at the level of its categories.
An example is the category of co-operation: Humans in all societies need to 
co-operate to a certain degree in order for society to exist. In class-based socie-
ties, co-operation takes on the form of a division of labour. In capitalism, co-
operation takes on the form of a division of labour that is highly technified so 
that machine systems emerge, in which workers become appendages of capital 
and technology. Co-operation has a universal, a particular and an individual 
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dimension. It exists in society, in class-based societies and capitalist society and 
takes on a particular form in a specific societal formation. 
Already Marx elaborated upon the dialectical relationship of general and 
specific categories as a fundamental epistemological principle of critical theory. 
This principle is most systematically expressed in the Grundrisse’s introduction.
1.2.13. Marx’s Introduction to the Grundrisse: The Method of 
Ascending from the Abstract to the Concrete
In the introduction to the Grundrisse, Marx (1857/1858, 101) characterises his 
own method as ‘rising from the abstract to the concrete’. One would have to 
analyse e.g. different levels of organisation of society, such as a) the popula-
tion, b) classes, c) wage labour and capital (Marx 1857/1858, 100). Traditional 
theory would simply start with abstract categories and then move analytically 
towards ever more concrete ones (100). Marx sees such a method as limited 
and argues that critical theory starts with concrete categories that contain the 
abstract ones in them, and then develops along with a concrete critical theory 
the more abstract categories. 
The concrete is concrete because it is the concentration of many deter-
minations, hence unity of the diverse. It appears in the process of 
thinking, therefore, as a process of concentration, as a result, not as a 
point of departure, even though it is the point of departure in reality 
and hence also the point of departure for observation [Anschauung] 
and conception (101). 
Marx mentions as example that the analysis of exchange-value presupposes the 
existence of classes and of a population: 
For example, the simplest economic category, say e.g. exchange value, 
presupposes population, moreover a population producing in specific 
relations; as well as a certain kind of family, or commune, or state, etc. 
It can never exist other than as an abstract, one-sided relation within an 
already given, concrete, living whole (101). 
Marx’s epistemological method of advancing from the abstract to the concrete 
allows us to understand that capitalism contains within itself sublations of all 
previously existing societal formations. It therefore becomes possible to analyse 
older societies and society in general when we conduct an analysis of capitalism. 
Bourgeois society is the most developed and the most complex historic 
organization of production. The categories which express its relations, 
the comprehension of its structure, thereby also allows insights into the 
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structure and the relations of production of all the vanished social for-
mations out of whose ruins and elements it built itself up, whose partly 
still unconquered remnants are carried along within it, whose mere 
nuances have developed explicit significance within it, etc. Human 
anatomy contains a key to the anatomy of the ape. The intimations of 
higher development among the subordinate animal species, however, 
can be understood only after the higher development is already known. 
The bourgeois economy thus supplies the key to the ancient, etc. (105).
1.3. The Frankfurt School 
1.3.1. Three Generations of the Frankfurt School
The Frankfurt Institute for Social Research at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe-
University Frankfurt was founded in 1923. Its first directors1 were Carl Grün-
berg (1923–1930), Max Horkheimer (1930–1953), and Theodor W. Adorno 
(1959–1969). After Adorno’s death, a committee of directors, including Ger-
hard Brandt, Rudolf Gunzert, Ludwig von Friedeburg, Wilhelm Schumm and 
Helmut Dubiel, led the Institute. Von Friedeburg was its director in the years 
1997–2001. Axel Honneth has held the directorship since 2001. The Institute 
has been a space for the development of critical theories of society.
Rolf Wiggershaus (1995, 1) differentiates in his book The Frankfurt School: Its 
History, Theories and Political Significance between the Frankfurt School’s first 
and second generation. He wants to ‘distinguish the older Frankfurt School 
from what has developed from it since the 1970s’. Martin Jay (1996, xv, 356–
364) in his book The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School 
and the Institute of Social Research 1923–1950 discerns between the Frankfurt 
School’s first generation (e.g. Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse, Friedrich Pollock, 
Erich Fromm, Walter Benjamin, Leo Löwenthal, Franz Neumann, Otto Kirch-
heimer), second generation (e.g. Jürgen Habermas, Alfred Schmidt, Albre-
cht Wellmer), and third generation (e.g. Axel Honneth, Oskar Negt, Helmut 
Dubiel, Claus Offe, Hauke Brunkhorst, Detlev Claussen). Also a fourth genera-
tion of thinkers in the tradition of the Frankfurt School has emerged. They tend 
to have a background in critical humanities or critical social sciences. It for 
example includes works by the social philosopher Rahel Jaeggi, the sociologists 
Hartmut Rosa and Thomas Lemke, etc. 
1.3.2. Georg Lukács and the Frankfurt School
This book applies specific thoughts from selected key thinkers from three gener-
ations of the Frankfurt School to the realms of communication as well as digital 
and social media. Lukács, Adorno and Marcuse represent the Frankfurt School’s 
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first generation, Habermas the second one, and Honneth the third one. Lukács 
is a foundational thinker of the Frankfurt School and of cultural Marxism in 
general. His notion of reification that is grounded in Marx’s concept of fetishism 
influenced Horkheimer and Adorno’s distinction between instrumental and crit-
ical reason (Horkheimer 1947, Horkheimer and Adorno 2002), Horkheimer’s 
(2002) differentiation between traditional and critical theory, and Marcuse’s 
(1941b, 1964) concept of technological rationality. It is therefore a logical step to 
start this book with a chapter dedicated to Lukács’ thought (chapter 2). Adorno 
and Marcuse, to whom chapters 3 and 4 are dedicated, built their thought, among 
others, on Lukács. I focus on Honneth, a representative of the third generation, 
in chapter 5, and then on Habermas, a representative of the second generation, 
in chapter 6. I have chosen this sequence because Honneth, more than Haber-
mas, grounds his thoughts in Lukács, which is more closely related to Adorno 
and Marcuse, and because Habermas is the key Frankfurt School thinker who 
thought about communication. For focusing on a critical theory of communica-
tion, he is therefore the central point of engagement. Dedicating the final and 
concluding chapter to Habermas with the aim of elaborating some foundations 
and prolegomena to a dialectical-critical theory of communication allows me to 
conclude with a focus on the most foundational questions.
There are other important thinkers that stand in the Frankfurt School tra-
dition or are close to it, such as Walter Benjamin, Friedrich Pollock, Erich 
Fromm, Leo Löwenthal, Franz Neumann, Siegfried Kracauer, Alfred Schmidt, 
Claus Offe, and Oskar Negt. A book only has limited space, however. So 
the exclusion of these and other authors does not imply that their work is 
unimportant in the age of the Internet. Updates of these and other critical 
approaches in cultural Marxism in the context of digital media are much 
needed today. The book series Critical Digital & Social Media Studies is a space 
for such engagements. 
David Held (1980, 22–23) in his study of Critical Theory (Introduction to 
Critical Theory: Horkheimer to Habermas) stresses the important influence of 
Lukács’ thought on this School’s thinkers: 
[C]ritial theorists retained many of Lukács’s concerns: the interplay 
between history and theory, the importance of theory as a “promotive 
factor in the development of the masses”, the relation of production 
and culture, the effects of reification and the way each aspect of society 
contains within itself “the possibility of unravelling the social whole or 
totality”. […] the impetus Lukács gave to the interrogation of orthodox 
Marxism and to the reworking of Marx’s ideas was built upon by each 
of the critical theorists. 
Martin Jay (1996, 175) argues that the Frankfurt theorists and Lukács ‘spoke to 
similar questions from within a common tradition’.
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1.3.3. Lukács’ Ontology of Social Being
Lukács’ Ontology of Social Being is an extensive book comprising of 1,460 
pages in total, separated into two volumes in the German edition. Some 
chapters of the Ontology have been translated into English and published 
in three parts in a total of 436 pages, which shows that large parts have 
remained thus far untranslated. We do not know why exactly there has thus 
far not been an interest to translate the whole book into English and why the 
excerpts that have been published in English as three short volumes have 
hardly been read, cited and discussed. History and Class Consciousness is 
extremely dominant in Lukács’ reception. In March 2016, History and Class 
Consciousness had around 5,400 citations on Google Scholar, the Ontology’s 
English excerpts’ first volume eight citations, the second four, and the third 
volume five. The German version of History and Class Consciousness had 
1,372 citations, whereas the complete German version of the Ontology pub-
lished in Lukács’ Collected Works only had four.2
My point is that also Lukács’ final work has key relevance for Marxist cultural 
theory. One can say that the Ontology is Lukács’ ultimate critical social theory. 
In it, he, in contrast to most of his previous works, also reflects on the rela-
tionship of the economy and culture, the relationship of labour and ideology, 
and the relationship work and communication. In the Ontology, Lukács intro-
duces the concept of teleological positing for describing human activity and 
for arguing that the economy and culture are identical and non-identical at the 
same time. In the aforementioned essays, Adorno conceives Hegel’s dialectical 
thought as the dialectic of identity and non-identity. Applying this idea to the 
relationship of the economy and culture allows him to therefore also stress that 
these two realms are at the same time identical and non-identical. These and 
other works come quite close to Raymond Williams’ understanding of dialecti-
cal Cultural Materialism. It is therefore time to no longer think about Williams 
and the Frankfurt School in terms of non-equivalence, but rather as a dialectic 
of identity and non-identity that recognises different backgrounds and context, 
but also stresses their commonalities. 
1.3.4. Negative Critique?
I want to pre-empt the criticism that this book is just a form of negative critique 
that is not constructive, does not analyse social movements, does not make 
suggestions how to change things, is therefore pessimist, etc. Critical theory 
critically interprets the world and has the potential to clarify what is wrong in it 
and why. We all have to politically change the world. Theory is an intervention 
into politics, but is not an autonomous political world in itself. Critical theory 
has first and foremost to be a negative dialectical theory in order to be critical. 
The demand that one has to be constructive, optimistic and looking for social 
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change tends to limit critique and to draw attention away from what is wrong 
with the totality. Too much research that sympathises with and studies progres-
sive societal change, i.e. research on progressive social movements, is a celebra-
tion of the radical and novel potentials of political groups, how they use various 
media in protest and mobilisation communication, etc. What is often forgotten 
is how difficult activism often and necessarily is in the global capitalist world 
because it automatically has to act from a position of resource inequality, where 
those in power control much more economic, political and cultural resources 
than civil society. 
Positivist social theory and research that stresses that critique has to be con-
structive, has to have a vision for a future society, foregrounds positive visions, 
etc., harbours the promise and threat of a deterministic concept of history that 
sees history as an unfolding of reason. In contrast, critical theory: 
is entirely negative, that is, what is “negative” in revolution/critique 
does not harbour in it the notion of a teleological or progressivist “posi-
tive resolution”. […] History does not lead anywhere, has no telos, no 
objectives, no purpose and it does not take sides. […] There is no reality 
beyond the existent social relations (Bonefeld 2014, 221, 223, 225).
1.3.5. Habermas and the Critical Theory of Communication
One cannot talk about communication theory without talking about Habermas. 
One can also not talk about critical theory without talking about Habermas. 
When bringing up the notion of a critical theory of communication, most read-
ers will inevitably first and foremost think of Habermas. Habermas’ profound 
engagement with social theory, political theory and communication theory 
was one of the most influential theories of the twentieth century in the social 
sciences and humanities. Updating critical theory and communication theory 
therefore requires a substantial engagement with Habermas’ works. There are 
many virtues of Habermas, not least that he is a true public intellectual who has 
intervened in everyday political debates. 
Habermas is not just known for the Theory of Communicative Action, but also 
for his earlier work, Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. Both works 
have become key readings in media and communication studies. In a sense, 
Habermas’ later work retains the notion of the public sphere, but connects it 
to the notion of communication, which has resulted in the concept of the life-
world. In media and communication studies, both Habermas and Raymond 
Williams are key thinkers – Habermas in respect to the concept of communi-
cation, Williams in respect to the notion of culture. There has, however, been 
hardly any direct connection between the two authors’ works. 
But the critical theory of communication does not end with Habermas. Today, 
we need to go beyond Habermas in an open manner. Habermas has not theorised 
26 Critical Theory of  Communication
digital communication, i.e. communication via computer networks such as the 
Internet, social media platforms, mobile media, etc. This is not to say that the rise 
of the computer and the Internet has changed everything and that we have entered 
a new society. Rather, we live in a capitalist society that has been significantly 
transformed in order to stay the same system of exploitation and domination. The 
Internet, social and mobile media can certainly not be ignored. Critical theory 
must be updated to the realities of the twenty-first century. New communications 
technologies are one of many realities that today need to be critically theorised 
(see Fuchs 2008, 2011, 2014a, 2014b, 2015a, 2016). The Internet’s power structures 
are not profoundly different from those of traditional mass media, yet it has new 
potentials and limits that interact with structures of accumulation in the economy, 
the political system and the cultural system. 
1.4. Linking the Frankfurt School and other Critical Theories: 
Lev Vygotsky, Valentin Vološinov, Ferruccio Rossi-Landi, 
and Raymond Williams
One must also see the limits of Habermas’ theory. This book advances the argu-
ment that Habermas’ theory of communicative action is a dualist theory that 
separates the system from the lifeworld and thereby also work from communi-
cation. It in contrast argues for taking a dialectical cultural materialist position 
in order to elaborate some foundations of a dialectical critical theory of com-
munication. In order to establish such foundations, I draw on two theoreti-
cal sources. On the one hand, I engage with Frankfurt School thinkers, who 
are often thought of as not having much to say on communication, but whose 
thought reveals interesting undercurrents that can be productively used and 
further developed in a dialectical critical theory of communication – Georg 
Lukács (especially his final book The Ontology of Social Being), Theodor W. 
Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, and Axel Honneth. On the other hand, I also draw 
on other critical social theories that standing in the Marxist tradition have con-
tributed to critically theorizing culture, signification, information and com-
munication: Lev Vygotsky’s activity theory, Valentin Vološinov’s Marxist phi-
losophy of language, Ferruccio Rossi-Landi’s Marxist semiotics, and Raymond 
Williams Cultural Materialism.
None of these approaches has elaborated a systematic dialectical critical the-
ory of communication, but we can build on certain elements of these thinkers 
and set them in a dialogue with Frankfurt School thinkers for grounding a 
dialectical cultural materialist position that allows us to think critically and 
dialectically about communication. I will do so by, on the one hand, theorising 
reification, knowledge, the relationship of the economy and culture, the rela-
tionship of work and communication, the relationship of labour and ideology 
in more general terms at the levels of society and capitalism, and by, on the 
other hand, applying these more general foundations to the concrete case of 
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digital and social media in order to critically understand phenomena such as 
digital labour, online alienation, and social media ideologies. 
Not every reader will be familiar with all of the thinkers just mentioned: Lev 
Vygotsky’s, Valentin Vološinov, Ferruccio Rossi-Landi, and Raymond Williams. 
Lev Vygotsky (1896–1934)3 was a Marxist psychologist from Belarus. He 
developed a theory of activity, whose basic point is that human cognition and 
language are grounded in human activity. Valentin Vološinov4 (1895–1936) was 
a Russian linguist. He was interested in establishing foundations of the Marxist 
philosophy of language. Foundations of this approach have been formulated 
in his book Marxism and the Philosophy of Language. Ferruccio Rossi-Landi5 
(1921–1985) was an Italian Marxist semiotician. His main theoretical insight is 
that language and communication are not just semiotic production processes, 
but specific forms of work. Raymond Williams6 (1921–1988) was a Welsh liter-
ary critic, cultural and communication theorist, and novelist. He developed the 
approach of Cultural Materialism and worked not just on British literature, but 
also on topics such as communications, television, everyday culture, the sociol-
ogy of culture, political theory, ecology, language, etc. 
Vygotsky, Vološinov, Rossi-Landi and Williams share with the Frankfurt 
School not just the interest in critical dialectical thought, but also the applica-
tion of the dialectic for critically understanding how the economy and culture 
are related. Discussing the relations between all of these approaches is therefore 
an interesting task for open cultural Marxism. It should also be stressed that the 
list of relevant thinkers is incomplete and that, in the spirit of an open Marx-
ism the thoughts and writings of other Marxist thinkers should also be used in 
cultural Marxism today.
1.4.1. Raymond Williams and the Frankfurt School
Raymond Williams (1983) commented on Georg Lukács’ works, especially his 
later ideas on aesthetics. Williams describes these works as having ‘some remark-
able resemblances to a familiar nineteenth-century idealism of art’ because of 
linking of works of art to ‘general human liberation’ (273). He also describes his 
own approach of Cultural Materialism as ‘a diametrically opposite answer to 
the questions which Lukács and other Marxists have posed’ (273). In his book 
Marxism and Literature, Williams (1977, 102) comments that Lukács’ theory of 
art faces the ‘danger of reducing this theory to art as the typification (representa-
tion, illustration) not of the dynamic process but of its (“known”) laws’. 
Williams (1977, 98–99) also argues that, for the Frankfurt School, being and 
consciousness are mediated. ‘The Frankfurt School, with its special emphasis 
on art, undertook a sustained re-examination of “artistic production”, centred 
on the concept of “mediation”’ (Williams 1977, 53). It would see mediation as 
‘a positive process in social reality, rather than a process added to it by way of 
projection, disguise, or interpretation’. 
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It is no surprise that Williams engages in more detail with Lukács than with 
the other thinkers discussed in this book because Williams and Lukács were 
both not just general critical theorists, but also literary critics, for whom aes-
thetics was very important. Williams’ reading of literature is indeed consider-
ably different from Lukács often socialist-realist position. But for example also 
Adorno strongly disagreed with Lukács’ theory of art, as I discuss in detail in 
section 3.3 (chapter 3) of this book. Lukács’ oeuvre is quite heterogeneous and 
therefore involves manifold, often contradictory strands of theory. His concept 
of reification had a positive influence on all Frankfurt School thinkers. There-
fore Lukács’ (1923/1971) History and Class Consciousness is often seen as one of 
the Frankfurt School’s intellectual starting points. It is ‘the founding text of the 
entire tradition of Western Hegelian Marxism’ (Žižek 2000, 152)
In Marxism and Literature, Williams discusses various concepts that Marx-
ist theories have used for conceptualising the relationship of the economy and 
culture: determination, reflection, reproduction, mediation, and homology. He 
argues that these concepts all assume a relationship between the economy and 
culture that to a varying degree is shaped by causal determination or mutual 
causality. But all of them would share the assumption of ‘the separation of “cul-
ture” from material social life’ (Williams 1977, 19) that Williams (1977, 59) 
considers to be ‘idealist’. In Williams’ view, the problem of these approaches is 
not that they are too economistic and materialist, but quite on the contrary that 
they are not ‘materialist enough’ (Williams 1977, 92). For Williams, culture is 
not a superstructure independent from an economic base, but rather culture 
understood as ‘language, ideas, values, beliefs, stories, discourses and so on’ is 
for him ‘itself material’ (McGuigan and Moran 2014, 176). 
Williams (1977) criticises the ‘idealist separation of “ideas” and “material 
reality”’ (59). The reflex against ‘idealist dualism’ would often be a ‘mechanical 
materialism’ that ‘leads directly to simple reductionism: “consciousness” and 
“its” products can be nothing but “reflections” of what has already occurred 
in the material social process’ (61). But consciousness and its products would 
always be ‘parts of the material social process itself ’(61). 
The basic insight of Williams’ Cultural Materialism is that the economy and 
culture are identical and non-identical at the same time (Fuchs 2015a, chapters 2 
and 3). Culture is part of the economy and at the same time goes beyond it. There 
is an economy that produces culture, but neither can we reduce the economy to 
culture nor culture to the economy. Williams’ approach is a dialectical Cultural 
Materialism.
Williams considered the Frankfurt School’s focus on mediation as too dualist 
and not dialectical and not materialist enough. But his knowledge of the Frank-
furt School’s works was certainly limited and for certain reasons had to remain 
limited. I argue in this book that there are certain works in the Frankfurt School 
tradition that, just like Williams, take a dialectical cultural materialist position 
on the question of how the economy and culture as well as work and commu-
nication are related to each other. I focus in this respect especially on Georg 
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Lukács’ (1986a, 1986b) final book The Ontology of Social Being, Adorno’s (1963) 
book Hegel: Three Studies, and Adorno’s essay On Subject and Object (Adorno 
1998, 245–258). 
Williams (1969) reviewed Marcuse’s (1988/1968) book Negations. He finds 
Marcuse’s approach of trying to combine Freud and Marx confused and 
argues that these two approaches do not go together. But Williams found 
particular interest in Marcuse’s essay ‘The Affirmative Character of Culture’. 
He argues that this essay is very close to his own materialist understand-
ing of culture because it questions ‘the separation of ideal and material life’ 
(Williams 1969, 165). Marcuse would show how this separation turns into an 
ideology he terms the affirmative culture. Williams’ interest in Marcuse is an 
indication that there are certain parallels between Williams and the Frank-
furt School’s understandings of culture. Drawing on both of these traditions 
therefore promises to be a fruitful approach for a critical theory of commu-
nication and culture. 
Williams was also aware of Horkheimer and Adorno’s work. In Marxism 
and Literature, Williams (1977, 98) stresses that Adorno is a representative of 
a position in Marxist theory that sees mediation as the key concept for relat-
ing the economy and culture. Williams commented that the notion of media-
tion other than the one of reflection ‘indicates an active process’, but ‘perpetu-
ates a basic dualism’ (99). So his criticism was that it is not dialectical enough. 
1.4.2. Habermas: Theory of Communicative Action
Habermas’ theory is one of the most influential communication theories 
of the twentieth century. For example, the Encyclopedia of Communication 
Theory lists the publication of the Theory of Communicative Action as a mile-
stone in a chronology of the field and says that it has had ‘huge impact’ and 
‘greatly influences critical communication theory’ (Littlejohn and Foss 2009, 
lxv). Jürgen Habermas built his approach on the classical Frankfurt School 
and at the same time worked out the concept of communicative rationality, 
by which he went beyond the classical tradition. Habermas (1984, 285–286) 
distinguishes between instrumental (non-social, success-oriented), strate-
gic (social, success-oriented) and communicative action (social, oriented 
on understanding). Habermas (1987, 333) argues that ‘Horkheimer and 
Adorno failed to recognize the communicative rationality of the lifeworld’. 
For Habermas (1987, 375), critical theory questions the fact that steering 
media (money, power) attack ‘the communicative infrastructure of largely 
rationalized lifeworlds’. Habermas (1971, 53) conceives instrumental action 
and communicative action as the two fundamental aspects of social praxis. 
What Habermas wants to express is that the human being is both a labouring 
and a communicating being: ‘the reproduction of life is determined culturally 
by work and interaction’ (Habermas 1971, 196). Dallas Smythe expressed the 
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same idea as foundation of a Marxist theory of media and communication: 
‘there will be no general Marxist theory of communication until Marxism 
comes to comprehend man as a message system- and symbol-using animal as 
well as a working animal’ (Smythe 1994, 258). 
For Habermas, emancipatory interest ‘aims at the pursuit of reflection’ 
(Habermas 1971, 198), it enables ‘liberation from dogmatic dependence’ 
(Habermas 1971, 271). In those passages, where Habermas tries to define what 
critical theory is all about (Habermas 1987, 375; Habermas 1971, 198, 271), his 
formulations remain abstract and vague. He mainly points out the emancipa-
tory role of communication and that the goal is undistorted communication. 
He thereby falls short of the concreteness of Lukács’, Horkheimer’s, Adorno’s 
and Marcuse’s notions of critical theory. These thinkers left no doubt that such 
a theory is all about questioning all structures of domination and exploitation. 
In a way, Habermas retains the classical Marxist distinction between base and 
superstructure, but inverts it by putting the stress on communication. Doubts 
arise if work can be so strictly separated from communication in a dualistic 
way. The twentieth and twenty-first century have seen a rising importance of 
communicative and cultural work in the economy. But if such activity takes on 
value-generating form, then culture and communication must be part of the 
economy themselves, base and superstructure become integrated, labour and 
communication cannot be separated.
Communication is one of the crucial foundations of the economy: the latter 
is not just a system of the production of use-values and in class-based socie-
ties of exchange values. It is also a social system because production in any 
society takes on complex forms beyond individual self-sustenance. The only 
way for organising the relational dimension of the economy is via communica-
tion, in the form of symbolic interaction and/or anonymous forms of indirect 
communication (as for example via money, markets, the price system, etc.). 
Human thought is a precondition for human communication and existence. 
When humans produce in the economy, they do so with a purpose in mind, 
which means that they anticipate the form of the object and how it will be put 
to use. The economic existence of man requires anticipative thinking just like it 
requires communication. It is in these two specific senses – the importance of 
communication and thought – that the economy is always and fundamentally 
cultural. Capitalism’s history has also been a history of the commodification of 
culture and communication, especially since the twentieth century. This is not 
to say that culture and communication necessarily take on the form of a com-
modity, but that in capitalism they frequently do so in the form of content com-
modities, audience commodities and cultural labour power as commodity. In 
this sense culture has been economised, or, to be more precise commoditised, 
i.e. put under the influence of the commodity logic. 
Communication is certainly an important aspect of a domination-less soci-
ety. Communication is, however, in capitalism also a form of interaction, in 
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which ideology is with the help of the mass media made available to the domi-
nated groups. Communication is not automatically progressive. For Habermas, 
the differentiation is between instrumental/strategic reason and communica-
tive reason, whereas for Horkheimer the distinction is between instrumental 
reason and critical reason (Horkheimer 1947) and based on it between tradi-
tional and critical theory (Horkheimer 2002). 
Habermas splits off communication from instrumentality and thereby 
neglects that in capitalism communication just like technology, the media, ide-
ology or labour is an instrument that is used by the dominant system to defend 
its rule. Communication is not pure and left untouched by structures of domi-
nation, it is antagonistically entangled into them. For Horkheimer (based on 
Marx), critical theory’s goal is man’s ‘emancipation from slavery’ (Horkheimer 
2002, 249) and ‘the happiness of all individuals’ (248). Horkheimer has the 
emancipation of communication just like the emancipation of work, decision-
making and everyday life, in mind. His notion of critical rationality is larger 
than Habermas’ notion of communicative rationality that risks becoming 
soaked up by non-critical approaches that use Habermas’ stress on communi-
cation for instrumental purposes. The concept of communication can be criti-
cal, but is not necessarily critical, whereas the concept of a critique of domina-
tion is necessarily critical.
1.5. The Frankfurt School and Martin Heidegger’s Philosophy7
Martin Heidegger has influenced some critical theorists, such as Herbert 
Marcuse, Günther Anders, Hannah Arendt, Jean-Paul Sartre, Jacques Der-
rida, Giorgio Agamben, Bernhard Stiegler, or Maurice Merleau-Ponty. 
Because he was not just a philosopher, but also a philosopher of technology, 
he has influenced studies of media and culture and continues to today influ-
ence the study of digital media, including critical studies. At the same time, 
many critical scholars, including Adorno, Marcuse, Anders and Habermas, 
have always been very sceptical of Heidegger because of his membership in 
the Nazi party. 
The publication of Heidegger’s philosophical notebooks, the Black Notebooks, 
as the final volumes in the collected Heidegger works, has since 2014 resulted 
in heavy debates about anti-Semitism and Heidegger. As a result, for example 
the President of the Heidegger Society Günter Figal stepped down. Explaining 
this move, he argued that he was shocked and that the revelations meant the 
end of Heideggerianism.8 Given that Heidegger remains influential in critical 
theories of digital media, I want to discuss why I think his approach is highly 
problematic and that Heidegger scholarship can after the Black Notebooks not 
simply continue as it did before. 
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1.5.1. Heidegger and Digital Media
In his book Critical Theory and the Digital, David M. Berry (2014) provides 
thoughts on how to use critical theory. I find this project feasible and can relate 
to it to the extent that Berry uses Frankfurt School concepts such as instru-
mental reason and the dialectic of the enlightenment in order to criticise what 
he terms computational ideology, authoritarian-computational epistemology, 
and computationality. New communication technologies have often come 
along with enthusiastic optimistic ideologies or cultural pessimistic ideologies, 
in which these tools are presented either as solving humanities’ problems and 
bringing about a much better society or as causing the decline of culture and 
society. Ideology critique of digital technologies is therefore a much-needed 
important endeavour. My own approach, however, diverges from Berry in 
respect to the fact the he is ‘drawing on the work of the later Heidegger, to 
create new concepts for thinking the digital, indeed, contributing to a critical 
theory for the digital’ (Berry 2014, 19).
I do not have the space here to detail the full argument of why I think Hei-
degger and a critical theory of technology and communication are incompat-
ible, and therefore have to refer the reader to two essays that I have written on 
this topic (Fuchs 2015b, 2015c). I can here only point out some aspects of this 
complex topic in a necessarily brief manner. I recommend to those who are 
further interested in Heidegger, anti-Semitism and the philosophy of technol-
ogy, to read my two articles in full and to also engage with related works that I 
reference there. 
1.5.2. Heidegger’s Black Notebooks
In the Black Notebooks, Heidegger (2014a, 2014b, 2014c, 2015) argues that Jews 
have a calculating, instrumental form of reason. Two examples: 
Jewry’s temporary increase in power is, however, grounded in the fact 
that Western metaphysics, especially in its modern development, fur-
nishes the starting point for the diffusion of a generally empty rational-
ity and calculative ability, which in this way provides a refuge in “spirit”, 
without being able grasp the hidden decision regions on their own9 
(Heidegger 2014c, 46 [XII, 67–68]). 
The Jews “live” by their marked talent for calculation second only to 
the principle of race, which is why they are resisting its consistent appli-
cation with utmost violence10 (Heidegger 2014c, 56 [XII, 82–83]).
Heidegger sees Jews as a powerful group, which plays with the myth of a Jewish 
world conspiracy. Furthermore, he argues that this group has a specific quality, 
namely a calculative rationality that is grounded in Western metaphysics. He 
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does not argue that this is a biological characteristic, but a socio-natural one, 
i.e. he constructs ‘the Jews’ as a homogenous collective, attributes to them and 
blames them for qualities of capitalism. The identification of Jews with instru-
mental rationality has a double feature: instrumental rationality, on the one 
hand, is an expression of the drive to accumulate capital and power, and on the 
other hand, the operating principle of modern technology. Heidegger blames 
Jews for both the logic of capitalism and industrialism.
Heidegger in the Black Notebooks employs six of the seven elements of anti-
Semitism that Adorno (2002) identified: he sees Jews and Germans as forming 
two races (I), identifies Jews with modernity, capitalism, and modern technol-
ogy (II, III), makes use of mystical and naturalistic logic by arguing that Jews 
are uprooted and threaten the Germans’ rootedness (V), and describes Jews 
as a powerful ‘world Jewry’ that rules the world (VI) as well as a homogenous 
collective to which he ascribes negative biological, social, and political charac-
teristics (VII). The only feature of anti-Semitism that is not present is the reli-
gious element (IV), which can be explained by the circumstance that Christian 
religion does not play a role in Nazi ideology.
1.5.3. Heidegger’s Philosophy
Heidegger (1927) already in Sein und Zeit advanced a conservative critique 
that sees modern technology as such as a problem. The problem is formulated 
abstractly as das Man (the they), but its causes and context remain unclear in 
the phenomenology that Heidegger formulated in Sein und Zeit. It is for Hei-
degger certainly not the capitalist use and design of and bureaucratic shaping 
of technology that form this context because class, the state, and capitalism 
are categories that are absent from his analysis. Heidegger does not argue for a 
redesign of modern technology and modern society, but for their abolishment. 
Heidegger’s most important works on technology are the two essays The Ques-
tion Concerning Technology and The Turning that go back to a series of lectures 
that he gave in the years 1949, 1950, and 1955 in Bremen and Munich. They 
were published together as the book Die Technik und die Kehre (Heidegger 
1962) in German and The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays 
(Heidegger 1977) in English. In this work, Heidegger characterises modern 
technology as ‘Ge-stell’ (the Enframing).
The power of capitalism and the modern state, or what Habermas (1984, 
1987) terms the systems of modern society that colonise the lifeworld, are absent 
both in Being and Time and The Question Concerning Technology. This circum-
stance is idiosyncratic, given that modern society is based on the accumulation 
of capital and bureaucratic power, two structures that frame the development 
and use of modern technology. So a major problem of Heidegger’s approach 
is that it is not a political economy, but merely a phenomenology of technol-
ogy. He describes attributes of modern technology, such as instrumental logic, 
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calculation, physics, the exact sciences, mathematics, in both books, but leaves 
open the question what the structural context of modern technology is. Hei-
degger’s phenomenology in both books does not give an answer to the question 
what the causes of the problems he ascertains are. But he makes clear that the 
problem is not technology itself: ‘What is dangerous is not technology. There is 
no demonry of technology’ (Heidegger 1977, 28). The danger would rather be 
the Ge-stell (Heidegger 1977, 28). The Ge-stell is however not an explanation 
in-itself, but an attribute of modern society. Heidegger neglects the analysis of 
capital and state power, two main features of modern society. So the two books 
leave open the question of the contexts of modernity’s problems.
The Black Notebooks are a work, in which Heidegger provided an answer to 
the question of the structural contexts of modernity and modern technology. 
He says that the logic of calculability is Jewish. Heidegger identifies instrumen-
tal reason with Jews. So for him the cause and context of modernity and mod-
ern technology’s problems – the rise of world-lessness and alienation – is seen 
in Jews.
There is a logical link between the Black Notebooks, Being and Time, and 
The Question Concerning Technology. The first provide the missing link and 
grounding for the second and the third. The Black Notebooks help explaining 
a theoretical void in the other two books. Das Man (the they) and das Ge-stell 
(the enframing) have in the Black Notebooks a grounding for Heidegger, 
namely what he and others term ‘world Jewry’, i.e. the myth of a Jewish world 
conspiracy.
1.5.4. Heidegger and the Critical Theory of Society, the Media 
and Technology
The Frankfurt School’s works form a critique of instrumental reason, a critique 
of capitalism’s reduction of humans to instruments whose labour serves capital 
accumulation, a critique of domination questioning the instrumentalisation of 
humans for fostering the rule and power of the few, and a critique of ideology 
questioning the instrumentalisation of human thinking. The Frankfurt School 
critique of instrumental reason is however fundamentally different from Hei-
degger’s analysis. Whereas Critical Theory’s context is political economy, Hei-
degger’s phenomenology is short-circuited and therefore prone to turn into an 
instrumental ideology itself. If one wants to ground a critique of modern technol-
ogy and media, then approaches that are much better grounded in the analysis 
of society and political economy than Heidegger’s phenomenology are available. 
Heidegger and the critical theory of society, the media and technology are 
irreconcilable. Such a theory can in contrast in a feasible manner be grounded 
in Karl Marx’s dialectic of technology, Georg Lukács’ notion of reification, Max 
Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno’s concept of instrumental reason, and 
Herbert Marcuse’s category of technological rationality. 
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1.5.5. Heidegger and Lukács
On Being and Time’s concluding page, Heidegger (2010, 414) says: 
We have long known that ancient ontology deals with ‘reified concepts’ 
and that the danger exists of “reifying consciousness”. But what does 
reifying mean? Where does it arise from? Why is being “initially” con-
ceived’ in terms of what is objectively present [Vorhanden], and not in 
terms of things at hand [Zuhanden] that do, after all, lie still nearer to us? 
Why does this reification come to dominate again and again?11 
Lucien Goldmann (1913–1970) was a French Marxist philosopher. He argues in 
respect to this passage in his book Lukács and Heidegger (Goldmann 1977, chap-
ter 1) that Heidegger refers to Lukács without naming him. He says that Lukács 
and Heidegger both criticise positivist thought and knowledge that is based on 
the separation of object and subject (Goldmann 1977, 29–31). Heidegger’s con-
cept of Vorhandenheit would parallel Lukács’ notion of reification, Heidegger’s 
concept of Zuhandenheit would parallel Lukács’ category of praxis (35–39). 
Lukács in contrast to Heidegger sees reification as a consequence of class-
based society and capitalism, whereas Heidegger’s Vorhandenheit is a much 
more abstract category, devoid of class relations, capitalism, and commodity 
fetishism. Goldmann hints at this fundamental difference: He says that whereas 
Lukács speaks of praxis in relation to ‘social classes’ (8), for Heidegger ‘histori-
cal action is the privilege of élitists to the exclusion of the masses’ so that ‘only 
a certain number of élite individuals are creators of history’ (9). ‘Contrary to 
Lukács who, starting from commodity fetishism and the collective subject, suc-
ceeds in explaining the genesis of the given world as a spectacle, Heidegger 
does not go beyond a phenomenological description of the world of evil and of 
inauthenticity, and has not succeeded in explaining its historical source’ (45). 
For Goldmann, Heidegger and Lukács are not irreconcilable, which in my view 
is a mistaken conclusion.
In contrast to Heidegger, Lukács (1923/1971) leaves no doubt about the 
source and context of reification in modern society, arguing that it is ‘growing 
out of the fetish character of commodities’ (84). ‘Reification is, then, the neces-
sary, immediate reality of every person living in capitalist society’ (197). Marx’s 
chapter dealing with the fetish character of the commodity [Capital 
Volume 1, chapter 1, section 4; see Fuchs 2016, chapter 1.4, pp. 41–47] 
contains within itself the whole of historical materialism and the whole 
self-knowledge of the proletariat seen as the knowledge of capitalist 
society (and of the societies that preceded it) (170). 
We today know that the Black Notebooks’ anti-Semitism is the ideology that fills 
the void that Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit creates in respect to the question of how 
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reification is grounded. Heidegger thought that Jewry is the cause of reification. 
Given Heidegger’s philosophy, it is difficult to see parallels between Lukács and 
him. Goldmann’s (1977, 17) mistaken characterisation also leads him to under-
estimate Heidegger when he writes that for Heidegger, ‘anti-Semitism could 
only be regarded as a profound and regrettable error, the biological having no 
place in ontology and being totally unable to limit or further the Being-there’s 
possibilities of choosing between the authentic and the inauthentic’. 
1.5.6. Adorno, Habermas and Marcuse about Heidegger
Herbert Marcuse was in the 1920s influenced by Heidegger, but turned away 
from him when his Nazi sympathies became evident. Frankfurt School authors 
such as Marcuse, Adorno and Habermas were extremely critical of Heidegger 
and certainly share the assessment that a critical theory of society is not pos-
sible with, but only against Heidegger. 
Theodor W. Adorno argues that Nazi ideology is immanent in Sein und Zeit, 
which was published in 1927 (Heidegger 1927). Adorno writes in his analysis 
that Heidegger’s ‘metaphysics of death’ cultivates ‘the heroic possibilities of death’ 
and is ‘a propaganda for death’ (Adorno 1965/2001, 131; see also Löwith 1946). 
Heidegger’s combination of philosophy and poetry is for Adorno (1960/1961) 
‘provincial kitsch’ (229) that uses ‘archaic language’ (230). For Adorno, Hei-
degger’s fetishism of the origin is a form of mysticism (Adorno 1960/1961, 
32–34). The ‘cult of origin and renewal’ would ‘not by accident and not exter-
nally have sympathy with the barbarism that took shape in his [Heidegger’s] 
political history’ so that foundations of ‘National-Socialist ideology’ would be 
contained in Sein und Zeit (241) [translation from German]. ‘Heidegger’s agree-
ment with fascism and the ideology of the conservative revolution, the more 
elegant version of fascist ideology, was not a lack of character of the philoso-
pher, but lay in the content of his doctrine’ (287).
In a lecture from 1935 that after its re-publication in 1953 resulted in pub-
lic debates, Heidegger (2000, 213) spoke in the context of National Socialism 
of the ‘inner truth and greatness of this movement (namely the encounter 
between global technology and modern man)’. Jürgen Habermas (1953, 197) 
drew the German public’s attention to his discovery that Heidegger in 1953 
‘publishes his words, in the meantime eighteen years old, about the greatness 
and inner truth of National Socialism’ and that it was therefore ‘time to think 
with Heidegger against Heidegger’.
1.5.7. Heidegger and Marcuse
Herbert Marcuse in 1928 moved from Berlin to the University of Freiburg in 
order to start a habilitation project under Heidegger’s supervision. Marcuse’s 
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thought was in the mid- to late-1920s deeply influenced by Heidegger’s (1927) 
Sein und Zeit. This also becomes evident in Marcuse’s first published essays, 
such as Contributions to a Phenomenology of Historical Materialism (Marcuse 
2005, 1–33). Marcuse tried to combine Marx and Heidegger. This influence 
also becomes evident in Macuse’s habilitation thesis Hegel’s Ontology and the 
Theory of Historicity, which he prefaces with the words: ‘What this work con-
tributes to the unfurling and clarification of problems, it owes to the philosophy 
of Martin Heidegger’ (Marcuse 1932a, 8). Because of his Jewish background, 
Marcuse could never defend his habilitation thesis. With the rise of Nazism, 
he had to flee Germany and spent the rest of his life in the USA. In 1941, he 
 published his first English book, which was a second monograph about Hegel: 
Reason and Revolution. Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory. In this book (1941a), 
Marcuse does not mention Heidegger at all. By the 1930s he had completely 
turned against Heidegger’s philosophy. 
Marcuse described his relationship to Heidegger’s philosophy in an interview:
I read Sein und Zeit when it came out in 1927 and after having read 
it I decided to go back to Freiburg (where I had received my PhD in 
1922) in order to work with Heidegger. I stayed in Freiburg and worked 
with Heidegger until December 1932, when I left Germany a few days 
before Hitler’s ascent to power, and that ended the personal relationship. 
I saw Heidegger again after the war, I think in 1946–47, in the Black For-
est where he has his little house. We had a talk, which was not exactly very 
friendly and very positive, there was an exchange of letters, and since that 
time there has not been any communication between us. […] We saw 
in Heidegger what we had first seen in Husserl, a new beginning, the 
first radical attempt to put philosophy on really concrete foundations— 
philosophy concerned with human existence, the human condition, and 
not with merely abstract ideas and principles. That certainly I shared with 
a relatively large number of my generation, and needless to say, the disap-
pointment with this philosophy eventually came—I think it began in the 
early thirties. But we re-examined Heidegger thoroughly only after his 
association with Nazism had become known. […] But I soon realized 
that Heidegger’s concreteness was to a great extent a phony, a false con-
creteness, and that in fact his philosophy was just as abstract and just as 
removed from reality, even avoiding reality, as the philosophies which at 
that time had dominated German universities, namely a rather dry brand 
of neo-Kantianism, neo-Hegelianism, neo-Idealism, but also positivism 
(Marcuse 2005, 165–166).
Marcuse realised that in order to ground a concrete, praxis-relevant Marxist 
philosophy, it is not necessary to rely on non-Marxist philosophy. He found 
the philosophical work he was looking for in Marx’s Economic and Philosophic 
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Manuscripts of 1844 that were first published in 1932. Marcuse published in 
1932 an enthusiastic review of the book (New Sources on the Foundation of 
Historical Materialism, Marcuse 1932b), in which he argued that these manu-
scripts’ publication ‘must become a crucial event in the history of Marxist stud-
ies’ (Marcuse 1932b, 86). 
The significance of Marcuse’s rejection of Heidegger’s philosophy also becomes 
evident in a review of ‘German Philosophy, 1871–1933’ that he wrote in 1934. In a 
section about Heidegger’s work, he characterises this philosopher’s work as racist: 
Heidegger’s philosophy is weeded to the idea of an authentic existence that 
is realized through a firm willingness to die for one’s own possibilities. It is 
here that Heidegger’s existential analytic is transformed into a politics of 
heroic, racist realism. […] The characteristics of authentic existence – the 
resoluteness toward death, the decision, the risking of life and the accept-
ance of destiny – are severed from all relations to the real misery and the 
real happiness of mankind and from all relations to the reasonable ends of 
humanity. In this abstract form, these characteristics become the funda-
mental categories of the racist worldview (Marcuse 2005, 160–161).
Marx’s early philosophical writings remained a major influence on Marcuse’s 
works, whereas he did not further engage with Heidegger’s theory after Hitler’s 
rise to power. 
In August 1947, Marcuse wrote a letter to Heidegger, in which he said: 
You never publicly denounced any of the actions or ideologies of the 
regime. Because of these circumstances you are still today identified 
with the Nazi regime […] But we cannot make the separation between 
Heidegger the philosopher and Heidegger the man, for it contradicts 
your own philosophy. […] Is this really the way you would like to be 
remembered in the history of ideas? (Marcuse 1998, 263–264).
In a response to Herbert Marcuse, Heidegger wrote in January 1948 that Mar-
cuse’s letter ‘shows me precisely how difficult it is to converse with persons 
who have not been living in Germany since 1933 and who judge the beginning 
of the National Socialist movement from its end’ (Wolin 1993, 162) and that 
there was not just a ‘regime that murdered millions of Jews’, but also one that 
murdered millions of ‘East Germans’ (Wolin 1993, 163). Marcuse, who com-
ing from a Jewish family and being a Marxist had to flee from Nazi Germany, 
answered in May 1948 that Heidegger tried ‘to relativize […] a crime by saying 
that others would have done the same thing. Even further: how is it possible 
to equate the torture, the maiming, and the annihilations of millions of men 
with the forcible relocation of population groups who suffered none of these 
outrages’ (Wolin 1993, 164).
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1.5.8. Whoever Is Not Willing to Talk about Heidegger’s Relation to 
Nazi Fascism and Anti-Semitism, Should Also Keep Quiet About 
Heidegger in Respect to Capitalism and Critical Theory 
When Max Horkheimer (1939/1989, 78) wrote in his essay The Jews and Europe 
that ‘whoever is not willing to talk about capitalism should also keep quiet about 
fascism’ (78), he expressed that there is an inherent connection of the logics of 
capitalism and fascism: ‘Fascism solidifies the extreme class differences which 
the law of surplus value ultimately produced’ (Horkheimer 1939/1989, 78). It 
is disturbing that many of those who are impressed by Heidegger’s philosophy 
and try to use it in critical theory try to talk with Heidegger about capitalism, 
but keep quiet about Heidegger’s relationship to anti-Semitism and Nazi fascism. 
Whoever is not willing to discuss Heidegger’s relation to Nazi fascism and anti-
Semitism shouldn’t discuss Heidegger in respect to capitalism and critical theory. 
1.6. The Chapters in this Book
This book consists of five essays that contribute to grounding foundations of 
a dialectical critical theory of communication that takes a cultural materialist 
approach (see also Fuchs 2015a for a discussion of Cultural Materialism). Each 
chapter is focused on specific works of one critical theorist and their applica-
tion: Georg Lukács (chapter 2), Theodor W. Adorno (chapter 3), Herbert Mar-
cuse (chapter 4), Axel Honneth (chapter 5), and Jürgen Habermas (chapter 6). 
I will give a brief outline of these essays. 
1.6.1. Chapter 2: Georg Lukács as a Communications Scholar: Cultural 
and Digital Labour in the Context of Lukács’ Ontology of Social Being
The task of this chapter is to apply thoughts from Georg Lukács’ final book, the 
Ontology of Social Being, to the theoretical analysis of cultural and digital labour. 
It discusses Lukács’ concepts of work and communication and relates them to 
the analysis of cultural and digital work. It also analyses his conception of the 
relation of labour and ideology and points out how we can make use of it for 
critically understanding social media ideologies. Lukács opposes the dualist sep-
aration of the realms of work and ideas. He introduces in this context the notion 
of teleological positing that allows us to better understand cultural and digital 
labour as well as associated ideologies, such as the engaging/connecting/sharing-
ideology, today. The analysis shows that Lukács’ Ontology is in the age of Face-
book, YouTube, and Twitter still a very relevant book, although it has thus far not 
received the attention that it deserves. This chapter also introduces the Ontology’s 
main ideas on work and culture, which is important because large parts of the 
book have not been translated from the German original into English.
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1.6.2. Chapter 3: Theodor W. Adorno and the Critical Theory 
of Knowledge
This chapter explores which insights of Adorno’s philosophy can be used for 
grounding a critical theory of knowledge? Adorno’s contribution to a critical 
theory of knowledge is analysed by revisiting the assumption that he is a media 
pessimist, reconsidering the debate about aesthetics between Lukács and Adorno 
and generalising its conclusions from art to the theory of knowledge, and by 
discussing and further developing Adorno’s dialectical concept of knowledge. 
Adorno’s theory of knowledge is not, as often claimed in media and cultural 
studies, a form of media and cultural pessimism that sees humans as passive, 
manipulated by ideologies, and incapable of resisting a society without alterna-
tives. He saw alternative and critical potentials of the media. A critical theory of 
knowledge can be grounded in dialectics of identity and non-identity and the 
subject and the object. Adorno made important contributions to the founda-
tions of such a theory. His works not just foreground the power of ideologies, 
but also stress the importance that one can learn from Hegel’s anti-positivist, 
dialectical language and thought how to criticise, deconstruct, and struggle 
against ideologies. Adorno’s works give us hope that instrumental knowledge 
that expresses partial interests is not the final world and can be changed by cri-
tique, which is the very process of the dialectic and dialectical knowledge.
1.6.3. Chapter 4: Herbert Marcuse and Social Media
This chapter reflects on the relevance of Herbert Marcuse’s philosophy of tech-
nology in the age social media. Although Marcuse did not experience the rise 
of the Internet, the World Wide Web and ‘social media’ as major means of 
communication, his insights about technological rationality, technology and 
the role of technology in the context of labour allow us to today reflect on the 
relevance of Marcuse’s philosophy of technology for a critical theory of digital 
and social media. 
The chapter first gives an overview of how Marcuse thought about computer 
technology. It then engages with Marcuse’s interpretation of Hegelian dialectics 
for analysing social media’s dialectics. It also uses Marcuse’s works for criti-
cally theorising digital labour on social media and social media ideologies. The 
chapter engages with Marcuse’s understanding of the dialectical logic of essence 
in order to provide some foundations of social media ethics.
1.6.4. Chapter 5: The Internet, Social Media and Axel Honneth’s 
Interpretation of Georg Lukács’ Theory of Reification and Alienation
This chapter poses the question, what are the potentials of the concept of alien-
ation/reification for a critical theory of society today? Based on the example of 
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Facebook, it then asks, how can we understand alienation in the realm of the 
media? Axel Honneth has reformulated Georg Lukács’ theory of reification and 
alienation in a critical theory of recognition. The advantage of this theory is 
that it is based on the distinction of three subdomains of society, reformulates 
Hegel’s dialectic of essence and existence in moral theory and thereby tran-
scends postmodern moral relativism, stresses the importance of sociality as 
moral essence, and distinguishes between alienation’s subjective, intersubjec-
tive and objective dimensions. It however downplays the importance of the 
economy and co-production in society. 
Building on and departing from Lukács and Honneth, this chapter first for-
mulates some principles of a moral theory that is grounded in the notion of 
co-operation as co-production that allows to identify nine dimensions of alien-
ation: economic, political, cultural, subjective, intersubjective and objective 
alienation. The example of Facebook shows that alienation has not ceased to 
exist in the world of digital media, but has become more complex. The exploi-
tation of digital labour, the surveillance-industrial complex, and centralised 
online visibility constitute additional forms of digital alienation.
1.6.5. Chapter 6: Beyond Habermas: Rethinking Critical Theories 
of Communication
This chapter asks, what is the relationship of labour and communication? This 
question is one about how the economy and culture are causally connected 
in society in general and contemporary society in particular. The chapter dis-
cusses several critical theories of communication and provides a classification 
of approaches. It engages especially with the approaches of Alfred Sohn-Rethel, 
Jean Baudrillard, Jürgen Habermas, Lev Vygotsky, Valentin Vološinov, Ferruc-
cio Rossi-Landi, and Raymond Williams.
It applies a reading of these theorists to foundations of a dialectical criti-
cal theory of communication. Such a theory is dialectical in a manifold sense. 
It theorises the dialectics of work/communication, body/mind, individuality/
sociality, internalisation/externalisation, subject/object, practices/technology, 
communication/media, agency/structures, communication/communications, 
instrumental communication/co-operative communication that are funda-
mental determinants of communication.
Notes
 1 See: Geschichte des Instituts für Sozialforschung, http://www.ifs.uni-frankfurt.
de/institut/geschichte/, accessed on 6 January 2016.
 2 Google Scholar, accessed on 19 March 2016. 
 3 See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lev_Vygotsky
 4 See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Valentin_Voloshinov
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 5 See: http://www.ferrucciorossilandi.com
 6 See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Raymond_Williams
 7 This section is based on parts of the following two articles. The passages 
are reproduced with kind permission of the journal tripleC: Communica-
tion, Capitalism & Critique: Fuchs, Christian. 2015. ‘Martin Heidegger’s 
Anti-Semitism: Philosophy of Technology and the Media in the Light of 
the “Black Notebooks” ’. Implications for the Reception of Heidegger in 
Media and Communication Studies’. tripleC: Communication, Capital-
ism & Critique 13 (1): 55–78; Fuchs, Christian. 2015. ‘Anti-Semitism, 
Anti-Marxism, and Technophobia: The Fourth Volume of Martin Hei-
degger’s Black Notebooks (1942–1948)’. tripleC: Communication, Capi-
talism & Critique 13 (1): 93–100.
 8 ‘Das Ende des Heideggerianterums’. Badische Zeitung Online, 23 January 
2015. 
 9 Translation from German: ‘Die zeitweilige Machtsteigerung des Judentums 
aber hat darin ihren Grund, daß die Metaphysik des Abendlandes, zumal in 
ihrer neuzeitlichen Entfaltung, die Ansatzstelle bot für das Sichbreitmachen 
einer sonst leeren Rationalität und Rechenfähigkeit, die sich auf solchem 
Wege eine Unterkunft im, Geist‘ verschaffte, ohne die verborgenen Entsc-
heidungsbezirke von sich aus je fassen zu können’.
 10 Translation from German: “Die Juden, leben” bei ihrer betont rechner-
ischen Begabung am längsten schon nach dem Rasseprinzip, weshalb sie 
sich auch am heftigsten gegen die uneingeschränkte Anwendung zur 
Wehr setzen’.
 11 German original: ‘Allein was bedeutet Verdinglichung? Woraus entspringt 
sie? Warum wird das Sein gerade‚ zunächst’ aus dem Vorhandenen‚ beg-
riffen’ und nicht aus dem Zuhandenen, das doch noch näher liegt? Warum 
kommt diese Verdinglichung immer wieder zur Herrschaft? Wie ist das 
Sein des‚ Bewußtseins’ positiv strukturiert, so daß Verdinglichung ihm 
unangemessen bleibt? Genügt überhaupt der “Unterschied” von “Bewußt-
sein” und “Ding” für eine ursprüngliche Aufrollung der ontologischen 
Problematik?’ (Heidegger 1927, 576).
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CHAPTER 2
Georg Lukács as a Communications 
Scholar: Cultural and Digital Labour 
in the Context of Lukács’ Ontology 
of Social Being
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2.1. Introduction
The task of this chapter is to apply thoughts from Georg Lukács’ final book, the 
Ontology of Social Being, for the analysis of cultural and digital labour. Section 2 
discusses Lukács’ concept of work and communication and relates them to the 
analysis of cultural and digital work. Section 3 focuses on his analysis of labour 
and ideology and points out how we can make use of it for the critical under-
standing of social media ideologies. Section 4 draws some conclusions. This 
chapter also introduces the Ontology’s main ideas on work and culture, which 
is important because large parts of the book have not been translated from the 
German original into English. 
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2.1.1. History and Class Consciousness
Georg Lukács was one of the twentieth century’s most well known Marxist phi-
losophers. His book History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dia-
lectics (Lukács 1923/1971) is among the most influential studies of the prole-
tariat and reified consciousness. History and Class Consciousness focuses on the 
analysis of class-consciousness, ideology, and reification. Labour is a strongly 
subordinated and rather neglected topic in the book. Language and commu-
nication play no role at all in it. In a preface written for the new 1967 edition, 
Lukács (1923/1971, xvii) acknowledges the neglect of labour in the book: ‘It is 
true that the attempt is made to explain all ideological phenomena by reference 
to their basis in economics but, despite this, the purview of economics is nar-
rowed down because its basic Marxist category, labour as the mediator of the 
metabolic interaction between society and nature, is missing’.
Lukács had an ambivalent position towards his own book. In the 1967 
preface, he characterised History and Class Consciousness as ‘ethical idealism’ 
(1923/1971, x), ‘revolutionary messianism’ (xiv). He writes that it did not begin 
‘its analysis of economic phenomena […] with a consideration of work’ (xx) 
and that it ‘equates alienation with objectification’ (xxiv). One should, how-
ever, see that these comments do not refute the importance of ideology cri-
tique and the understanding of ideology as reified thought in class-based socie-
ties. Rather, Lukács expresses the need that ideology critique is part of a larger 
critical theory of society that he did not elaborate in the 1920s. The project of 
establishing such a theory was undertaken in his last book, in the Ontology of 
Social Being. It is a theory of production in society, including the production of 
use-value and value, physical and cultural commodities as well as the produc-
tion of ideologies. One could say that the Ontology is a broader framework that 
encompasses History and Class Consciousness. 
Lukács died in 1971. Shortly before his death in 1971, some of his students 
conducted interviews with him that together with a New Left Review inter-
view from 1971 was published as his autobiography (Lukács 1983). In it, Lukács 
(1983, 77) repeats his criticism of History and Class Consciousness, but also says 
that it ‘is even today better and more intelligent than many of the things that 
bourgeois writers scrawl about Marx’ (77). He also says that in the Ontology, 
the ‘concept of labour is the hinge of my analysis’ (173) and stresses the impor-
tance of ontology in Marxist philosophy. 
2.1.2. Adorno, Lukács and Ontological Philosophy
The Ontology of Social Being was as entire book first published in German in the 
year 1986. Excerpts from it were published in English in 1978 (Lukács 1978a, 
1978b, 1978c). Adorno died in 1969 and Horkheimer in 1973. They therefore 
had no opportunity to read and comment on Lukács’ final book. One can, 
Georg Lukács as a Communications Scholar 49
however, certainly say that Lukács’ approach formulated in this book encom-
passes ideology critique in the tradition of the Frankfurt School. In 1960/1961, 
Adorno gave lectures on the overall topic of Ontology and Dialectics (Ontolo-
gie und Dialektik) at the University of Frankfurt. These lectures have posthu-
mously been published in German (Adorno 1960/1961). 
Adorno in these lectures undertakes a profound critique of Heidegger’s phi-
losophy. He argues that Heidegger is the main representative of an ontological 
philosophy. Adorno in these lectures opposes dialectical philosophy to ontol-
ogy (114) and when he speaks of ontology he means Heidegger’s philoso-
phy. Adorno criticises that for Heidegger, being dominates the subject. As a 
consequence, this ‘extreme objectivism that more or less neutralises the sub-
ject’ (200) results in an archaic (239) and mythological (246) philosophy that 
has ‘sympathy with barbarism’ (240). Heidegger’s philosophy is for Adorno 
undialectical. He argues that being ‘becomes for Heidegger an undialecti-
cal essence’ (315). Adorno says that dialectical philosophy that stresses non-
identity is not an alternative ontology, but the latter’s anti-pole (325). But he 
also stresses that there is not a strict choice between ontology or dialectical 
philosophy (10) and that dialectical philosophy is the ‘critical self-reflection 
of ontology’ (12–13) and the ‘dialectic is in itself mediated through ontology’ 
(13). In Negative Dialectics, Adorno (2004) formulates the same critique of 
Heidegger’s ontology. He argues that ‘dialectics is the ontology of the wrong 
state of things’ (Adorno 2004, 11). 
Given that ontology is a theory of being, Adorno’s concern is that formulat-
ing an ontology automatically posits being as static and is prone to justifying 
the bad reality that exists today. So his concern is that ontology neglects reality’s 
dynamic and historical character. In a dialectical ontology, any being is how-
ever always tied to its negative other that contradicts it, by which the founda-
tions of change are automatically given. The One is always related to the Other, 
Being to Nothingness, and the unity of both constitutes becoming. So there can 
be no being without becoming. Being is only because it becomes. Becoming 
is being in dialectical motion. Adorno hints at this relation of ontology and 
dialectic, but unlike Lukács does not speak of a dialectical ontology. Adorno 
was interested in a dialectical critical theory of society. Lukács called such a 
theory in his final work a ‘dialectical ontology of social being’. We do not know 
if Adorno would have agreed on such a title, but Lukács and Adorno certainly 
both share the interest in how to combine the critical theory of society and 
dialectical philosophy. 
2.1.3. Lukács Scholarship: The Unfortunate Neglect of the 
Ontology of Social Being
The Ontology of Social Being is in contrast to History and Class Consciousness a 
critical theory of society and capitalism and is therefore much more concerned 
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with the relationship between work and culture, as well as that between labour 
and ideology. It also gives attention to communication and language, which 
makes it particularly interesting for reflections from a media and communi-
cations perspective. In the reception of Lukács’ works, there has been a very 
strong focus on History and Class Consciousness, overlooking that he also wrote 
other important works, such as the Ontology of Social Being. This also becomes 
evident in more recent publications on Lukács.
Andrew Feenberg (2014, viii) argues in his book The Philosophy of Praxis: 
Marx, Lukács and the Frankfurt School that History and Class Consciousness is 
the ‘pivotal text of [the] philosophy of praxis’. He therefore focuses the entire 
book on this work and its relevance and does not mention the Ontology once. 
The book Georg Lukács: The Fundamental Dissonance of Existence (Bewes and 
Hall 2011) is a collection of 13 essays. They contain just one reference to the 
Ontology and 127 to History and Class Consciousness. The collected volume 
Georg Lukács Reconsidered (Thompson 2011) consists of 13 essays. They in total 
make 13 references to the Ontology and contain hundreds of references to and 
quotes from History and Class Consciousness. Chris Nineham’s (2010) Capital-
ism and Class Consciousness: The Ideas of Georg Lukács focuses on History and 
Class Consciousness and does not mention the Ontology. 
In the first volume of Theory of Communicative Action, Jürgen Habermas 
(1984) devotes chapter IV to the topic ‘From Lukács to Adorno: Rationaliza-
tion as Reification.’ He shows the influence that Lukács had on the Frankfurt 
School and focuses his analysis on Lukács’ concept of reification in History and 
Class Consciousness. Habermas argues that Horkheimer and Adorno’s ‘critique 
of instrumental reason understands itself as a critique of reification that takes 
up Lukács’ reception of Weber without accepting the implications of his objec-
tivistic philosophy of history’ (Habermas 1984, 366). Habermas’ criticism of 
Horkheimer and Adorno is that they lack a theory of communicative rational-
ity that negates instrumental rationality. In formulating this critique however, 
because of his pure focus on History and Class Consciousness and his neglect 
of the Ontology of Social Being, Habermas does not realise that the importance 
of communication in society can be grounded in Lukács’ works itself, which 
may be a better way for a critical theory than using concepts of communication 
that stem from bourgeois approaches such as John L. Austin and John Sear-
le’s speech act theories and George Herbert Mead’s symbolic interactionism. 
Habermas (1984, 365) concludes that Lukács’ theory is a return to objective 
idealism. He, however, ignores in this context that in the Ontology Lukács was 
very much concerned with the relationship of culture and the economy. Haber-
mas’ judgement is based solely on a reading of History and Class Consciousness 
and the complete neglect of the Ontology. 
Ricardo Antunes (2013) compares Habermas’ theory of communicative 
action and Lukács’ Ontology. He concludes that Habermas ‘isolates the life-
world as a thing-in-itself, conferring upon it a non-existent separation from the 
systemic sphere’, whereas for Lukács there is an ‘unshakable interrelationship 
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between the sphere of the subject and the activity of work’ (Antunes 2014, 138). 
Antunes goes one step too far in his reading of the Ontology and completely 
leaves out the analysis of ideology and ideological labour, i.e. labour that pro-
duces ideology (see Fuchs 2015, chapter 3). Lukács however discusses, as I will 
show, this form of production as well as others in the Ontology, and thereby 
integrates History and Class Consciousness’ stress on ideology. 
One should not misinterpret my stress on Lukács’ Ontology. I do not want 
to say that History and Class Consciousness is unimportant, problematic and 
outdated and should not be read. To the contrary: in chapter 5 of this book, I 
show the contemporary relevance of Lukács’ History and Class Consciousness 
by engaging with how his concept of reification inspired Axel Honneth’s critical 
theory of recognition. We can use both approaches for a critical theory of rei-
fied/alienated media in the digital age. So my point is that one should not only 
read History and Class Consciousness, but also Lukács’ other works. His philoso-
phy is immensely rich and a thorough engagement with it is very rewarding. 
2.1.4. The Ontology of Social Being’s Context
The Ontology was written in the years 1964–1970 and was Lukács’ final work 
(Fehér, Heller, Markus and Vajda, 1976). In his study of the Ontology, Nicolas 
Tertulian argues that Lukács’ aim in this work was ‘to reconstruct ontology 
as the fundamental discipline of philosophical reflexion’ (Tertulian, 1988, 247) 
and to work out ‘a really universal theory of the categories of existence’ (249). It 
is an extensive book comprising of 1,460 pages in total, separated into two vol-
umes in the German edition. Some chapters of the Ontology have been trans-
lated into English and published in three parts on a total of 436 pages, which 
shows that large parts have remained thus far untranslated. The first part of the 
English edition focuses on Hegel (Lukács, 1978a), the second on Marx (Lukács, 
1978b), and the third on labour (Lukács, 1978c). The second German volume 
(Lukács, 1986b) contains a part called Das Ideelle und die Ideologie (The Realm 
of Ideas and Ideology) that consists of three parts: Das Ideelle in der Ökono-
mie (The Role of the Ideal in the Economy), Zur Ontologie des ideellen Moments 
(Toward an Ontology of the Ideal Moment), and Das Problem der Ideologie (The 
Problem of Ideology). It also contains a section on work that has been trans-
lated (Lukács, 1978c). Given that there is both a focus on work and ideas and 
on labour and ideology in one volume, it is clear that the Ontology promises 
insights into the relationship of the economy and culture. 
Lukács’ doctoral students Ferenc Fehér, Ágnes Heller, György Markus, and 
Mihály Vajda (1986) published their notes on the Ontology, in which they for-
mulated dissatisfaction with the work concerning concepts such as nature, 
objectification, reflection, value, freedom, and progress. They also note that it 
remained an unfinished work because Lukács, who only partly agreed with his 
students’ criticisms, died before he could carry out any planned revisions. But 
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overall, he was not convinced by his students’ criticisms. Rather ‘at the end of 
his life, Lukács was persuaded that it was in his Ontology that he had furnished 
the essential and definitive form of his thought’ (Tertulian, 1988, 248).
The analysis shows that the Ontology is largely ignored and has not been read 
and discussed a lot, both in the German-speaking world and internationally. 
The reasons for this cannot be ascertained and can only be left to speculation. 
Lukács left the book unfinished, but it is nonetheless extremely voluminous. It 
is certainly a book that is difficult to read. The popularity of History and Class 
Consciousness may also play a role in the lack of its reception. And the fact 
that only parts of the book have been translated into English certainly strongly 
limits its international presence. It is difficult to be recognised when one stands 
in the shadow of giants. My point is that the Ontology should be seen as having 
equal importance as History and Class Consciousness. 
For a cultural-materialist perspective on society, Lukács’ final book promises 
insights into the relationship of work on the one hand and communication and 
language on the other hand, as becomes evident when for example Titus Stahl 
(2013) in an encyclopaedia entry about Lukács writes about the Ontology: 
From these ontological commitments, it follows that the existence of the 
social totality depends on the intentionality which guides individual acts of 
labor and vice versa […] Lukács therefore describes social phenomena – as 
language and institutions – as modifications and ‘mediations’ of the rela-
tions of the labor process. That is, they are media of “indirect” teleological 
positing because they enable forms of action which do not directly modify 
nature, but which indirectly aspire to bring other persons to do so. 
Language and communication in the Ontology are explained as part of the dia-
lectics of society, in which work undergoes dialectical mediations. 
The principal aim of the ontological-genetical method developed by 
Lukács in his last work is to show how, in beginning from the elemen-
tary act of work, social life constitutes itself as a tissue of objectifications 
of greater and greater complexity, as interhuman relations better and 
better articulated, thanks precisely to the relation of dialectical tension 
between the teleological activity of individual subjects and the network 
of objective causal determinations (Tertulian 1988, 258).
2.2. Work and Communication
2.2.1. Work’s Ontology
Lukács starts the second German volume of the Ontology with a discussion 
of work’s ontology. He uses the German term Arbeit that has been translated 
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into English as ‘labour’. The term labour goes back to the Latin word laborem 
that means hard work, pain, and trouble (Fuchs, 2015, 23–24). The German 
word Arbeit derives from the Germanic term arba, which means slave (ibid.). 
The English word ‘work’ and the German term werken go back to the Indo-
European term uerg (doing, acting) (ibid.). They have the connotative mean-
ing of creating something that has artistic value. In contemporary language, 
the terms work and labour are often used interchangeably in English, and the 
German word Arbeit often stands for both work and labour. It is certainly not 
Lukács’ intention to assume that slavery and toil are features of all societies. In 
the discussion that follows, I therefore replace his usage of the term labour by 
‘work’ where he speaks of anthropological features of the economy in society. 
Lukács defines work as ‘a relationship of interchange between man (society) 
and nature, and moreover with inorganic nature (tools, raw materials, object of 
labour) as well as organic’ (1978c, iv) and ‘the positing of a goal and its means’ 
(22), ‘the metabolism between man (society) and nature’ that is an ‘“eternal” 
form that persists through the change in social formations’ (39). Work ‘involves 
a process between human activity and nature: its acts are directed towards the 
transformation of natural objects into use-values’ (47). It is the ‘intervention into 
concrete causal relations in order to bring about the realization of the goal’ (67).
2.2.2. Work as Teleological Positing
Work is a ‘teleological positing’ that results in ‘the rise of a new objectivity’ (3). 
Work is teleological because in it, a ‘conscious creator’ (human beings) pro-
duces with a purpose, orientation and goal (5). So the human teleology that 
Lukács considers as being characteristic for work, and therefore for society, is 
not opposed to causality and is not an external, esoteric force that drives society 
to a higher goal (such as Hegel’s Weltgeist or in pre-Socratic Greek philosophy 
Anaxagoras’ nous), but is immanent in society itself, namely in human practice 
and consciousness.
Lukács’ (1978c) examples are predominantly taken from agriculture and hunt-
ing. When describing concrete work processes, he speaks for instance of the selec-
tion of ‘one stone out of a heap of stones’ as tool (31), of hunting (47), or the human 
use of fire (Lukács 1986b, 34). In a materialist philosophy, there is nothing outside 
of matter and therefore nothing outside of nature. Humans and society are how-
ever different from non-human beings in that they can make conscious choices 
between alternatives and anticipate the potential effects of their behaviour, which 
enables morality. Work not only takes physical objects found in nature as its input, 
but also physical and non-physical objects created by humans. The tools of work 
are not just physical tools, but can also be information-processing technologies 
such as the computer. The products of work processes are not just physical goods, 
but also information, non-physical services and social relations. With the devel-
opment of scientific and technological progress, human work therefore has the 
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tendency to distance itself from its close grounding in natural objects. One may 
therefore say that work is not just a process between humans and nature, but one 
between humans, nature and culture, in which humans create, with the help of 
technologies, physical, social, and informational use-values out of natural, indus-
trial, and cultural objects. 
Lukács (1978c) was aware of this circumstance and therefore argued: ‘In the 
later and more developed forms of social practice, the effect on other people 
comes more the fore, and ultimately – if only ultimately – this effect aims at 
the production of use-values’ (47). Work’s teleological positing has historically 
become more distanced from nature and has become ‘also designed to cause 
other men to carry out positings of this kind in their turn’ (128). This results in 
‘man’s own behaviour, his own subjectivity, becoming the object of a teleologi-
cal positing’ (128). 
The decisive variations arise by the object and medium of realization 
in the teleological positings becoming ever more social. This does not 
mean, as we know, that the natural basis disappears, simply that the 
exclusive orientation to nature that characterizes work as we originally 
presupposed it is replaced by intentions that are objectively mixed in 
character, and become ever more strongly social (129).
Lukács here argues that the social itself, such as relations, intentions, experi-
ences and knowledge, in the course of society’s development has become more 
part of the objects, tools and products of work so that work has partly been dis-
tanced from its original natural basis, which however does not mean that infor-
mation work substitutes, but rather complements agricultural, extractive and 
industrial work. Lukács distinguishes between two types of teleological posit-
ings: those that change nature and those that change the social (Lukács, 1986b, 
136). The latter of the two would become the more important, the more work 
and co-operation develop (ibid.). They are expressions of ‘mental work’1 (ibid.). 
2.2.3. Society as Complex of Complexes
Society is for Lukács a totality consisting of over-grasping moments, i.e. sys-
tems that reach over into each other. It is a ‘complex of complexes’ (Lukács, 
1986b, 155; see also 181) that help in reproducing society (182). Language is 
one of these complexes. It is a subjective organ and objective medium that 
enables social reproduction so that the human species can continuously pre-
serve itself by continuous change of subjective and objective moments (169). 
Language use and communication are for Lukács constitutive moments in 
the social reproduction of society. He does however, unlike Niklas Luhmann 
(1995), not assume that communication is a subject in itself that continuously 
produces further communications in an autopoietic manner, so that social sys-
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tems and society in a self-referential manner reproduce themselves (see Fuchs, 
2008, chapter 3). The problem with Luhmann’s approach is that he considers, in 
a functionalist manner, humans as outside observers of social systems, as sen-
sors in the environment of social systems (Luhmann, 1995, 410). For Lukács, 
communication as a form of social reproduction in contrast depends on active 
human, social, languaging beings inside the systems that they reproduce 
through interaction with nature and interaction between themselves.
2.2.4. Consciousness
Consciousness plays a crucial role in the ‘active and productive being of the 
positing of causal relationships’ (Lukács, 1978c, 31). That work is a conscious 
activity means that workers constantly make choices between behaviour alter-
natives, which results in a ‘chain of causality’ that in contrast to nature is not 
automatic, but consciously decided (33). The work process is ‘a chain of alterna-
tives’ (33). If a programmer, for example, codes a piece of software, s/he must 
consciously decide which algorithm is used next, how it is implemented, which 
syntax elements are used, etc. in order to achieve the goal that the programme 
should fulfil. Consciousness enables ‘human self-control’ (45), ‘self-realization’, 
‘self-founded being’, and ‘social being’ (46). 
Lukács (1986b, 478) argues that dualist concepts of consciousness and theories 
that draw a sharp distinction between the physical and the ideational, reflect in 
an ideological manner society’s division of labour that has, since the emergence 
of slavery, instituted this division in the economy itself. One should, however, not 
forget that a similar separation is also immanent in patriarchy that institutes a 
gendered division between physical and social labour and in gerontocracy, which 
is based on a generational division between labour and collective decision-mak-
ing. Lukács opposes dualist ontologies of society with his dialectical ontology. 
2.2.5. The Economy and Culture
For Lukács (1978c), work is the essential and foundational activity of humans 
and society. It is the ground of other phenomena such as language (v). Work is 
the ‘model for all social practice, all active social behaviour’ (46). Work ‘is the 
underlying and hence the simplest and most elementary form of those com-
plexes whose dynamic interaction is what constitutes the specificity of social 
practice’ (59). There is an ‘identity of identity and non-identity’ of work and 
other forms of human practice (59). 
Lukács considers teleological positing (the conscious and active production 
of changes by realising subjective intentions in the objective world) as a com-
mon feature of work and communication, i.e. the economy and culture. There 
is an ‘ontological similarity of base and superstructure as they are both based 
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on teleological positings and their causal effects’2 (Lukács, 1986b, 424). In the 
economy, where work creates goods, the intentional goals tend to be much 
more clearly defined, whereas in culture, where communication influences 
social behaviour, there is much more scope for what is considered desirable 
and undesirable, for ‘reactions to societal matters of fact, situations, tasks, etc.’3 
(Lukács 1986b, 417). Lukács says that in the economy, the value of a product 
depends on whether it is ‘immediately useful or non-useful, whereas in artistic 
creation the field and possibilities of value and non-value are extraordinarily 
widely stretched and hardly determinable in advance’ (535).4 
‘Teleological positing’ means that ideas are a guiding and goal-setting dimen-
sion of work so that culture is immanent in work itself. The human brain defines 
goals that are conditioned by economic and social needs and for realising them 
guides human activities. Culture however is not the same as the economy, but 
is a guiding feature of the economy that created by work goes beyond the econ-
omy and takes effect in the form of collective meanings all over society. Culture 
is simultaneously economic and non-economic. 
For Lukács, consciousness is not reality, but a form of objectivity that repro-
duces reality (1978c, 26). ‘Ontologically, social being divides into two hetero-
geneous moments, […] being and its reflection in consciousness’ (26). Human 
consciousness was ‘called into being in work, for work, and by work’ (52). There 
is no photographic copying of reality in consciousness, but reflection is ‘con-
ditioned by the posited goals’ and ‘the social reproduction of life, originally 
by work’ (27). Consciousness and work have at the same time a relationship 
of ‘linkage and autonomy’ (52). So consciousness alone is not behaviour and 
work, but a foundation of both. Consciousness has an important role in society 
because it ‘sets goals’, masters the human body, and allows a ‘distanced and 
critical’ relationship of the person to him-/herself and to others (109). ‘And the 
origin of this mastery lies undoubtedly in work’ (109). 
All work and action has an aspect of consciousness. Before engaging in work 
and action, humans reflect on what they want to achieve and how. Ideas and 
material changes of the world are therefore not independent, but inherently 
connected (Lukács, 1986b, 297). Lukács criticises that theorists such as Georgi 
Plekhanov, Karl Kautsky, Max Adler, and Stalin have separated the economy 
from the world of ideas in a dualist manner (298–299). He in this discussion 
points to the fact that human thought is not work itself, but one of its necessary 
preconditions and parts. Reflection precedes and enables both physical work 
that creates physical goods and mental work that creates informational use-
values in society. 
2.2.6. Cultural Work and Ideology
Lukács says that ideology is not the same as cultural work, but can emanate 
from it. In making this argument, he argues for a true dialectic of the culture 
Georg Lukács as a Communications Scholar 57
and economy: on the one hand, he sees all culture and ideology produced by 
work, i.e. there is an economic foundation of cultural work. Culture and ideol-
ogy also take on an emergent quality that goes beyond the economy so that the 
meanings cultural work produces take effect all over society. This explains why 
Lukács speaks of the identity and non-identity of work and culture. 
Mental work is, also as a moment of society’s division of labour, by no 
means identical to ideology. Their connection is therefore very deep: The 
result of any mental work can turn into ideology in certain social situa-
tions, society’s division of labour constantly creates situations in which 
such turns become necessary and permanent (Lukács 1986b, 427).5 
2.2.7. The Emergence of Language
Lukács argues that communication already exists in higher animals for the 
purposes of ‘danger, food, sexual desire, etc.’ (1978c, 100). Human language 
and communication would arise out of economic necessity when humans are 
required to say something to each other in order to master the rising complex-
ity of the organisation of production. So for example hunting requires co-oper-
ation because it is a complex process, for which co-ordination is necessary. ‘Its 
[co-operation’s] mere existence, albeit on a low level, results in the emergence 
of another key determination of social being from work, the precise commu-
nication of humans united in work: language’6 (Lukács, 1986b, 118). Language 
enables teleological positings that have the intention to ‘encourage other people 
to conduct a teleological positing that is desired by the predicating subject’7 
(Lukács, 1986b, 119). Language develops with the development of work, co-
operation, and the division of work (119). 
Communication is based on the fact that the human is an ‘answering being’8 
(Lukács, 1986b, 339). An answer, however, presupposes a question. Humans 
have the capacity to find answers posed by nature and to ask questions about 
nature, themselves, and society. We can therefore say in expanding Lukács’ 
thought that communication is based on a dialectic of questioning and answer-
ing, in which a question produces answers, which produces further questions, 
and so on. 
2.2.8. The Spatio-Temporality of Communication
Words that form a language are abstractions and generalisations of reality 
(Lukács, 1986b, 346, 419). The description of a specific circumstance is con-
crete and therefore requires a complex linguistic combination of words (1986b, 
346). Language enables the ‘distancing of the object from the subject’ (1978c, 
100) and enables this distancing. 
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In this way what is depicted by the verbal sign is separated from the 
objects it describes, and hence also from the subject uttering it, becom-
ing the mental expression for an entire group of particular phenomena, 
so that it can be applied in a similar way in completely different contexts 
and by completely different subjects (100). 
Human language allows the repetition and development of production pro-
cesses in the same or different spaces at different times. Lukács, at a high level 
of theoretical abstraction, hints at the facts that the development of produc-
tion technologies allows the spatio-temporal distancing of production, that 
the development of transport and distribution technologies enables the spatio-
temporal distancing of distribution, and that the development of conservation 
and preservation technologies fosters the distancing of consumption. ‘In its 
further development, work constantly interposes whole series of mediations 
between man and the immediate goal which he is ultimately concerned to 
achieve. In this way, work gives rise to a differentiation between immediate and 
more mediated goal positings’ (101–102). 
The spatio-temporal distancing of production requires physical and linguis-
tic technologies of production, distribution, and consumption. Communica-
tion is an important means of organising work and human activity in space-
time and over spatio-temporal distances. ‘The mental distancing of objects by 
language only makes the real distancing that thus arises communicable, mak-
ing possible its establishment as the common possession of a society’ (102). 
The storage of information enables the organisation of the economy and society 
over spatio-temporal distances and across generations. Society’s development 
is therefore connected to the development of information technologies that 
store and distribute information about human social relations. They include, 
for example, human memory, tradition, myths, art, writing, lists, timetables, 
the book, libraries, archives, schools, universities, newspapers, the telegraph, 
the telephone, the radio, the television, cinema, the database, computers, com-
puter-mediated communication, the Internet, records, tapes, CDs, DVDs, Blu-
ray discs, digital hard disks, servers, FTP, cloud storage, etc. (see Fuchs, 2003).
Language is a complex in society that mediates both the human metabolism 
with nature as well as the relations between humans in society (Lukács, 1986b, 
18). It helps distancing human subjects from objects and from other subjects 
and at the same time helps to co-ordinate the production of new objects out 
of existing objects and the emergence and reproduction of social relations 
between humans. 
2.2.9. Freedom Within Necessity
For Lukács, consciousness enables a form of freedom within necessity (Lukács 
1986b, 308), i.e. human choices between different actions based on conditions 
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that are not self-chosen. Conscious human action opens up the world to chance 
and makes it to a certain degree undetermined and shapeable by humans. To 
illustrate this circumstance, Lukács (1986b, 304) quotes in this context Marx 
(1867, 208–209): ‘No one can sell unless someone else purchases. But no one 
directly needs to purchase because he has just sold’. If someone who has money 
chooses to buy or to save, what exactly s/he buys in the case of a purchase, and 
from whom, is not determined, but rather depends on an interaction of complex 
conditions and choices, the ‘mutual dialectical polarity of the ideal and the real’9 
(Lukács, 1986b, 306). Market supply, local accessibility, wages and prices, class 
struggles, transport structures, etc. condition the possible choices that the poten-
tial purchaser makes based on his/her evaluation of these structures. The ideal 
moves the real, but it can only move ‘real possibilities of being-in-itself ’10 (343).
2.2.10. Cultural Work
Based on Lukács’ idea that mental work creates culture that is simultaneously 
economic and transcends the economy, we can design a dialectical model of 
cultural work (see figure 2.1, see also Fuchs 2015, chapter 2).
Using a stage model allows us to identify and relate different levels of cultural 
work (see figure 2.1). Cultural work is a term that encompasses organisational 
levels of work that are simultaneously distinct and dialectically connected: cul-
tural work has an emergent quality, namely information work that creates con-
tent and is based on and grounded in physical cultural work, which creates infor-
mation technologies through extractive and industrial work processes. Physical 
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work takes place inside and outside of culture: it creates information technolo-
gies and its components (cultural physical work) as well as other products (non-
cultural physical work) that do not primarily have symbolic functions in society 
(such as cars, toothbrushes or cups). Cars, toothbrushes, or cups do not primar-
ily have the role of informing others or enabling communication with others, 
but rather help humans achieve the tasks of transport, cleanliness, and nutrition. 
Culture and information work however feedback on these products and create 
symbolic meanings used in contemporary society by companies for marketing 
them. Cultural work is a unity of physical cultural work and information work 
that interact with each other, are connected and at the same time distinct.
All culture involves cultural work and effects of cultural products in society 
(meaning-making). The production and communication of meanings, social 
norms and morals are work processes: they create cultural use-values. Culture 
requires on the one hand human creativity for creating cultural content and 
on the other hand specific forms and media for storage and communication. 
The creation of information and communication through language is specific 
for work conducted in the cultural system: informational and communication 
work. For having social effects in society, humans with the help of information 
and communication technologies, such as computers, TV, radio, newspapers, 
books, recorded films, recorded music, language, etc., organise (i.e. store, pro-
cess, transport, analyse, transform, create) information and communication. 
Physical cultural work produces information technologies. Culture encom-
passes a) physical cultural work that creates cultural technologies (information 
and communication technologies) and b) information work that creates infor-
mation and communication.
Think of the example of a piano player. Playing the piano as a human activ-
ity is not possible without a piano and without composed music. The activity 
of playing the piano therefore presupposes the work of the composer and the 
piano maker. Culture is a manifold production process that involves the work 
of the piano maker, the composer and the player. In the capitalist culture indus-
try, the commodity form shapes all three forms of cultural production: a piano 
is a musical instrument sold as a commodity. Composers and musicians tend 
to be wage-labourers, who are employed by and exploited by large multimedia 
corporations, especially the ‘big three’ – Universal, Sony and Warner Music. 
And also audiences, who listen to music for example on YouTube or on com-
mercial radio, tend to become audience workers when cultural corporations 
sell audiences and users’ attention and usage behaviour data is sold as a com-
modity to advertising clients (see Fuchs 2014, chapters 4 and 11).
2.2.11. Digital Work
The term digital labour emerged for understanding value-creation on social 
media platforms such as Facebook, YouTube, Twitter and Weibo (see the 
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contributions in Scholz, 2013). It would however be idealistic to limit the 
notion of digital labour to the exploitation of users’ online activities by com-
mercial platforms that use targeted advertising or to the creation of digital 
content that is sold as a commodity. The creation of digital content requires a 
technological infrastructure that is produced and maintained by labour pro-
cesses (Fuchs, 2014, 2015). Digital labour is all paid and unpaid labour that 
helps creating digital technologies, content, and data that is sold as a com-
modity. It includes diverse activities such as slave-labour extracting minerals 
that form the physical foundation of information technologies, the labour 
of militarily controlled and highly exploited hardware assemblers who work 
under conditions of Taylorist industrialism, a highly paid knowledge labour 
aristocracy, precarious digital service workers as well as imperialistically 
exploited knowledge workers in developing countries, workers conducting 
the industrial recycling and management of e-waste, or highly hazardous 
informal physical e-waste labour (Fuchs, 2014, 2015). Such forms of digi-
tal labour form an international division of digital labour that creates the 
digital media industry’s profits (ibid.). Why is it important to have such a 
unified concept of digital labour? Nick Dyer-Witheford (2014, 175) provides 
an answer: ‘To name the global worker is to make a map; and a map is also 
a weapon’. So what Nick Dyer-Witheford points out is the political relevance 
of a critical theory of digital media: it names and analyses the problem and 
can thereby point citizens, classes and social groups towards what is wrong 
and what contradictions they face. 
Digital work is a specific organisational form of cultural work that creates 
digital media, content, or data (see figure 2.2, see also Fuchs 2015, chapter 6).

















































The international division of digital labour, for example, involves Congolese slave 
workers, who mine minerals that form the physical foundation of mobile phones, 
computers and laptops. Assemblage workers, such as the highly exploited Foxconn 
workers in China, assemble the ICT components created out of minerals into whole 
technologies. Such technologies are put to use both by consumers and workers: low-
paid software engineers in countries such as China and India as well as highly paid 
and highly exploited programmers at Google, Microsoft and other large software 
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2.2.12. Digital Labour
Digital labour is alienated digital work: it is alienated from itself, from the 
instruments and objects of labour and from the products of labour. Digital 
labour is digital work that is organised within class relations. Figure 2.3 shows 
a model of the international division of digital labour. Each production step 
involves human subjects (S) using technologies/instruments of labour (T) on 
objects of labour (O) so that a product emerges. 
The international division of digital labour, for example, involves Congo-
lese slave workers, who mine minerals that form the physical foundation of 
mobile phones, computers and laptops. Assemblage workers, such as the highly 
exploited Foxconn workers in China, assemble the ICT components created 
out of minerals into whole technologies. Such technologies are put to use both 
by consumers and workers; low-paid software engineers in countries such as 
China and India as well as highly paid and highly exploited programmers at 
Google, Microsoft and other large software companies make use of comput-
ers for coding application software, operating systems, etc. Consumers put to 
use both hardware and software for various purposes. On advertising-driven 
Internet platforms, these users are also workers, whose usage labour creates 
a data commodity that advertisement-driven platforms, such as Facebook, 
Weibo, Twitter or YouTube, sell as commodities to their advertising clients. 
There is also a whole range of precarious online labour that is conducted on 
Figure 2.3: The international division of digital labour.
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the Internet. An example are the users of freelance platforms, who create cul-
tural products and find their clients online at sites such as Upwork, Amazon 
Mechanical Turk, PeoplePerHour, or TaskRabbit. The international division of 
digital labour involves diverse forms of exploited digital labour. 
Physical digital labour creates minerals and ICT components that are assembled 
into digital media technologies. It involves extractive and industrial digital labour. 
Digital information workers use this technological infrastructure in order to cre-
ate digital contents and data that are sold as commodities. Physical and informa-
tional digital work can take place within various social relations of production, 
including slavery, freelance labour, wage labour, feminised labour, unpaid labour, 
etc. In the case that these relations are class relations, we speak of digital labour. 
In contrast, if we have to do with communist relations of production, in which 
there are no class relations but common property and common production, we 
merely speak of digital work. Digital work is a more general term than digital 
labour. All digital labour is digital work, but not all digital work is digital labour. 
Table 2.1 shows an overview of relations of production into which digital work can 
be embedded. It is based on a distinction between different forms of ownership 
(self-control, partly self-control and partly alien control, full alien control).
Lukács’ Ontology is a general theory of society that draws attention to the 
importance of work, language, and communication in general. However, it is 
also an ontology of class-based society, in which he analyses the role of labour 
and ideology. 
2.3. Labour and Ideology
2.3.1. Ideological Labour
We have seen in the previous section that for Lukács, cultural workers create cul-
ture, which means that also ideologies are created by labour, namely ideological 
Owner of labour 
power
Owner of the means 
of production
Owner of the 
products of work
Patriarchy Patriarch Patriarch Family
Slavery Slave master Slave master Slave master






Capitalism Worker Capitalist Capitalist
Communism Self All Partly all, partly 
individual
Table 2.1: The main forms of the relations of production in various modes of 
production.
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labour. Lukács makes clear that not every cultural work creates ideology, but cul-
tural products can turn into ideology if they serve dominative interests in class-
based societies. Critiques of ideology such as Critical Discourse Analysis, often 
with the help of text and visual analysis, focus on uncovering the structure of ide-
ologies, but neglect the working conditions under which concrete humans and 
organisations create ideologies, whereas labour studies often focus on the study 
of working conditions and neglect how ideologies frame labour and capital (see: 
Fuchs, 2015, chapter 3). Lukács’ approach allows us to understand that labour and 
ideology are inherently connected: there is ideology-producing and -communicating 
labour – ideological labour – just like there are ideologies of and about labour. 
Lukács (1978c) argues that use-value can exist independently from exchange-
value as ‘a product of work which man is able to make use of in the reproduction 
of his existence’ (v). With the rise of capitalism, use-value has however become 
the antagonist of exchange-value. ‘The more general the exchange-value, the 
clearer and more precisely socially necessary labour time comes into the lime-
light as the economic foundation of its respective quantity’11 (Lukács, 1986b, 
124). Lukács says that ‘the division of labour mediated and brought about by 
exchange-value produces the principle of control by time by a better subjective 
use of it’ (1978c, 83). Exchange-value is a contradictory form that in capitalism 
‘assumes the leading role in human social intercourse’ and therefore subsumes 
use-value, but at the same time ‘can only come to prevail by being based on 
use-value’ (87).
2.3.2. Alienation and Ideology
Lukács (1986b, 635) argues that for Marx, reification and the alienation of 
humans and capitalist labour that results from it are connected to labour-time. 
Humans are reduced to a cog in the accumulation process that aims at creating 
as much profit per unit of time as possible: ‘Time is everything, man is noth-
ing; he is, at the most, time’s carcass. Quality no longer matters. Quantity alone 
decides everything; hour for hour, day for day’ (Marx 1847, 127). The modern 
form of instrumental reason has its origin in the logic of quantification and 
the reduction of humans to instruments for quantitative increases of the ruling 
and owning elites’ power. The psychological reasons why humans reproduce 
ideologies would have to do with fear and hope (Lukács 1986b, 643). 
Lukács connects the existence of ideologies as cultural phenomena to the 
existence of alienated labour in the economy. The reification of labour power 
necessitates ideologies that justify the existence of alienation. Ideologies attempt 
to alienate the human mind. They try to instrumentalise consciousness in the 
interest of dominant powers. Lukács (1986b, 397) is sceptical of Gramsci’s the-
ory of ideology, in which ideologies are understood as individual worldviews. 
For Lukács, ideology in capitalism has its foundation in the masking of the 
subject by the object, for example the masking of surplus value produced in 
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social relations as an expenditure of a specific amount of labour-time by mon-
etary profit (Lukács, 1986b, 319–321). Ideology is made up of thoughts, prac-
tices, ideas, words, concepts, phrases, sentences, texts, belief systems, mean-
ings, representations, artefacts, institutions, systems or combinations thereof 
that represent and justify one group’s or individual’s domination and power 
by misrepresenting, one-dimensionally presenting or distorting reality in sym-
bolic representations (Fuchs 2015, chapter 3).
Ideology exists for Lukács (1986b) only where there are social struggles, i.e. 
in societies with antagonistic interests (398). They are ‘theoretical or practical 
vehicles for fighting out societal conflicts’12 (400). Ideology presupposes ‘soci-
etal structures, in which different groups and conflicting interests act and strive 
to impose their interest onto the totality of society as its general interest. To put 
it concisely: The emergence and diffusion of ideologies appears as the general 
characteristic of class societies’13 (Lukács, 1986b, 405).
One should note that Lukács’ engagement with ideology in the Ontology 
shows that he did not discard History and Class Consciousness, but that he sub-
lated the latter into a more general critical theory of society. 
2.3.3. Ideology, Advertising and the Religion of Consumption
Lukács (1986b, 581) points out that commodity fetishism contains elements of 
religious ideology/alienation: money and commodities appear as quasi-Gods. 
Religion is sublated in capitalist ideology. Religion is for Lukács the archetype 
of all ideological alienation (605). Lukács argues that ideologies that the ontol-
ogy of everyday life is the ‘all-sided medium of immediacy’14 (556) that con-
nects ideologies to the objective world of phenomena. In everyday life com-
munication, humans get in touch with culture and ideologies. 
Lukács says that ideology has, in capitalism since the rise of mass consump-
tion in the twentieth century, taken on a transition from the power of not-
having to the power of having: 
In workers’ everyday life, the power of having does not appear as simple 
privation, the fact that they are not-having the most important means 
necessary for the everyday satisfaction of needs influences regular life. 
This power in contrast appears as direct having, as the race with other 
humans and groups in the attempt to raise personal prestige by the 
quantity and quality of having15 (Lukács, 1986b, 699). 
Advertising plays a crucial role in this process: 
The effect on humans is primarily oriented on the belief that the purchase 
of particular hair tonics, ties, cigarettes, cars, etc., the visit to specific 
holiday resorts etc. results in one’s personality being truly acknowledged 
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in one’s environment. The promotion of commodities as originally in 
ad promotion is not primary here, but rather the consumer’s personal 
prestige that shall be attained by purchasing. Underlying is a double 
tendency: on the one hand the intention to influence humans into a 
specific direction and to form them, on the other hand the intention to 
breed the particularity of humans, to enforce their perception that this 
superficial differentiation of particularity that has been purchased on 
the world market is the sole way of how humans become personalities, 
i.e. how they can achieve personal recognition16 (701).
2.3.4. Online Targeted Advertising as Capital Accumulation Model: 
The Engaging/Connection/Sharing-Ideology
If we look at today’s media landscape, we can see that advertising plays a very 
important role in it (McKinsey, 2014). Lukács’ analysis that in the twentieth 
century advertising has become one of the dominant forms of ideology in capi-
talism is even more poignant in the twenty-first century. On the Internet, tar-
geted advertising is the dominant business model (Fuchs, 2014, 2015). Its intro-
duction in the first decade of the twenty-first century has been accompanied by 
new ideologies that try to justify and legitimate capitalist Internet platforms. 
Internet companies are a first kind of actor that spread Internet ideologies. 
Here are some examples:
• Facebook says it provides ‘the power to share and to make the world more 
open and connected’.17 
• YouTube conceives the essence of freedom as the possibility ‘to connect, 
inform and inspire others across the globe and acts as a distribution plat-
form for original content creators and advertisers large and small’.18 
• For Twitter, the freedom of social media is ‘to connect with people, express 
yourself and discover what’s happening’ and ‘give everyone the power to 
create and share ideas and information instantly’.19 
• Instagram says it is a ‘fast, beautiful and fun way to share your life with 
friends and family’.20 
• tumblr says it enables you to ‘share the things you love’.21
• Sina Weibo’s self-understanding22 is that it is a platform designed to ‘allow 
users to connect and share information anywhere, anytime and with anyone 
on our platform’ and provides ‘an array of online media and social network-
ing services to our users to create a rich canvas for businesses and brand 
advertisers to connect and engage with their targeted audiences’. 
Not only do social media platforms’ marketing and PR departments advance 
the idea that social media is great because it allows engaging, connecting and 
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sharing, but also some journalists and many consultants communicate such 
ideologies. They have business opportunities and capital accumulation in mind 
whenever they think of the Internet and are a second type of actor produc-
ing social media ideologies. Kevin Kelly (2009) for example, argued in Wired 
magazine that social media enables sharing, cooperation, collaboration, and 
collectivism. He celebrates ‘the power of sharing, cooperation, collaboration, 
openness, free pricing, and transparency’. Marketing guru Gary Vaynerchuk 
(2011) argues that social media enables the emergence of a thank you econ-
omy, in which entrepreneurs create ‘a culture of caring’ (233), empower ‘peo-
ple to be forthright, creative, and generous’, and allow ‘customers to help you 
shape your brand or business’ (233). Also celebratory cultural studies scholars 
have used similar language for the analysis of social media. Such scholars are 
a third type of ideologues producing social media ideologies. Henry Jenkins 
writes for example that ‘the Web has become a site of consumer participation’ 
(Jenkins, 2008, 137).
2.3.5. The Commodity Fetishism and Social Media Corporations
Lukács has based his theory of ideology as reification on Marx’s concept of 
commodity fetishism, in which an object or something concrete (such as the 
commodity or money) masks the subject, the abstract, and social relations. 
The engaging/connecting/sharing-ideology is a special form of a reifying ide-
ology, a form of inverted commodity fetishism: the users do not immediately 
experience the commodity as it is not immediately visible and experienced 
when logging into platforms without payment. This is different from buying 
a cinema, concert or circus ticket, where money directly mediates cultural 
experience. The commodification of data happens behind the users’ back. The 
social use-value of social media is immediately experienced and masks the 
commodity form. On targeted-advertising funded ‘free’ use platforms, the 
subject and the social mask the object and the commodity form. Inverted 
commodity fetishism conditions the emergence of the engaging/connecting/
sharing ideology that in a populist manner appeals to users’ direct social expe-
rience and fetishises the social in order to mask the reality of commodifica-
tion. The engaging/connecting/sharing ideology foregrounds and constantly 
stresses categories of non-instrumental, social, communicative reason such 
as caring, sharing, emotions, empowering, creativity, connecting, or making. 
This social dimension of online media in the contemporary capitalist Internet, 
however, serves instrumental reason, namely the accumulation of capital. The 
universe of use-value and sociality has in the engaging/connecting/sharing 
ideology become subsumed under the logic of instrumental and technologi-
cal reason that fosters capital accumulation in the interest of a particularistic 
capitalist class interest. 
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2.3.6. Users’ Consciousness
How do users react to the engaging/connecting/sharing ideology? There are 
different possible responses of audiences, users, consumers, and citizens to ide-
ologies. They can accept, resist, or partly accept and resist ideologies. This was 
the point of Stuart Hall’s (1973) encoding/decoding model. The problem of this 
model is that in a relativist manner, it conveys the impression that all three 
options have the same likelihood. The likelihood of specific audience responses 
is complex, having to do with factors such as time, education, skills, personal 
experiences, political worldviews, etc. In a capitalist society, audience responses 
therefore tend to be asymmetrically distributed.
Empirical studies indicate that users do not simply reproduce the engaging/
connecting/sharing ideology, but rather seem to be at the same time support-
ive of corporate social media’s social use-value dimension and sceptical of its 
exchange-value dimension and the commodification of personal data (Allmer, 
Fuchs, Kreilinger and Sevignani 2014). They tend to have little knowledge 
about how the political economy of social media works and providing them 
with such information seems to empower them in being able to feel compe-
tent to make political and moral assessments of social media (ibid.). Internet 
users’ opinions towards social media are quite ambivalent and not automati-
cally ideological.
One important implication of Lukács’ Ontology is that ideologies are 
not free-floating, independent structures, but are produced under specific 
working conditions by an ideological labour force. Concrete human beings 
and organisations create and reproduce the engaging/connecting/sharing 
ideology.
2.3.7. Social Media is Bullshit
B.J. Mendelson argues in his book Social Media is Bullshit that myths about 
the Internet that are based on what Harry G. Frankfurt (2005) calls ‘bullshit’ 
spread through an ‘asshole-based economy’ (Mendelson 2012, 54) that cyber 
hipster, tech media and marketers, analysts, corporations, mainstream media 
and users advance (74). Mendelson draws on his own long experience as an 
Internet consultant and concludes that you can only attain a lot of attention 
and visibility on social media if you are a powerful organisation investing a lot 
of money. He argues that advertising consultants tend to create the impression 
that social media is a great business opportunity for everyone in order to foster 
their own profit interests by selling the engaging/connecting/sharing ideology. 
Social media’s ideological workers include tech companies’ strategists, market-
ing gurus and consultants, neoliberal journalists, and users who reproduce this 
ideology as hegemony. 
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2.4. Conclusion
For Lukács, work understood as the active, conscious teleological positing of 
changes so that use-values are created in order to achieve goals is the founda-
tion of humans and society. He opposes the dualist separation of the realms of 
work and ideas. Teleological positing – the conscious and active production of 
changes by realising subjective intentions in the objective world – is the com-
mon feature of the economy and culture. Teleological positing means that ideas 
are a guiding and goal-setting dimension of work so that culture is immanent 
in work itself. Lukács argues that mental work creates and communicates ideas 
as social use-values and is therefore a specific form of teleological positing. 
Lukács’ dialectical ontology of society can inspire us to think about the rela-
tionship between culture and economy. It provides an ontological foundation 
for conceiving cultural work as consisting of physical and informational cul-
tural work that form a dialectic. Digital work is then a specific form of cultural 
work that creates digital media technologies, digital content, or digital data. It 
consists of physical and informational digital works that are interconnected 
and organised in the form of various social relations. In contemporary global 
capitalism, digital work takes on the form of an international division of digital 
labour. 
For Lukács, a specific form of cultural work – ideological labour – creates 
ideologies. In ideology, an object masks a subject. Ideologies are produced 
and communicated by concrete humans and groups in specific labour pro-
cesses and under particular working conditions. With the rise of advertising-
financed social media platforms, a new form of ideology has emerged that jus-
tifies the capitalist Internet by foregrounding the social-use value these media 
enable in order to mask the commodification of data and the logic of capital 
accumulation.
For Lukács, class struggle is an essential implication of Marxist theory that 
aims at overcoming alienation and reification. He argues with Marx that aliena-
tion can only be abolished through social struggles, which includes ideologi-
cal struggles (1986b, 653). Alienation can ‘only be sublated by a fundamental 
economic-political-social revolution of the whole system as general and objec-
tive mass phenomenon’23 (698). The bottom line of the political economy of the 
contemporary landscape of cultural and digital labour is that we need political 
struggles for an alternative Internet and alternative media that are redesigned 
within an alternative political and societal framework. 
Lukács’ Ontology allows us to understand the broader totality of capitalism 
and how its moments are related. Teleological positing is an ontological concept 
that shows how the economy and culture are connected. All culture is posited 
with specific purposes, which shows that it always has an economic dimension, 
although it is not only economic, but has as meaning effects all over society. 
Lukács also integrates the notion of reification that he introduced in History 
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and Class Consciousness into the Ontology. Teleological positing in class-based 
society reverses means and ends so that exploitation, domination and ideo-
logical control emerge as attempts to instrumentalise humans. The tasks that 
remain are social struggles that aim to overcome class and domination. 
Notes
 1 Translation from German: ‘geistige[n] Arbeit’.
 2 Translation from German: ‘ontologischen Gleichartigkeit von Basis und 
Überbau, daß sie nämlich beide auf teleologischen Setzungen und deren 
kausalen Folgen beruhen’.
 3 Translation from German: ‘Spielraum gewünschter (oder unerwünschter) 
Reaktionen auf gesellschaftliche Tatbestände, Situationen, Aufgaben etc.’
 4 Translation from German: ‘daß auf je einer konkreten Produktionsstufe der 
Wert des Produkts der Arbeit sich scharf danach scheidet, ob es unmit-
telbar brauchbar oder unbrauchbar ist, während im künstlerischen Schaf-
fen das Feld, die Möglichkeit von Wert oder Unwert außerordentlich weit 
gestreckt, im voraus kaum bestimmbar ist’.
 5 Translation from German: ‘geistige Arbeit ist, auch als Moment der 
gesellschaftlichen Arbeitsteilung, keineswegs mit Ideologie identisch. Ihre 
Verknüpftheit ist aber eben deshalb sehr innig: das Ergebnis jeder geistigen 
Arbeit kann in bestimmten sozialen Situationen in Ideologie umschlagen, 
ja die gesellschaftliche Arbeitsteilung bringt ununterbrochen Situationen 
hervor, in denen dieses Umschlagen notwendig und permanent wird’.
 6 Translation from German: ‘Ihre bloße Existenz, wenn auch auf noch so nie-
drigem Niveau, läßt eine weitere entscheidende Bestimmung des gesells-
chaftlichen Seins aus der Arbeit herauswachsen, die präzise Kommunika-
tion zwischen den zu einer Arbeit vereinten Menschen: die Sprache’.
 7 Translation from German: ‘die Intention haben, andere Menschen dazu zu 
veranlassen, eine vom Subjekt der Aussage gewünschte teleologische Set-
zung ihrerseits zu vollziehen’.
 8 Translation from German: ‘ein antwortendes Wesen’.
 9 Translation from German: ‘wechselseitigen dialektischen Polarität des 
ideellen und des Reellen’.
 10 Translation from German: ‘realen Möglichkeiten im Ansichseienden’.
 11 Translation from German: ‘Je allgemeiner sich der Tauschwert verbreitet, 
desto deutlicher und bestimmter tritt als die ökonomische Fundierung 
seiner jeweiligen Größe die gesellschaftlich notwendige Arbeitszeit in den 
Mittelpunkt’.
 12 Translation from German: ‘theoretisches oder praktisches Vehikel zum 
Ausfechten gesellschaftlicher Konflikte’.
 13 Translation from German: ‘Die Hauptfrage ist demnach, daß das Entste-
hen solcher Ideologien Gesellschaftsstrukturen voraussetzt, in denen 
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verschiedene Gruppen und entgegengesetzte Interessen wirken und 
bestrebt sind, diese der Gesamtgesellschaft als deren allgemeines Interesse 
aufzudrängen. Kurz gefaßt: Entstehen und Verbreitung von Ideologien 
erscheint als das allgemeine Kennzeichen der Klassengesellschaften’
 14 Translation from German: ‘allseitige Medium der Unmittelbarkeit’
 15 Translation from German: ‘Im Alltagsleben des Arbeiters zeigt sich die 
Macht des Habens nicht mehr als ein einfaches Entbehren, als Einfluß des 
Nichthabens der wichtigsten Mittel zur alltäglich notwendigen Bedürfnisbe-
friedigung auf das normale Leben, sondern im Gegenteil als die des direkten 
Habens, als der Wettlauf mit anderen Menschen und Gruppen im Versuch, 
die persönliche Geltung durch Quantität und Qualität des Habens zu erhöhen’.
 16 Translation from German: ‘Die Wirkung auf den Menschen richtet sich also 
primär darauf, daß er des Glaubens sei, durch Erwerb der betreffenden Haar-
wässer, Krawatten, Zigaretten, Autos etc., durch Besuch bestimmter Bade-
orte etc. als echte, von seiner Umgebung anerkannte Persönlichkeit zu gelten. 
Nicht das Anpreisen der Waren ist also hier das Primäre, wie ursprünglich 
im annoncierenden Anpreisen, sondern das persönliche Prestige, das durch 
ihre Erwerbung für den Käufer erreicht werden soll. Dem liegt sozial gese-
hen eine Doppeltendenz zugrunde: einerseits die Absicht, die Menschen in 
bestimmter Richtung zu beeinflussen, zu formen (wieder sei an Hitlers These 
über den femininen Charakter der Massen erinnert), andererseits die, die 
Partikularität der Menschen hochzuzüchten, in ihnen die Einbildung zu ver-
stärken, gerade diese auf dem Warenmarkt erworbene oberflächliche Dif-
ferenzierung der Partikularität sei der alleinige Weg des Menschen, Persönli-
chkeit zu werden, d. h. persönliches Ansehen zu erringen’.
 17 https://www.facebook.com/FacebookUK/info, accessed on April 10, 2014. 
 18 http://www.youtube.com/yt/about/en-GB/, accessed on 10 April 2014.
 19 https://about.twitter.com/company, accessed on 10 April 2014.
 20 http://instagram.com, accessed on 10 April 2014.
 21 https://www.tumblr.com/, accessed on 10 April 2014.
 22 http://corp.sina.com.cn/eng/sina_intr_eng.htm, accessed on 9 April 2014.
 23 Translation from German: ‘kann diese Entfremdung nur durch eine funda-
mentale ökonomisch-politisch-soziale Umwälzung des ganzen Systems als 
allgemeine und objektive Massenerscheinung aufgehoben werden’.
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CHAPTER 3
Theodor W. Adorno and the Critical 
Theory of Knowledge
3.1. Introduction
This chapter asks: what insights of Adorno’s philosophy can be used for ground-
ing a critical theory of knowledge?
It is a common prejudice that Adorno was a pessimist, saw humans as pas-
sively manipulated, considered instrumental society to be without alternative, 
and thought political change was hopeless. What many want to make us believe 
is that Adorno’s theory of knowledge is a theory of ideological manipulation 
that creates and reproduces false consciousness. Such prejudice and its repeti-
tion can keep theoretically interested readers from exploring the wealth and 
richness of Adorno’s works beyond the Culture Industry chapter in the Dialectic 
of Enlightenment (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002, 94–136).
This chapter analyses Adorno’s contribution to a critical theory of knowledge 
by revisiting the assumption that he is a media pessimist (section 2), reconsid-
ering the debate about aesthetics between Lukács and Adorno and generalis-
ing the conclusions from art to the theory of knowledge (section 3), and by 
discussing and further developing Adorno’s dialectical concept of knowledge 
(section 4).
The first task is to show that Adorno was not simply a media pessimist, but 
that his work is much richer. For doing so, section 2 draws especially on Adorno’s 
articles Education after Auschwitz (Adorno 1967), Chaplin Times Two (Adorno 
1996), and Prologue to Television (Adorno 1998, 49–57). For the second task, 
the discussion of Adorno’s critique of Lukács’ aesthetics and the generalisation 
of this criticism to the theory of knowledge, section 3 provides a reading of 
Adorno’s (1997) Aesthetic Theory and his essay Extorted Reconciliation: On Georg 
Lukács’ Realism in our Time (Adorno 1958). It also makes cross-references to 
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Jürgen Habermas’ (1971) book Knowledge and Human Interest. Habermas devel-
oped his theory of communication based on and by going beyond Adorno. For 
the third task, the discussion of the dialectics of knowledge, section 3 especially 
refers to Adorno’s (1963) book Hegel: Three Studies and his essays On Subject and 
Object (Adorno 1998, 245–258) and Ideology (Adorno 1954).
The reader may ask: why does the discussion of the dialectics of knowledge in 
this chapter not engage profoundly with Adorno’s (1973b, 2008) Negative Dia-
lectics? Adorno’s three Hegel studies are explicitly devoted to epistemology. The 
first study (Aspects of Hegel’s Philosophy) discusses the relationship of subject 
and object in Hegel’s philosophy and the role of reason and (ir)rationality in 
this relation. The second study (The Experiential Content of Hegel’s Philosophy) 
analyses how Hegel saw experience and knowledge. The third one (Skoteinos, or 
How to Read Hegel) focuses on the dialectical character of Hegel’s writing and 
how to read Hegel, i.e. how the reader of Hegel creates knowledge about Hegel. 
Negative Dialectics is an interesting work in itself, but Hegel: Three Studies is the 
work that more directly engages with Hegel’s dialectical epistemology. 
3.2. Adorno – A Media Pessimist? 
3.2.1. Adorno and Cultural Studies
In media and cultural studies, we often find short standard dismissals of 
Adorno in a few paragraphs that lack an in-depth engagement with his works. 
Here are some example assessments that I collected from cultural studies books 
and essays by searching for the keyword ‘Adorno’ in a sample of works.
• The ‘Frankfurt School have no room in their scenario for resistant or evasive 
practices. […] this produces a left-wing elitism that implicitly or explicitly 
devalues the people with whom it is politically aligned: an uncomfortable 
position, to say the least. One result of this is the way it has blinkered Marx-
ist theory to the notion of popular pleasure, and particularly to the idea that 
popular pleasure must necessarily contain traces of resistance: there is no 
popular pleasure in being ideologically duped or hegemonically victimized. 
The power of ideology or hegemony simply is not that great’ (Fiske 1989, 183).
• ‘Adorno condemns mass or popular music as a standardized industrial 
product (commodity) which determines an infantilized (fetishized) mode 
of consumption. […] Adorno collapses the distinction between production 
and consumption, making the consumer’s alienation the same as the labor-
er’s. […] For critical theory, the cultural object is pure exchange value, with 
no use value whatsoever’ (Grossberg 1997, 108–109).
• ‘I blame Adorno. I mean, you read his work on ‘The culture industry’, 
and it’s so obvious that he doesn’t know anything about popular cul-
ture, he’s never consumed any popular culture – in fact, it seems like 
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he’s never even spoken to anybody who’s ever consumed any popular 
culture!’ (Jenkins 2006).
• For Horkheimer and Adorno, mass culture means ‘citizens are turned into a 
passive mass of consumers […] In this world of mass culture, all is false and 
inauthentic because it is tainted by the hand of production, commodifica-
tion and exchange’ (du Gay, Hall, Janes, Mackay and Negus 1997, 87).
• ‘Unfortunately, the force of the Frankfurt School’s critique was weakened 
by their apparently elitist dismissal of forms of popular culture’ (Longhurst 
2013, 75).
• ‘Adorno is often (and rightly in my view) accused of not understanding 
TV’s manifold pleasures, and at the same time of taking it too seriously’ 
(During 2005, 115).
• ‘Adorno will be presented as a (Marxist) high culture gladiator’ (Walton 
2007, 48). For him, popular culture ‘pacifies the masses and encourages 
them to confirm to their humiliating conditions. The exploited masses 
(consumers) are seen as victims of depoliticization and impoverished, 
materially, intellectually and emotionally’ (Walton 2007, 53).
• ‘Like the perspective developed by Arnold, Leavisism and some of the 
American mass culture theorists, the Frankfurt School perspective on pop-
ular culture is essentially a discourse from above on the culture of other 
people (a discourse of “us” and “them”)’ (Storey 2008, 70).
• ‘The Frankfurt School also applied a transmission mode, though messages 
were intrinsically ideological; media messages always carried the politi-
cal interests of the elites who generated them. Adorno, Horkheimer and 
Marcuse believed, it would seem, that the masses were passive and uni-
dimensional victims of the overbearing power of state and media institu-
tions’ (Lewis 2008, 109).
• ‘The commodification of culture, then, was a much more ambivalent process 
than was allowed for by Adorno and Horkheimer’s pessimism. […] there 
is a constant sense in Adorno and Horkheimer that the battle has already 
been lost, that culture has been already subsumed both by capital and by an 
abstract system of “instrumental reason”’ (Hesmondhalgh 2013, 25).
Such passages are likely to keep readers from engaging with Adorno’s work, 
rather than encouraging interest because they label them as being pessimistic, 
deterministic, and elitist. 
3.2.2. Was Adorno a Cultural Pessimist?
Adorno, who is vilified by many cultural studies scholars as the prototypical 
cultural pessimist and elitist, had a positive vision for a medium like TV. For 
television (in German, Fernsehen means literally ‘to watch into the distance’) ‘to 
keep the promise still resonating within the word, it must emancipate itself from 
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everything within which it – reckless wish-fulfilment – refutes its own principle 
and betrays the idea of Good Fortune for the smaller fortunes of the depart-
ment store’ (Adorno 1998, 57). Adorno frequently acknowledges the need and 
potentials of emancipation. In the case of TV, he points out that enabling watch-
ing into the distance beyond capitalism is a good fortune. This is indirectly a call 
for the creation of alternative media that question the status quo. 
Adorno did not despise popular culture. He was for example a fan of Char-
lie Chaplin and pointed out the critical role of the clown in popular culture 
(Adorno 1996). Adorno admired and was a ‘fan’ of the clown of all clowns – 
Charlie Chaplin. ‘Presence of mind and omnipresence of mimetic ability also 
characterize the empirical Chaplin. […] Incessant and spontaneous change: in 
Chaplin, this is the utopia of an existence that would be free of the burden of 
being-one’s-self ’ (Adorno 1996, 60). Adorno’s fondness of Chaplin, the figure 
of the clown, and the circus shows that he was not opposed to entertainment as 
such. He rather despised capitalism and therefore the commodity form.
Even in the Culture Industry chapter of the Dialectic of the Enlightenment, 
the positive elements of popular culture are visible. For example when Adorno 
writes that ‘traces of something better persist in those features of the culture 
industry by which it resembles the circus’ (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002, 114). 
3.2.3. Was Adorno an Elitist Theorist?
Was Adorno a cultural elitist who looked down on everyday people and the 
working class? Horkheimer and Adorno’s position was fundamentally shaped 
by the historical defeat of the German working class in Nazism and its support 
for Hitler. They asked themselves, how could history go so wrong? Given this 
experience, they also distrusted the assumption that what the mass of working 
people in Germany was doing and thinking after Auschwitz was automatically 
right. They distrusted the idealisation of the working class, stressed the role 
of ideology in everyday life, and argued for institutions and mechanisms that 
strengthen critical and reflective thought in society. They, however, never gave 
up on the idea of human emancipation, although they thought emancipation 
was quite unlikely in post-Nazi Germany. They saw anti-fascist education as a 
key political task so that Nazism’s history would not repeat itself. 
Was Adorno an elitist? In a class-based society, all philosophy and theory 
is to a certain extent elitist because it is based on a division of labour, where 
people employed at universities have much more time for intellectual engage-
ment than everyday people. This situation has changed to a significant degree 
with the rise of precarious intellectual labour under neoliberalism. But cer-
tainly university-educated people and university employees have more time 
and capacities for intellectual engagement than others. 
So as a tendency, critical theorists can afford much more time for the analy-
sis of society than the everyday member of the working class. In a class-based 
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society, critical theory is therefore necessarily privileged and because of its privi-
leged use of time and spaces for critical thought, it is very likely to come up with 
profound analyses of class-based society’s contradictions. One can therefore not 
blame Adorno or any other critical theorist for the privileged role they have in 
the analysis of society, but should rather blame class-based society itself. All 
critical theory is privileged by necessity in a class-based society. The democrati-
sation of the production of critique requires the abolition of class-based society 
and its replacement with a free association that replaces the division of labour 
by well-rounded human activities for all so that, as Marx said, 
nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can become accom-
plished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production 
and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another 
tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the 
evening, criticise after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becom-
ing hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic (Marx and Engels 1845, 53). 
That Adorno argued for critical education shows that he was concerned with 
the question of how critique could be generalised as a participatory mechanism 
in society that acts as a bulwark against fascism.
3.2.4. Did Adorno Hate Popular Culture? He Hated the 
Commodity Form
Adorno profoundly opposed the commodity form and was convinced that 
wherever it is introduced, it damages human life in society. He did not hate pop-
ular culture, but hated the commodity form of any form of culture. In respect 
to music, Adorno (1991, 38) argued for example that ‘all contemporary musical 
life is dominated by the commodity form’. He also wrote that the ‘role of music 
in the social process is exclusively that of a commodity’ so that its organisation 
is ‘in the hands of powerful monopolies’ (Adorno 1932, 391). What Adorno 
calls musical fetishism becomes especially evident in the use of different types 
of music in advertising. Music would today serve ‘as an advertisement for com-
modities which one must acquire in order to be able to hear music’ (38). Because 
of ‘commodity listening’, the ‘differences in the reception of official ‘classical’ 
music and light music no longer have any real significance’ (35). 
3.2.5. Adorno’s Version of Fan Studies
It is certainly true that Adorno’s musical taste focused on twelve-tone music 
by composers such as Arnold Schönberg, Anton Webern or Alban Berg. Mari-
sol Sandoval argues in this context that one must see that ‘Adorno was a fan 
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of serious music. He enjoyed playing as well as listening to classical music’ 
(Sandoval 2015, 67). His fascination with fan studies becomes quite evident 
in his (1932) essay On the Social Situation of Music, in which he expresses his 
admiration for and analyses topics such as the music of Arnold Schönberg, 
Igor Stravinsky, Kurt Weill, Hanns Eisler and Alban Berg, the writings of Bert 
Brecht and Karl Kraus, and Adolf Loos’ architecture. To a certain extent his 
fandom may have influenced Adorno’s theory. So he is in an epistemological 
respect not so different from contemporary fan studies, in which scholars tend 
to analyse the forms of culture they personally like. 
But Adorno’s critique is not limited to entertainment or popular music, but 
extends to what some term classical or serious music. Just think of the domi-
nant way people consume music today: commercial radio stations are entirely 
funded by advertising. Popular and classical musical festivals are exercises in 
commercial sponsorship and branding. YouTube is for many a primary source 
for listening to and watching music. It interlaces music with advertisements. 
Spotify presents a couple of minutes advertisements to all those listeners who 
are not premium subscribers. Adorno felt that culture becomes debased when 
it is connected to commerce and advertisements. Out of his analysis of music 
and culture speaks the desire for a world of culture beyond the commodity 
form and beyond advertisement. 
3.2.6. Adorno and Alternative Media
Adorno argues for music and culture as non-identity, as something that is 
functionless and is consumed independently of the profit logic of corpora-
tions. ‘Profit puts the functionless into its service and thereby degrades it 
into senselessness and unrelatedness’ (Adorno 1973a, 222). Adorno was a 
radical anti-capitalist, who was opposed to the capitalist form of music and 
culture. He would not oppose YouTube, where in fact one can not just watch 
music videos and other films, but also listen to lectures by Adorno. But he 
would oppose the commodity character of users’ data on this platform, 
i.e. the constant feature of advertisements that prohibit the uninterrupted 
engagement with culture. Thinking Adorno to the end means that we have 
to talk about and struggle for non-commercial, alternative, critical media.
Adorno’s critique of the culture industry is a radical critique of the commodity 
form. ‘From a social perspective, present-day musical activity, production and 
consumption can be divided drastically into that which unconditionally recog-
nises its commodity character and, refusing any dialectic intervention, orients 
itself according to the demands of the market and that which in principle does 
not accept the demands of the market’ (Adorno 1932, 395). Adorno’s hatred 
of the commodity form of the media and culture can be read as an appeal for 
the creation and sustenance of non-commercial, non-profit media and culture, 
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so-called ‘alternative media and alternative culture’ that are organised outside of 
corporate monopolies and challenge the ‘mainstream’. 
Adorno was a public intellectual who effectively used broadcast media for dis-
cussing contemporary political issues. He especially gave lectures on the radio 
and participated in discussions broadcast on radio and television. The six CD 
box set ‘Kultur und Verwaltung: Vorträge und Gespräche’ (Culture and Admin-
istration: Lectures and Discussions) documents some of these activities. It con-
sists of three Adorno lectures as well as three discussions between Adorno and 
Arnold Gehlen (on the public sphere, sociology and the human being, modern 
art) broadcast by Südwestrundfunk (SWR), a southwest regional public service 
broadcaster in Germany. The five CD box set ‘Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit’ 
(Working Through the Past) documents radio lectures Adorno gave in the years 
from 1955 until 1969. Although Adorno was a critic of the capitalist culture 
industry, this does not mean that he opposed popular cultural forms of expres-
sion. To the contrary, he himself made an alternative use of radio and television 
and was an excellent example of mediated public intellectualism. 
3.2.7. The Media and Education after Auschwitz
Adorno (1967) in his essay Education after Auschwitz wrote about in the positive 
role that TV could play in anti-fascist education in Germany after Auschwitz. 
He argues that the ‘premier demand upon all education is that Auschwitz not 
happen again’ (19). ‘When I speak of education after Auschwitz, then, I mean 
two areas: first, children’s education, especially in early childhood; then, gen-
eral enlightenment, which provides an intellectual, cultural, and social climate 
in which a recurrence would no longer be possible’ (22). One of the measures 
of anti-fascist education that Adorno suggests are ‘television programmes […] 
with consideration of the nerve centres of this particular state of consciousness’, 
i.e. the authoritarian personality (24). 
Since 2010 the Maximilian-Kolbe-Werk, a German NGO, has organised 
international meetings of young journalists and media studies students with 
survivors of extermination camps such as Auschwitz, Buchenwald, Dachau, 
and Sachsenhausen. The idea is that young people create interviews, videos, 
and reports about the survivors and make use of traditional and online media 
for disseminating these materials. The project describes itself the following way: 
Young journalists meet survivors of the Nazi regime in the Memorial 
Sites of Auschwitz and Dachau. They visit together the authentic places 
of Nazi crimes and conduct interviews. They record the testimonies of 
survivors as their unique legacy. By means of various media techniques 
and Web 2.0 applications they produce audio, video and text media 
pieces and publish them using conventional and new media. They are 
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accompanied by experienced journalists and media educators. In dif-
ferent program units, young people will get the opportunity for per-
sonal and professional exchange in the international context. They will 
approach the following questions: What influence do the media, par-
ticularly the Internet, have on the commemorative process? How can 
young journalists participate in the commemorative discourse today 
and tomorrow? How can they contribute to the remembrance of the 
Nazi past and what preventive measures against the influence of right-
wing extremists can they meet?1
Asked why she participates, one young journalist says for example: 
Although I am a journalist, first of all it was actually a very personal 
motivation. I have since my childhood really asked myself the ques-
tions: What is the Holocaust? What have the people there been capable 
of doing to others? And how could those, who had to suffer these atroci-
ties, live on?2 
The results have been published online, in newspapers, and have been broad-
cast on radio and television.3
This project involves both young people and survivors and makes use of 
media for the task of documenting the experiences of those whom the Nazis 
tried to exterminate. Confronting the public with the horrific reality of exter-
mination is a necessary element of education after Auschwitz. Traditional 
media and social media platforms are very good means for documenting these 
experiences and making them available to a broader public. Adorno proba-
bly would not be a fan of commercial social media and would have detested 
targeted online advertising, but he probably would much welcome the use of 
social media in a project such as the Max-Kolbe-Werk’s international meetings. 
He would probably advise to upload resulting reports, such as videos, on non-
commercial platforms because he would find it utterly distasteful if a report of 
an Auschwitz survivor were interrupted by advertisements on YouTube. 
If one goes beyond a superficial and selective reading of Adorno, then one will 
find his deep belief in the possibility of emancipation and in the role that cul-
ture can play in this process. English translations of Horkheimer and Adorno’s 
works are imprecise because the language of the two philosophers is complex 
and not easily translatable. But besides the problem non-German speakers are 
facing when reading Horkheimer and Adorno, there seems to be a certain non-
willingness in media and cultural studies to engage thoroughly with the Frankfurt 
School’s and Critical Political Economy’s origins in order to set up a straw man.
Adorno’s criticism of Georg Lukács is alongside his writings on culture an 
important contribution to the critical theory of knowledge. It will be discussed 
next. 
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3.3. Lukács and Adorno: The Theory of Art and Knowledge 
Art is a specific form of culture and objectified knowledge. In this section, I will 
compare Lukács’ and Adorno’s aesthetic theory and then generalise the results 
as foundations for dialectically theorising knowledge.
Adorno (1960) argues that not just fascism, but also Stalinism is a system 
grounded in authoritarian personalities. ‘Authoritarian personalities identify 
themselves with real, existing power per se, prior to any particular contents’ 
(9). It would therefore be wrong to construe authoritarian structures ‘from 
the vantage point of a particular political-economic ideology’ (8). Lukács 
(1954/1980) in The Destruction of Reason however sees irrationality immanent 
only in fascism, capitalism and imperialism, and according to some (includ-
ing Adorno 1958) disregards the reality that Stalinism was not an alternative, 
but irrational as well and not altogether different from the logic of capitalism: 
forms of irrationality were for example the cult of personality, the ideology of 
hard labour, and the violent destruction of all opposition to and criticism of 
Stalin with the help of the Gulag and show trials. Stalinism was based on the 
idea that socialism works in one country that can, by developing productivity, 
compete with and overtake capitalism, which resulted in a harsh puritanical 
work ethic enshrined in Article 18 of the 1936 Constitution of the USSR: ‘The 
Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic declares labour to be the duty of 
all citizens of the Republic, and proclaims the slogan: ‘He who does not work, 
neither shall he eat!’’4 
3.3.1. The Destruction of Reason
At the end of the Destruction of Reason, Lukács presents Marxism-Leninism 
and the peace movement as movements for the restoration of reason, but he is 
silent on the problems of Stalinism. Lukács in this book as an example of Nazi 
philosophy discusses Heidegger’s theory. He points out a passage, in which 
Heidegger says that those Germans who had read Hölderlin must have thought 
differently than the Nazis. Lukács comments that such young men 
were not only in a “situation confronting death” under Hitler, but took 
a highly active part in murder and torture, pillage and rape. Evidently 
he considers it superfluous to mention this, for after all the incognito 
covers everything up: who can tell what a pupil of Heidegger intoxicated 
by Hölderlin “thought and lived” when he was pushing women and chil-
dren into the gas chambers at Auschwitz? Nobody can tell, either, what 
Heidegger himself “thought and lived” when he led the Freiburg stu-
dents to vote for Hitler. (Lukács 1954/1980, 833) 
This passage shows that Lukács’ criticism of fascist thought was quite powerful. 
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In the autobiographic interviews with Lukács, István Eörsi – one of Lukács’ 
students – asks if it is not a defect that the Destruction of Reason does ‘not 
criticize in it the type of irrationalism characteristic of Stalinism. I am think-
ing, for example, of the culture of personality, which is undoubtedly a kind of 
irrationalism’ (Lukács 1983, 103). Lukács answers that Stalinism ‘was in fact a 
type of hyper-rationalism’, that ‘with Stalin rationalism acquired a form which 
bordered on the absurd’, that Stalin regarded ‘tactics as primary’ and deduced 
“ ‘the theoretical generalizations from them’, and that Stalin shows that ‘when 
the rational is transcended, the possibility of transformation into the irrational 
does exist’ (104). So Lukács considered Stalinism as a form of irrational ration-
ality, but did not want to criticise it in a book that focuses on the German irra-
tionality that led to Nazism. Lukács formulated the task of the Destruction of 
Reason as the analysis of ‘Germany’s path to Hitler in the sphere of philosophy’ 
(Lukács 1954/1980, 4). 
3.3.2. Lukács on Art
For Lukács (1970), an artwork is not a free-floating idea, but aesthetic content 
that has a specific form and exists in a specific objective context in society. He 
assumes a specific relationship between the work of art and objective reality. 
He argues that socialist art is partisan (29) and that therefore the reflection of 
objective reality in the work of art takes on particular forms, reflecting ‘great 
social problems’ (33), providing 
a picture of reality in which the contradiction between appearance and 
reality, the particular and the general, the immediate and the concep-
tual, etc., is so resolved that the two converge into a spontaneous integ-
rity in the direct impression of the work of art and provide a sense of an 
inseparable integrity (34). 
Socialist art would reflect ‘correctly and in proper proportion all important fac-
tors objectively determining the area of life it represents’ (38) and show ‘fidelity 
to reality, the unsparing effort to render reality comprehensively and realisti-
cally’ (74). It would have to be a ‘correct reflection of the totality’ (43). 
Lukács summarises the basic dogma of socialist realism that he takes for 
granted: art ‘is a particular form by means of which objective reality is reflected’ 
so that it ‘becomes of crucial importance for it to grasp that reality as it truly is, 
and not merely to confine itself to reproducing whatever manifests itself imme-
diately and on the surface’ (in: Adorno et al. 1980, 33). ‘Great realism’ portrays 
‘man in the whole range of his relations to the real world, above all those which 
outlast mere fashion’ (in: Adorno et al. 1980, 48). 
Lukács (1970) labels art that does not fulfil the criterion of socialist realism as 
‘bourgeois decadence’, ‘hypocritical, foggy idealism’ (32), ‘capitalist degeneration’ 
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(34), ‘idealistic subjectivism’, ‘subjective idealism’, ‘self-complacency’, ‘parasitic’ 
(42), ‘philistinism’ (105), ‘deformities’ (106), or ‘sick art’ (109). He was critical 
of ‘“modernist anti-realism”’ (Lukács 1958/1971, 17) that he characterised as 
‘universal distortion’ (33) and the ‘negation of art’ (46). In literature, he was for 
example critical of Franz Kafka’s and James Joyce’s works. He described Kafka’s 
writings as ‘decadent modernism’ (Lukács 1958/1971, 92) and accused it of ‘guilt 
by association with Hitlerism and the preparations for atomic war’ (81).
3.3.3. Lukács and Stalinism
Although Lukács’ Destruction of Reason is silent on Stalinism and the old 
Lukács’ aesthetic theory glorifies socialist realism that played such an impor-
tant role in Soviet culture under Stalin, it would be a mistake to characterise 
Lukács as a Stalinist. In other places he clearly criticises Stalin. While in exile 
in Moscow, the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) accused 
him of being a spy of the Hungarian police and confined him in the Lubyanka 
prison in 1941 (Lukács 1983, 115). It is also important to note that Lukács dur-
ing the Stalinist Rákosi era in Hungary (1949–1956) remained distanced from 
political appointments and was never a member of the Hungarian Communist 
Party’s Central Committee (116), whereas he became one of six members of the 
Central Committee at the time of Hungarian uprising of 1956 (129). He was a 
political supporter of the Hungarian Revolution against the Soviets and became 
the minister of culture in Imre Nagy’s reform-communist government that was 
in office from 26 October until 4 November 1956, when the Soviet invasion of 
Hungary ended the revolution. 
In his article Reflections on the Cult of Stalin, Lukács (1962) criticises Stalin’s 
concept of the dialectic as ideology: 
The Stalinist tendency is always to abolish, wherever possible, all inter-
mediate factors, and to establish an immediate connection between the 
crudest factual data and the most general theoretical propositions. […] 
Stalin’s unscrupulousness in this matter reached the point of altering the 
theory itself if necessary. [...] For him, in the name of partiinost, agitation 
is primary. Its needs determine [...] what science must say and how it must 
say it. […] In the famous Chapter IV of the Short History, Stalin defines 
the essence of dialectical and historical materialism. […] Stalin’s propa-
gandistic simplifications (often vulgarizations) at once became the unique 
and absolutely binding norm and the utmost limit of philosophical investi-
gation. If anyone ventured, appealing for instance to Lenin’s philosophical 
notes, to go beyond the definitions of Chapter IV or simply to supplement 
them, he was courting ideological condemnation and could not publish 
his researches. […] All science and all literature had to serve exclusively 
the propagandistic demands formulated above, by Stalin himself.
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In his final book The Ontology of Social Being, Lukács (1986) repeats this criti-
cism of Stalinism. He for example speaks in it of ‘Stalin’s brutal manipulation’5 
(722) and that ‘Stalin’s ideology brought it about to reify Marxism itself ’ (600).6 
‘It is important to note that Stalin in such cases acted based on purely tactical 
considerations and used the theoretical analysis of the particular historical situ-
ation as pure means of propaganda for his already taken decision’ (499).7 
Lukács (1991) argues that Stalinism was economically reductionist and focused 
its politics of how to catch up with and overtake Western capitalism on rapid 
industrialisation. Questions of socialist democracy were ignored. Stalin argued 
that the ‘party must commit itself to build the industrial base of socialism with the 
greatest speed regardless of the human cost to the population and without certainty 
that these draconian measures would produce the requisite industrial foundation’ 
(Lukács 1991, 113). Lukács considers the Soviets that emerged in the Paris Com-
mune of 1871 and in the Russian revolutions of 1905 and 1917 as expressions of 
grassroots socialist democracy (125–126, 144). Stalin reified the dialectic (130) and 
ideologically dressed up totalitarian bureaucracy that opposes socialist democracy 
as Marxism: Stalin destroyed ‘every tendency that might act as a precondition for 
socialist democracy. The Soviet system practically ceased to exist’ (133). Stalinism 
brands every dissenting viewpoint as an enemy of the people. Anyone 
who does not agree with the official, tactically determined party deci-
sions is judged as a subversive, or the direct tool of the agents of impe-
rialism. An effort is made to destroy them with the organized means of 
the government apparatus. That was the method of the Great Purge Tri-
als. […] The preservation of Stalinism is the greatest barrier to the rise 
of socialist democratization inside the domains of socialism. It is equally 
the major barrier to international cooperation and the integrating of all 
people striving for a renaissance of the genuine method of Marx (169). 
All knowledge stands in relations to nature and society because humans act 
within natural and social environments. Lukács considers only art that is a 
socialist reflection of political life as true art, whereas Adorno and others see 
such an understanding as instrumental and stress the importance of abstracted, 
experimental, and autonomous knowledge in art. Lukács understood the 
notion of reflection (Widerspiegelung) as a realistic mirroring of reality in art. 
Mirroring is a category that can create the impression that all knowledge strives 
to be an exact mapping of nature and society. 
3.3.4. Adorno on the Truth of Art
In contrast to Lukács, for Theodor W. Adorno (1997) the truth of an artwork 
lies in an autonomous aesthetic logic that is not subsumed under the logic of 
domination so that it constitutes a different, non-instrumental logic. Art 
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becomes social by its opposition to society, and it occupies this position 
only as autonomous art. By crystallizing in itself as something unique 
to itself, rather than complying with existing social norms and qualify-
ing as “socially useful”, it criticizes society by merely existing, for which 
puritans of all stripes condemn it (225–226). 
‘Insofar as a social function can be predicated for artworks, it is their func-
tionlessness’ (227). If an artwork becomes instrumental to and a function of 
something, then for Adorno it loses its truth. Functionlessness is for Adorno 
the symbol of freedom beyond capitalism and class. So his search for elements 
that are functionless and his critique of how the commodity form tries to func-
tionalise almost everything is a dialectical anticipation of a free society and the 
ascertainment of the need of such a society. 
For Adorno, the criteria that Lukács’ aesthetics advance are therefore 
already a form of instrumentalism. He argues that although Lukács tried to 
broaden the concept of socialist realism, it remained rather dogmatic, reject-
ing most of modern literature as decadent, sick, or reactionary. ‘Art exists 
within reality, has its function in it, and is also inherently mediated with real-
ity in many ways. But nevertheless, as art, by its very concept it stands in 
an antithetical relationship to the status quo’ (Adorno 1958, 224). Art can 
display and create illusions and fictitious reality, which for Adorno does not 
make it bad art. There is an ‘“aesthetic difference” from existence’ (225), a 
non-immediacy with established facts (227). The ‘work of art does not have 
something immediately real as its subject matter’ (232). Lukács’ later aesthetic 
theory would be too close to the catechism of socialist realism, ‘the ideologi-
cally sanctioned copy theory of knowledge’ (236). Comparable to Adorno, 
Ernst Bloch also criticises Lukács’ aesthetics for assuming the existence of a 
‘closed […] reality’ and the equation of experimental art ‘with a condition of 
decadence’ (in: Adorno et al. 1980, 22). Bertolt Brecht also commented that 
dogmatic art critics like Lukács or Alfred Kurella ‘want to play the apparatchik 
and exercise control over other people. Everyone of their criticisms contains 
a threat’ (in: Adorno et al. 1980, 97). 
3.3.5. Adorno on Jazz
But isn’t Adorno’s assessment of jazz quite comparable to Lukács’ contempt for 
anti-realistic literature? Some observers think so. So for example Robert W. 
Witkin (2000, 145) argues: ‘At best Adorno’s attack on jazz seems to be out of 
sympathy with informed opinion on the subject; at worst it appears to be reac-
tionary and possibly racist’. Jazz originated in the context of black experiences 
of slavery and segregation. The argument that some make is that Adorno is rac-
ist and argues that jazz is problematic because of its black origins and because 
it lacks ‘whiteness’. 
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It is a strange form of reverse elitism and top-down judgement when scholars 
argue that Adorno, who came from a Jewish family and experienced the con-
sequences of anti-Semitism in Nazi Germany when he had to flee, is a racist. 
Adorno does not make racist arguments about jazz. In his article On Jazz, he 
criticises the commercial character of jazz ‘as a mass commodity’ (Adorno 1936, 
473) that ‘wants to improve its marketability and veil its own commodity charac-
ter’ (473). Jamie Owen Daniel (1989/1990, 39–40) writes in an introduction to the 
English translation of the essay that it is ‘not about jazz as such, but rather about 
[…] its commercial production and consumption’. One should certainly refuse 
allegiance to Adorno when he denies that ‘jazz has anything to do with genuine 
black music’ (477) and that its arrangement is ‘identical to that of a military band’ 
so that it ‘can be easily adapted for use by fascism’ (485). The Nazis prohibited jazz 
and any music performed by black people. They considered it to be ‘degenerate’ 
art and spoke of ‘nigger jazz’.8 Adorno’s assessment is problematic, but not racist. 
Also in the essay On the Fetish Character in Music and the Regression of Lis-
tening (Adorno 1991, 29–60), Adorno makes clear that his criticism concerns 
the commodity form of music, art, and culture: ‘The listener is converted, along 
his line of least resistance, into the acquiescent purchaser’ (32). He is for exam-
ple critical of the use of music in advertising: 
For all contemporary musical life is dominated by the commodity form; 
the last pre-capitalist residues have been eliminated. Music […] serves 
in America today as an advertisement for commodities which one must 
acquire in order to be able to hear music. If the advertising function is 
carefully dimmed in the case of serious music, it always breaks through 
in the case of light music (37–38).
Adorno was not unaware of the fact that it is not just pop and rock music that 
can be turned into a commodity. He saw that no form of music is immune to 
the commodity form. So, for example, the Salzburg Festival is considered as 
one of the world’s primary festivals of classical music. In 2015, the prices for a 
subscription package for attending a series of 3–5 of the events ranged between 
€129.60 and €1,231.20.9 In 2013, the Salzburg Festival’s revenues from ticket 
sales amounted to €28.3 million.10 Classical music is just like pop and rock 
music a culture industry, which renders the distinction between classical and 
popular or entertainment/light music and serious music superfluous. Adorno 
identified this tendency: 
The differences in the reception of official “classical” music and light 
music no longer have any real significance. They are only still manipu-
lated for reasons of marketability. The hit song enthusiast must be reas-
sured that his idols are not too elevated for him, just as the visitor to 
philharmonic concerts is confirmed in his status (Adorno 1991, 35).
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If all forms of music and culture can be commodified, then they also must have 
the potential to resist commodification independent of musical style. Music is 
a common good in the sense that new music reflects the history of music and 
is influenced by other music. The logical consequence should be to treat all 
culture and music as commons instead of as commodity. The Internet partly de-
commodifies music and culture by file sharing and partly creates new strategies 
of commodification (e.g. iTunes, Spotify). All of this takes however place within 
capitalist society, which creates contradictions between fans, the culture indus-
try, amateur and professional artists, as well as between the content industry 
that tries to police copyrights and the ‘openness’ industry (e.g. YouTube) that 
sells advertisements and therefore welcomes free and open culture as strategy 
for attracting audiences whose attention is sold as commodities to advertisers. 
Heinz Steinert (2003) reminds us that the point of Adorno’s theory of the cul-
ture industry is not to criticise specific artistic practices, forms, or contents, but 
the abstract ‘principle of commodity-form cultural activity’ (10). So we cannot 
say that Adorno’s view of jazz was racist. His essays on jazz were rather con-
cerned about the commercial form of culture in general. 
3.3.6. Knowledge and Communication
We can now try to generalise the conclusions from the debate about aesthetics 
between Lukács and Adorno for knowledge in general. All individual and col-
lective knowledge takes place in the context of both nature and society. These 
contexts condition, but do not determine the form and content of knowl-
edge. Humans are part of social systems, in which they communicate, i.e. they 
exchange knowledge and can thereby create new individual knowledge and 
reproduce existing individual knowledge. Social groups, organisations, social 
systems, and society at large also create based on individual knowledge and 
through communication of collective knowledge that represents and describes 
important features of these systems. In class-based and dominative societies, 
these knowledge structures also represent class structures and structures of 
domination, as well as the struggles for defining how and what these systems 
communicate to the social environment. Knowledge in class-based societies 
is class knowledge, which does not mean that the knowledge of the dominant 
class is always false and the one of the dominated class always true (the oppo-
site can be the case), but rather that knowledge in class-based society is shaped 
by struggles about how to and who can define reality. Individual knowledge, 
communication, and social knowledge have specific contents, in which human 
relationships to nature and society are reflected. This reflection is however not 
a mirroring, but a complex, non-linear relation, whose character depends on 
the kind of knowledge that is being formed. So for example paintings can be 
very realistic trying to portray a part of nature and society in a photographic 
manner or very abstract so that there is no intention to map nature or society, 
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but where nature and society are only experiential contexts of the artist, who 
creates abstractions from ideas that are situated in social and natural contexts. 
3.3.7. Adorno on the Dialectic of Subject and Object
In his first study on Hegel’s epistemology, Adorno (1963) discusses the dialectic 
of subject and object in relation to knowledge. He argues that there is not sim-
ply a human subject and an independent outside world as object of thought, but 
a dialectic of subject and object: 
Hegel’s critique strikes at the empty center of the static analysis of knowl-
edge into subject and object […], and the blow he strikes is so deadly 
because he does not set up an irrational unity of subject and object in 
opposition to that analysis but instead preserves the distinct moments 
of the subjective and the objective while grasping them as mediated by 
one another. The insight that in the realm of the Geisteswissenschaften, 
wherever the object itself is mediated by ‘spirit’, knowledge becomes 
fruitful not by excluding the subject but through its utmost exertions, 
through all its impulses and experiences – this insight […] comes from 
Hegel’s system (Adorno 1963, 7).
Figure 3.1 generalises Adorno’s insights and visualises the production of 
knowledge. All human cognition takes place in the context of a social environ-
ment, in which humans communicate, and a natural environment, with which 
humans stand in a physical metabolism. Cognition is the production of new 
individual knowledge and the reproduction of individual knowledge. Cogni-
tion’s objects are nature and society. Individuals do not always have to com-
municate with other humans in society to form and reproduce thoughts. They 
can merely observe and thereby gather experiences that form and reproduce 
knowledge. Individuals also do not have to work in order to cognise, i.e. they 
do not have to create social use-values out of nature and culture that satisfy 
general social needs. They can merely act in a social and natural environment 
without working and thereby form and reproduce knowledge. But of course 
all work is a dialectical unity of brain and body activity, mental and physical 
dimensions. Knowledge work in addition creates social knowledge as social 
use-value, whereas physical work creates physical products.
3.3.8. Adorno on Language and Communication
In his third study of Hegel’s epistemology, Adorno (1963) makes an important 
contribution on how to understand the relationship of communication and the 
reality that language and communication express: 
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As an expression of the thing itself, language is not fully reducible to 
communication with others. Nor, however – and Hegel knew this – is 
it simply independent of communication. Otherwise it would elude all 
critique, even in its relationship to the matter at hand, and would reduce 
that relationship to an arbitrary presumption. Language as expression 
of the thing itself and language as communication are interwoven. The 
ability to name the matter at hand is developed under the compulsion 
to communicate it, and that element of coercion is preserved in it; con-
versely, it could not communicate anything that it did not have as its 
own intention, undistracted by other considerations. This dialectic plays 
itself out within the medium of language itself; it is not merely a fall 
from grace on the part of an inhumane social zeal that watches to make 
sure that no one thinks anything that cannot be communicated. Even 
a linguistic approach of the utmost integrity cannot do away with the 
antagonism between what is in itself and what is for others (105).
In communication, the subject relates to the object via language because lan-
guage is needed in order to communicate views of the objective world to oth-
ers. At the same time, the objective world relates to society via the individ-
ual languaging being that has an interest in parts of this objective world and 
appropriates the world linguistically out of personal interest, which enables 
Figure 3.1: The production of knowledge.
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the communication with others. Adorno shows that there is a dialectic of the 
social, the individual, and the objective world in the communication process. 
Communication is the symbolically expressed social relation that allows the 
individual A to relate to others O and other individuals O to relate to A and 
other individuals as their others. They together and individually relate to the 
objective world that consists of nature and society. 
Communication is a form of symbolic interaction, in which humans mutu-
ally make meaning of the knowledge others utter. Some, but not all commu-
nication processes result in co-ordination and co-operation processes that 
create knowledge products that satisfy the human need to be informed. Such 
knowledge products can also be of a more individual nature, for example 
a novel written by an author. Such a novel is however also a social product 
because authors form ideas in communication processes with other humans 
and by reading the works of others. The quality of knowledge products and 
their specific relations to society and nature depend on the type of knowl-
edge. Adequately understanding knowledge therefore requires a typology of 
the forms of knowledge.
3.3.9. Fritz Machlup: Types of Knowledge
What types of knowledge are there? Let us have a look at two of the most impor-
tant approaches, the ones by the economist Fritz Machlup and the critical theo-
rist Jürgen Habermas. Machlup is a very influential social thinker because his 
1962 book The Production and Distribution of Knowledge in the United States 
was an early formulation of the claim that there is a transition towards a post-
industrial knowledge society. 
For Machlup, knowledge production is ‘any human (or human-induced) 
activity effectively designed to create, alter, or confirm in a human mind a 
meaningful apperception, awareness, cognizance, or consciousness of anything 
whatsoever’ (Machlup 1980, 92). He draws a distinction between five classes of 
knowledge (Machlup 1980, 108; 1962, 21–22):
1) Practical knowledge: Knowledge that is ‘useful in the knower’s work’ 
(Machlup 1980, 108);
2) Intellectual knowledge: Knowledge that satisfies ‘intellectual curiosity, 
regarded as part of liberal education, humanistic and scientific learning, 
general culture’ (ibid.);
3) Small-talk and pastime knowledge: Knowledge that is ‘satisfying the non-
intellectual curiosity or his desire for light entertainment and emotional 
stimulation, including local gossip, news of crimes and accidents, light 
novels, stories, jokes, games, etc.’ (ibid.);
4) Spiritual knowledge: Knowledge that is ‘related to his religious knowledge 
of God and of the ways to the salvation of the soul’ (ibid.),
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5) Unwanted knowledge: Knowledge that is ‘outside of his interests’ (ibid.).






f) and other practical knowledge.
There are several problems of Machlup’s theory of knowledge:
• Abstractness: it is abstract and does not stress the class and contested char-
acter of knowledge in modern society.
• Arbitrariness: Machlup’s typology of knowledge is arbitrary. He does not pro-
vide an underlying theoretical criterion for distinguishing these five types. 
• Religious fetishism: the category of spiritual knowledge presupposes that 
God and salvation of the soul exist. He does not see religious knowledge as 
a specific form of ethical/moral knowledge, but rather reifies it.
• Elitism: Machlup (1962, 25) says that chamber music is intellectual knowl-
edge because it requires attention, serious strain, and concentration, 
whereas he classifies rock ’n’ roll as pastime knowledge (Machlup 1962, 25). 
He makes an elitist distinction between high culture and low/popular cul-
ture that reminds one of conservative cultural theorists such as Matthew 
Arnold, who were criticised by people like Raymond Williams for their elit-
ist concept of culture. Machlup indirectly expresses that he thinks fans of 
pop culture are stupid and primitive. ‘My decisions may possibly be judged, 
by my critics, as high-brow or even snobbish’ (Machlup 1962, 25). 
3.3.10. Matthew Arnold 
Matthew Arnold defined culture as cultivation that produces individuals 
who are ‘led, not by their class spirit, but by a general humane spirit, by 
the love of human perfection’ (1869/2006, 81) and are educated by engaging 
with ‘the best which has been thought and said in the world’ (1869/2006, 5). 
Culture is: 
a pursuit of our total perfection by means of getting to know, on all 
the matters which most concern us, the best which has been thought 
and said in the world, and, through this knowledge, turning a stream 
of fresh and free thought upon our stock notions and habits, which we 
now follow staunchly but mechanically, vainly imagining that there is a 
virtue in following them staunchly which makes up for the mischief of 
following them mechanically. 
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Raymond Williams says that such a concept of culture is oriented on reproduc-
ing existing capitalist values and thereby society as it is: the ‘culture which is 
then being defended is not excellence but familiarity, not the knowable but only 
the known values’ (Williams 1980, 8). 
3.3.11. Habermas: Three Forms of Knowledge
Jürgen Habermas (1971) distinguishes three forms of knowledge: 
information that expands our power of technical control; interpreta-
tions that make possible the orientation of action within common tra-
ditions; and analyses that free consciousness from its dependence on 
hypostatized powers. These viewpoints originate in the interest struc-
ture of a species that is linked in its roots to definite means of social 
organization: work, language, and power. The human species secures 
its existence in systems of social labor and self-assertion through vio-
lence, through tradition-bound social life in ordinary-language com-
munication, and with the aid of ego identities that at every level of 
individuation reconsolidate the consciousness of the individual in 
relation to the norms of the group. Accordingly the interests consti-
tutive of knowledge are linked to the functions of an ego that adapts 
itself to its external conditions through learning processes, is initi-
ated into the communication system of a social life-world by means 
of self-formative processes, and constructs an identity in the conflict 
between instinctual aims and social constraints. In turn these achieve-
ments become part of the productive forces accumulated by a society, 
the cultural tradition through which a society interprets itself, and the 
legitimations that a society accepts or criticizes. My […] thesis is thus 
that knowledge-constitutive interests take form in the medium of work, 
language, and power (313).
Habermas’s (1971) threefold distinction between technical knowledge, eman-
cipatory knowledge, and practical knowledge reflects his later distinction that 
he draws in the Theory of Communicative Action between the economic system, 
the political system, and the life-world as the three realms of modern society 
(Habermas 1984, 1987).
There are, however, also problems in Habermas’ theory of knowledge and 
human interest and his strict separation of work (economy), power (politics) 
and language (culture, lifeworld):
• The labour process does not necessarily have to be a form of the control of 
nature and humans. In an emancipated society, work turns from labour into 
well-rounded human activity that is a form of freedom beyond necessity.
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• Language and communication are not innocent and pure, but are often also 
media and processes of control and power.
• Power and power struggles are not just limited to politics, but also take 
place in culture and the economy. 
The point is then to construct a non-dualist theory of knowledge that does not 
separate work, communication, and power. 
3.4. The Dialectics of Knowledge
3.4.1. Raymond Williams: Cultural Materialism 
We can draw on Habermas’ distinction that knowledge production is not 
confined to a single dimension of society, but can take place in all of society’s 
subsystems: the economy, politics, and culture. The economy is the system, in 
which humans create use-values that satisfy human needs. In the political sys-
tem, humans make collective decisions on how to shape and regulate society. 
In the cultural system, they give meanings to the world that help them to define 
themselves (identity) and to make sense of the world (norms and worldviews 
relating to others and the world). 
Raymond Williams’ approach of Cultural Materialism allows us to under-
stand these three realms not as independent, but as simultaneously identical 
and non-identical, i.e. as a dialectic (see Fuchs 2015, chapter 2): knowledge 
work creates economic and non-economic social knowledge that satisfies the 
human need of information. Knowledge is a material dialectical process, in 
which humans connect their ideas to each other and create new knowledge 
structures. This production involves processes of work: social knowledge 
emerges from knowledge work, which is an economic process. All knowledge 
production is an economic process. Depending on the type and role of knowl-
edge in society, knowledge does not need to be confined to the economy but 
can extend to society at large, i.e. also to politics and culture. Economic, politi-
cal, and cultural knowledge have an economic dimension and a potential non-
economic dimension. 
3.4.2. Adorno on Hegel, Knowledge and Work
Adorno (1963), in his first study of Hegel’s epistemology, discusses how Hegel 
relates knowledge and work and mental and non-mental work. He thereby 
makes an important contribution to the analysis of how the economy is related 
to knowledge production. Adorno (1963) stresses that for Hegel, the mind is 
active and producing (17). ‘The reference of the productive moment of spirit 
back to a universal subject rather than to an individual who labors is what 
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defines labor as something organized, something social; its own “rationality”, 
the ordering of functions, is a social relationship’ (18). In the Phenomenology, 
Hegel would see mind as a form of work (21). ‘The path natural conscious-
ness follows to the identity of absolute knowledge is itself work [“labor” in the 
original translation]. The relationship of spirit to what is given manifests itself 
on the model of a social process, a process of work [“labor” in the original 
translation]’ (21). Adorno argues that for Hegel the mind is a moment of social 
work, ‘the moment that is separate from physical work [“labor” in the original 
translation]’ (23). But physical work would also depend on nature: Work can-
not ‘be conceived without the concept of nature, any more than can nature 
without’ work: ‘the two are distinct from and mediated by one another at the 
same time’ (23).
Hegel (1807/1977) discusses these aspects of knowledge and work in the pref-
ace to his Phenomenology of Spirit. Philosophical knowledge would be obtained 
through mental work: ‘True thoughts and scientific insight are only to be won 
through the work [“labour” in the original translation] of the Notion’ (Hegel 
1807/1977, 43). He argues that knowledge is connected to non-knowledge. 
Mental work would turn experience into knowledge. 
It is this coming-to-be of Science as such or of knowledge, that is 
described in this Phenomenology of Spirit. Knowledge in its first phase, 
or immediate Spirit, is the non-spiritual, i.e. sense-consciousness. In order 
to become genuine knowledge, to beget the element of Science which is 
the pure Notion of Science itself, it must travel a long way and work its 
passage (Hegel 1807/1977, 15).
For Hegel, mental and physical work stand in a dialectical relationship, 
they are identical and non-identical, just like there is a dialectic of work 
and nature. Adorno (1963) argues that the separation of mental and physi-
cal labour in class-based societies comes along with a labour ideology that 
ascribes to labour ‘inherent value’. ‘The metaphysics of labor and the appro-
priation of the labor of others are complementary’ (24). ‘For the absoluti-
zation of labor is that of the class relationship: a humankind free of labor 
would be free of domination’ (26). One problem with Hegel would be that in 
the final instance he ‘dissolves labor into a moment of spirit’ (24) so that the 
concept of the absolute spirit reifies bourgeois society’s class-based forms of 
labour. 
3.4.3. Power
Power is human actors’ capacity to influence the development of the social sys-
tems that affect their lives. Power is therefore not limited to the political system, 
but has economic, political, and cultural dimensions (see table 3.1).
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3.4.4. Individual and Social Knowledge
Economic, political, and cultural structures are regularities that emerge from 
co-ordinated social production, enable and constrain individual and social 
human practices that produce new structures and reproduce existing ones. All 
social systems and societies are based on a dialectic of structure and agency: 
Humans produce social structures that enable and constrain human practices 
that again produce and reproduce social structures. This dialectic of structure 
and agency is situated in specific economic, political or cultural contexts, in 
which certain structures are produced and reproduced (Fuchs 2008): Use-
values are the key economic structures, rules the key political structures, and 
collective meanings the key cultural structures. Modern society is a society that 
is based on the accumulation of money (that mediates the production of use-
values) in the economic system, political influence in the political system, and 
reputation in the cultural system (Fuchs 2008, chapter 3). In modern society, 
structures take on a duality of general features and roles in accumulation that 
correspond to a generalisation of the duality of the commodity as use-value and 
exchange-value that Marx (1867) identified for the modern economy. Mod-
ern society is based on a dialectic of general social structures and structures of 
accumulation: the modern economy is shaped by a dialectic of use-values and 
monetary capital, the modern political system by a dialectic of rules and influ-
ence, and the modern cultural system by a dialectic of collective meaning and 
reputation (table 3.2). General social structures become subsumed under the 
logic of accumulation (Fuchs 2008, chapter 3).
Work, political engagement, and cultural activity produce and reproduce 
use-values, rules, and meanings (table 3.2). The structures produced by such 
Dimension of 
society
Definition of power Structures of power in modern 
society
Economy Control of use-values and 
resources that are produced, 
distributed and consumed. 
Control of money and capital.
Politics Influence on collective deci-
sions that determine aspects of 
the lives of humans in certain 
communities and social 
systems.
Control of governments, 
bureaucratic state institutions, 
parliament, military, police, par-
ties, lobby groups, civil society 
groups, etc.
Culture Definition of moral values and 
meaning that shape what is 
considered as important, repu-
table and worthy in society.
Control of structures that define 
meaning and moral values in 
society (e.g. universities, religious 
groups, intellectual circles, opin-
ion making groups, etc.).
Table 3.1: Three forms of power (Source: Fuchs 2014, chapter 2).
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social practices are combinations of physical resources and knowledge. All use-
values are objectification of activities of the human body and the human brain 
and they are to specific degrees tangible or intangible. Rules such as laws are 
intangible social conventions that are written down in texts and enforced by 
concrete human beings. Collective meanings can be more or less tangible and 
intangible. A tradition, for example, is mainly intangible, but it is carried out 
by humans with the help of artefacts. Concrete human beings acting socially 
in their social environment and physically in the natural environment produce 
and reproduce general social structures. As part of their practices (work, politi-
cal engagement, cultural activity), they draw on their individual knowledge 
and create new social knowledge. The dialectic of individual knowledge and 
social knowledge products is part of the dialectic of structure and agency that is 
at the heart of society and all social system (Fuchs 2008, chapter 3). Knowledge 
structures are dialectically mediated with general social structures (table 3.2). 
3.4.5. The Individual and the Species-Being
Adorno (1998) reflects on the dialectics of structure and agency and individual 
and social knowledge in his article On Subject and Object, where he speaks of 
a dialectic of the individual subject and the human species-being as subject: 
No concept of the subject can have the element of individual humanity 
[…] separated from it in thought; without any reference to it, subject 
would lose all significance. Conversely, the particular human individual, 
as soon as one reflects upon it under the guise of the universality of 
its concept, which does not signify merely something particular being 
hic et nunc, is already transformed into a universal, similar to what was 
expressed in the idealist concept of the subject; even the expression 
‘particular person’ requires the concept of species simply in order to be 
meaningful (Adorno 1998, 245). 
The dependence of ‘cognitive subjects upon space, time, and forms of thought 
marks their dependence on the species’ (Adorno 1998, 252). Adorno com-
ments on the dialectic of the universal and the particular: ‘Neither one can 
Key structures Individual knowledge Social knowledge
Economy use-values, money skills knowledge products
Politics rules, influence political knowledge collective political 
worldviews
Culture meanings, reputation cultural tastes collective identities
Table 3.2: Individual and social knowledge structures.
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exist without the other, the particular only as determined and this universal, 
the universal only as the determination of a particular and thus itself particular. 
Both of them are and are not. This is one of the strongest motives of a nonideal-
ist dialectics’ (Adorno 1998, 257). So for Adorno, the human being is universal 
and particular at the same time: it can only be an individual by being a social 
species-being and only social by also being individual. There is a dialectic of the 
individual and the social. 
Table 3.2 gives an overview of society’s three subsystems’ key structures and 
their forms of individual and social knowledge. This typology of knowledge has 
in contrast to Machlup’s, the advantage that it is systematic and not a simple list 
of various forms of knowledge. It is based on the distinction of three distinct, 
but interconnected subsystems of society, which is an insight that we take from 
Habermas’ theory. 
How is table 3.2 related to figure 3.1? Individuals based on their individual 
knowledge (skills in the economy, political knowledge, cultural tastes) enter 
social systems, in which they, through communication processes, create and 
reproduce individual knowledge. Such communication can also result in the 
production and reproduction of social knowledge: collective knowledge prod-
ucts in the economy, collective political worldviews in the political system, and 
collective identities in the cultural system. These social knowledge structures 
enable and constrain the production and reproduction of individual knowl-
edge. The dialectic of individual and social knowledge shapes and is shaped 
by the production and reproduction of use-values in the economy, rules in the 
political system, and meanings in the cultural system. A specific social system 
or organisation always has economic, political, and cultural dimensions. One 
of these dimensions can however be dominant. So, for example, a factory pro-
ducing chairs is predominantly an economic organisation, but also has a com-
pany identity as a cultural feature, and specific decision structures as a political 
characteristic. 
3.4.6. Dominative Knowledge and Emancipatory Knowledge
Modern society is inherently competitive and based on structures of accumula-
tion so that both general social structures and knowledge structures have a sub-
sumed character and are instruments for the accumulation of money, political 
influence, and reputation. Structures of accumulation result in interest conflicts 
between those who control power and those who are excluded from it. Modern 
society is therefore both a class and a dominative society. Habermas argues that 
emancipatory knowledge is constituted in struggles that question dominant 
powers in the political system. I have argued that power is not just political, 
but a more general social structure. Emancipatory power struggles question 
social structures of accumulation and domination that benefit one group at the 
expense of others. Knowledge is one form of power. Therefore emancipatory 
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struggles have the power to create alternative, emancipatory knowledge that 
question dominative knowledge. 
Table 3.3 gives an overview of the conflict between dominative, ideological 
knowledge and emancipatory knowledge. Concrete individuals and groups in 
social relations produce knowledge. Knowledge structures are not abstract, but 
grounded in social relations between human actors. Knowledge workers create 
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parties and politicians: 
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global unity in diversity 
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tors, artists: tabloidised, 
one-dimensional culture
Actors, entertainers, direc-

























Racists, divisionists: racism Universalists: intercul-
tural understanding
Table 3.3: Ideological and emancipatory knowledge (Source: Fuchs 2015, 
chapter 3).
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social knowledge products that have economic and non-economic roles inside the 
economy and in society at large. Table 3.3 shows both the actors creating domina-
tive and emancipatory knowledge and the type of social knowledge they create.
3.4.7. The Dialectics of Knowledge
The production of social knowledge is dialectical in a manifold way: social sys-
tems are based on a dialectic of general social structures and knowledge struc-
tures and a dialectic of individual knowledge and social knowledge. In domi-
native social systems, there are interest conflicts about the control of power 
that also result in a conflict between dominative and emancipatory knowledge. 
Knowledge in such systems is therefore dialectical in the sense that it is con-
tested in interest conflicts. Struggles for the definition and control of knowl-
edge tend to be asymmetrical in that dominant actors, who control money, 
influence, and reputation have structural advantages. They can try to mobilise 
these resources in order to legitimate their dominance and hinder struggles 
and alternatives. They can exert physical, structural, and ideological violence 
in order to uphold their dominant position. There is no guarantee that alterna-
tive structures and alternative, emancipatory knowledge can emerge or that 
actors and movements organising such alternatives can exert enough power 
to become significant counter-hegemonic forces. There is a political economy 
of resource asymmetry inherent in modern society that poses structural dis-
advantages for alternative movements, alternative structures, and emancipa-
tory knowledge. This becomes evident in the realm of social media: Facebook 
dominates the world of social networking sites by attracting billions of users, 
whereas non-commercial alternatives such as Diaspora or Crabgrass have thus 
far remained marginal and only attract comparatively few users. 
3.4.8. Johan Galtung: Violence
Based on the works of Johan Galtung (1990), violence can be defined as ‘avoid-
able insults to basic human needs, and more generally to life, lowering the real 
level of needs satisfaction below what is potentially possible’ (Galtung 1990, 
292). Violence can according to Galtung (1990) be divided into three princi-
pal forms: direct violence (through physical intervention; an event), structural 
violence (through state or organizational mandate; a process), and ideological 
violence (dehumanizing or otherwise exclusionary representations; an invari-
ance). These forms operate through the denial of four basic needs: survival 
needs (through killing and exploitation), well-being needs (through maiming, 
sanctions, and exploitation), identity needs (through desocialization, resociali-
zation and segmentation), and freedom needs (through repression, detention, 
expulsion, marginalization and fragmentation) (Galtung 1990).
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3.4.9. Ideology as Cultural Violence
Ideology as specific form of knowledge is according to Galtung a form of vio-
lence. Habermas (1971) assumes that there is an inherent connection of knowl-
edge and human interests. He argues that critical knowledge has the poten-
tial to understand the variant and invariant dimensions of reality and to use 
ideology critique for unmasking ‘ideologically frozen relations of dependence 
that can in principle be transformed’ (310) so that unreflected consciousness 
is substituted by reflected knowledge and has a potential to become ‘critically 
mediated knowledge’ (310) that can become the foundation of transformations 
of reality. Ideology furnishes ‘our actions with justifying motives in place of the 
real ones’ (311)
Ideology is a semiotic level of domination and exploitation – it practices the 
production and spread of information and meanings in the form of ideas, belief 
systems, artefacts, systems and institutions so that domination and exploita-
tion are justified or naturalised. An ideology is a social knowledge product that 
represents and justifies one group’s or individual’s power, domination or exploi-
tation of other groups or individuals by misrepresenting, one-dimensionally 
presenting or distorting reality in symbolic representations. 
Adorno has described ideology in a Lukácsian sense as ‘a consciousness 
which is objectively necessary and yet at the same time false, as the intertwin-
ing of truth and falsehood’ (Adorno 1954, 189). Ideology: 
is justification. It presupposes the experience of a societal condition 
which has already become problematic and therefore requires a defense 
just as much as does the idea of justice itself, which would not exist 
without such necessity for apologetics and which has as its model the 
exchange of things which are comparable (Adorno 1954, 189–190). 
From the existence of ideology in class-based society follows for the Frankfurt 
School the necessity of the critique of ideology, which Adorno defines as ‘the 
confrontation of ideology with its own truth’ (Adorno 1954, 190). The critique 
of ideology ‘is the negation defined in the Hegelian sense, the confrontation of 
the spiritual with its realization, and has as its presupposition the distinction of 
the truth or falsity of the judgment just as much as the requirement for truth in 
that which is criticized’ (Adorno 1954, 191).
3.4.10. Ideological Knowledge, Identity and Non-Identity 
Also Adorno’s second and third study of Hegel’s epistemology make impor-
tant contributions to the question what ideological knowledge is and how 
it can be deconstructed. In the second study, he discusses the non-identity 
of the immediate and the mediated. Adorno (1963) stresses that for Hegel 
Theodor W. Adorno and the Critical Theory of  Knowledge 103
immediacy is not really immediate. ‘One can no more speak of mediation 
without something immediate than, conversely, one can find something 
immediate that is not mediated’ (59). For Hegel, existence is not what it 
appears to be, its essence is hidden behind appearances. The ‘concept and 
the thing itself are not one and the same’ (70–71). Existence is for Hegel only 
actual if it becomes true. Hegel’s critique of immediacy ‘becomes the figure 
of a comprehensive commitment to a lack of naiveté’ (64). Hegel’s philosophy 
would be anti-positivist (65). He ‘demonstrated that concept, judgement, and 
conclusion, unavoidable instruments for ascertaining through consciousness 
something that exists, always end up contradicting that existing thing; that 
all individual judgements, all individual concepts, all individual conclusions, 
are false by the criterion of an emphatic idea of truth’ (76). Ideologies in con-
trast are identity thinking, they aim to deny and delegitimise non-identical 
moment that can go beyond immediate existence and have potentials for the 
transformation of society.
This truth however lies for Hegel in the absolute spirit, in which the non-
identity of subject and object is sublated into identity: 
The True is the whole. But the whole is nothing other than the essence 
consummating itself through its development. Of the Absolute it must 
be said that it is essentially a result, that only in the end is it what it truly 
is; and that precisely in this consists its nature, viz. to be actual, subject, 
the spontaneous becoming of itself (Hegel 1807/1977, 11). 
Adorno (1963) argues that the irrationality of the society founded on exchange, 
the irrationality of modern rationality that has enabled Auschwitz, shows that 
Hegel has to be turned from head to toe: ‘The whole is the untrue’ (87). This 
falseness of the modern totality would however contain glimpses of hope that 
the totality can be made reasonable: ‘The ray of light that reveals the whole to 
be untrue in all its moments in none other than utopia, the utopia of the whole 
truth, which is still to be realized’ (88). 
In the third study of Hegel’s epistemology, Adorno (1963) argues that Hegel 
rejects positivism also by the dialectical language he uses in his works, in which 
a concept always reflects an other and is at the same time identical and non-
identical with this other: 
Through the explication of the concepts, in other words through what, 
according to traditional logic and epistemology, is accomplished by 
analytic judgements, the concept’s Other, the nonidentical, becomes 
evident within the concept itself, something implied in its meaning, 
without the scope of the concept being infringed upon. The concept 
is turned this way and that until it becomes clear that it is more than 
what it is (133). 
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Hegel would compel the reader to think dialectically and in a non-identical 
manner. Dialectical thinking in the way that Hegel and Adorno conceive it has 
the potential to deconstruct instrumentality and ideology by stressing non-
identity and the dialectic of identity and non-identity. 
Knowledge as ideology is violent and repressive. This violence takes on 
different forms in the economy, politics, and culture (see table 3.3). In the 
knowledge economy, ideology operates as the fetishism of commodities 
that alienates humans from the immediate experience of the subject and 
the social by veiling the abstract, the subject, and the social behind objects, 
namely the money and commodities. Knowledge commons that transcend 
the commodity form of knowledge stand in a contradiction to knowledge 
commodities. 
The digitisation of knowledge has taken this contradiction to a new level and 
has resulted in complex antagonisms between professional knowledge creators, 
consumers, citizen and amateur knowledge producers, the traditional media 
industries that sell content and access, and the openness industry that sells 
audiences and user data and provides open access to content. In the political 
world, ideological worldviews try to justify domination, whereas emancipatory 
worldviews challenge domination and struggle for participatory democracy. In 
the cultural world, ideological forms of culture are one-dimensional, do not 
significantly engage people, lack autonomy and therefore often represent par-
tial interests of dominative groups. 
3.4.11. Artistic Knowledge
In art, realistic art takes actual persons, societies, or times as their subject 
matter, whereas in experimental art there is an abstraction from actual 
reality. Abstract and experimental art is however according to Adorno not 
ideological, but tries to strengthen audiences’ imagination, which makes 
it anti-ideological. Realist and political art is not automatically ideologi-
cal, but becomes ideological if it identifies itself with a particular ideology 
and dominative group. Artworks’ relation to social reality is complex and 
ranges from a continuum with realist art on one end and abstract art on the 
other. One must also bear in mind that there are different forms of art that 
foreground different senses in artistic knowledge: the literary arts (texts), 
the visual arts (visual objects), the performing arts (socially performed art-
works), the digital arts, in which texts, the visual, and the social can con-
verge. Art is economically non-autonomous if it is dependent on marketing, 
branding, advertising, and the commodity form to survive. It is politically 
non-autonomous if it is commissioned by dominative powers in order to 
glorify their power. This was for example the case with a lot of artworks in 
traditional empires, in which art served the purpose of displaying the power 
of religion and emperors. 
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3.4.12. Academic Knowledge
In the academic system, there is, as Machlup (1980) stresses, a difference 
between knowledge in the natural sciences, the humanities and the social sci-
ences. Knowledge of natural sciences is positivist and aims to discover laws 
that allow mapping and predicting reality. The humanities and cultural sciences 
(languages, literature, philosophy, religion, ethics, arts) develop critical judge-
ments by interpreting and creating texts. The social sciences focus on human 
action just like the humanities, but are bound up in a conflict between criti-
cal and administrative academic knowledge. They take the humanities and/or 
the natural sciences as models, which results in conflicts and relations between 
the qualitative/the quantitative, theory/empirical research, a priori/a posteriori 
knowledge, reason/experience, etc. Habermas (1971, 303) argues that positivist 
knowledge dissociates normative values from facts and claims that knowledge 
is value-free. It is an ideological denial of the inherent connection of knowledge 
and social conflicts.
Academic knowledge is a systematic and coherent creation of knowledge 
about nature, humans, or society that is based on previous academic knowl-
edge and tries to obtain insights about dimensions of reality that are thus far 
unknown, unexplored, or need further exploration. Artistic knowledge is 
systematic like academic knowledge, but more practical. It appeals to human 
imagination, creativity, interpretation, and intuition. It is inherently open for 
interpretation and for the creation of meaning. Science has more fixed mean-
ings, whereas art more directly and as an immanent feature invites judgements 
of taste on the side of viewers, spectators, audiences, listeners, readers, etc. 
3.5. Conclusion
This chapter has argued that Adorno’s works are an important foundation for a 
critical theory of knowledge. It maintains that Adorno’s theory of knowledge is 
not, as often claimed in media and cultural studies, a form of media and cultural 
pessimism that sees humans as passive, manipulated by ideologies, and inca-
pable of resisting a society without alternatives. He saw alternative and critical 
potentials of the media and popular culture and identified a role for the media 
in education after Auschwitz. The interested reader will find quite a few radio 
broadcasts of Adorno’s talks and discussions with him online, which shows that 
he did not despise the media as such, but rather saw their educational potential 
and made very active use of media, especially radio broadcasts, himself. 
Adorno’s criticism of Georg Lukács’ aesthetic theory shows the dangers of 
assuming that knowledge is or should be a simple mapping of outside reality. 
Adorno saw this relationship as complex and dialectical. Based on his insights, 
foundations of a dialectical model of knowledge were developed that involves 
dialectics of the subject and the object, agency and structures, the individ-
106 Critical Theory of  Communication
ual and the social, society and nature, the economic and the non-economic 
(knowledge work creates social knowledge that not just has economic dimen-
sions, but can play a role in all realms of society), mental and physical work, 
general social structures and knowledge structures, individual knowledge and 
social knowledge. Adorno stresses the importance of the dialectic of identity 
and non-identity in Hegel’s work. 
The dialectics just mentioned are all dialectics of identity and non-identity 
that operate in the constitution, reproduction, and transformation of knowl-
edge. Each one of the poles of the dialectics exists only in itself as identity by 
relating to and grasping over into its other: the one is identical and non-iden-
tical with the other. Each one can only be itself by standing in a relation to an 
other. But the other is not just non-identical with the one because it is itself also 
a one that is an other for another one and therefore identical with itself and the 
other. 
In modern society, there is a dialectic of general social structures and structures 
of accumulation. In all class-based societies, we find conflicts of interests that 
are expressed in general social conflicts that include conflicts between hegem-
onic and counter-hegemonic knowledge. There is a general conflict between 
ideological/dominative knowledge and emancipatory knowledge. Often domi-
nant actors have structural advantages in the definition of social knowledge. In 
class-based societies, it tends to be much harder to diffuse critical, emancipatory 
knowledge throughout society than ideological, dominative knowledge. 
It is more likely that dominant classes and groups have ideological knowl-
edge than emancipatory knowledge. There is however no mapping of class 
position onto forms of knowledge. Marx and Engels themselves came from 
bourgeois families, but created critical knowledge. There is also no guarantee 
that being part of a dominated group results in non-ideological knowledge, as 
the phenomenon of racism among a specific share of the traditional working 
class shows. Adorno, in his works, doesn’t just foreground the power of ide-
ologies, he also stresses the importance that one can learn from Hegel’s anti-
positivist, dialectical language and thought how to criticise, deconstruct, and 
struggle against ideologies. 
Adorno’s works give us hope that instrumental knowledge that expresses par-
tial interests is not the final word and can be changed by critique, which is the 
very process of the dialectic and dialectical knowledge. ‘Critique of society is 
critique of knowledge, and vice versa’ (Adorno 1998, 250).
Notes
 1 https://70jahrenachauschwitz.wordpress.com/das-projekt/, accessed on 
5 March 2015.
 2 Translation from German: ‘Ich bin zwar Journalistin, aber als allererstes war 
das eigentlich eine sehr persönliche Motivation. Ich hab mich seit meiner 
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Kindheit eigentlich mit der Frage beschäftigt: Was ist der Holocaust? Wozu 
sind die Menschen dort fähig gewesen? Aber wie konnten die Menschen auch 
weiterleben, die diese Greueltaten erleiden mussten?’ (https://soundcloud.
com/mkwprojekt2012/umfrage-unter-den-teilnehmenden-warum-bin-ich-
hier, accessed on 5 March 2015).
 3 See for example: https://70jahrenachauschwitz.wordpress.com/medien 
beitrage-2/
 4 http://www.departments.bucknell.edu/russian/const/18cons01.html
 5 Translation from German: ‘Stalinschen brutalen Manipulation’.
 6 Translation from German: ‘die Stalinsche Ideologie es zustande gebracht 
hat, den Marxismus selbst zu verdinglichen’.
 7 Translation from German: ‘Wichtig ist, daß in allen solchen Fällen Stalin 
von rein taktischen Erwägungen ausging und die theoretische Analyse der 
jeweiligen historischen Lage als bloße Propagandamittel für seinen bereits 
gefällten Beschluß gebrauchte’.
 8 See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Negermusik
 9 Data source: http://www.salzburgerfestspiele.at/subscriptions#SERIES+1, 
accessed on 20 March 2015.
 10 Data source: http://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/316345/umfrage/
einnahmen-der-salzburger-festspiele/, accessed on 20 March 2015.
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4.1. Introduction
Douglas Kellner and Clayton Pierce (2014, 1) argue that ‘Herbert Marcuse 
synthesized Hegelian, Marxian and other currents of modern philosophy and 
modern philosophy in an attempt to reconstruct the Marxian theory in accord-
ance with changes in the trajectory of modern culture, politics, and society’. 
Peter Marcuse (2014, 433) writes that his father’s achievement was that he ana-
lysed ‘political conflicts, economic conflicts, and cultural conflicts – and, quite 
centrally and profoundly, how these conflicts relate to each other’. Given the 
breadth and depth of Marcuse’s Marxist theory of society, it is rewarding to ask 
how it can help us to understand aspects of contemporary economy, politics 
and culture and their interconnections and how we can re-actualise Marcuse’s 
approach for this purpose. My own contribution has in this respect been to 
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study inspired by Marcuse, Marx, Hegel and others the world of the Internet 
and digital media. 
4.1.1. Philosophy and Sociology of Technology
During my time as a PhD student at the Vienna University of Technology in 
Austria, I started teaching philosophy and sociology of technology to informat-
ics students in 2000. I had read Marx and made his analysis of technology in 
capitalism a centrepiece of my lectures. I however wanted to complement Marx 
by a critical analysis of the role of technology in the twentieth century. Like 
most students interested in Frankfurt School Critical Theory in the German-
speaking world, I had read Horkheimer, Adorno and Habermas. But I found 
their approaches did not sufficiently engage with the relationship of technology 
and society. I had at this time only read a couple of Herbert Marcuse’s essays. 
In the German-speaking world, students interested in critical theory are not so 
much encouraged to engage with Marcuse and many scholars have the (false) 
idea that Marcuse only copied Horkheimer and Adorno’s culture industry-
chapter and did not write much more than One-Dimensional Man. Facing the 
task of teaching Frankfurt School Critical Theory of technology, I discovered 
the importance of Marcuse’s works.
I used parts of One-Dimensional Man (Marcuse 1964b) and Marcuse’s 
(1941b) essay Some Social Implications of Modern Technology for teaching. Fas-
cinated by Marcuse’s insights, I read more and more of his books and articles 
and thereby obtained a fuller picture of the breadth and depth of his critical 
theory. I was especially impressed by Reason and Revolution (Marcuse 1941a) 
because it opened up an interpretation of Hegel’s dialectical logic that was 
grounded in a dialectic of subjectivity/objectivity and chance/necessity and 
helped me to understand the importance of avoiding the twin traps of idealist 
subjectivism that neglects structural conditions of action and vulgar material-
ism that sees the world as being determined by natural laws. 
I wrote three books about the contemporaneity of Marcuse’s works: 
• Krise und Kritik in der Informationsgesellschaft. Arbeiten über Herbert Mar-
cuse, kapitalistische Entwicklung und Selbstorganisation (Crisis and Criti-
cism of the Information Society. Works on Herbert Marcuse, Capitalist Devel-
opment and Self-Organisation, Fuchs 2002).
• Emanzipation! Technik und Politik bei Herbert Marcuse (Emancipaton! 
Technology and Politics in the Works of Herbert Marcuse, Fuchs 2005a).
• Herbert Marcuse interkulturell gelesen (Herbert Marcuse: An Intercultural 
Interpretation, Fuchs 2005b).
These three works have not been much read because they have not been trans-
lated into English and there is much more interest in Adorno, Horkheimer and 
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Habermas than Marcuse in the German-speaking world. Having established 
some conceptual foundations of a critical theory of technology, I moved on 
and started working on the foundations of a critical theory and a critique of the 
political economy of the Internet and the media, which resulted in books such 
as Internet and Society: Social Theory in the Information Age (Fuchs 2008), Foun-
dations of Critical Media and Information Studies (Fuchs 2011), Digital Labour 
and Karl Marx (Fuchs 2014a), OccupyMedia! The Occupy Movement and Social 
Media in Crisis Capitalism (Fuchs 2014b), Social Media: A Critical Introduction 
(Fuchs 2014c), Culture and Economy in the Age of Social Media (Fuchs 2015), 
Reading Marx in the Information Age: A Media and Communication Studies Per-
spective on “Capital Volume I” (Fuchs 2016), as well as collected volumes such 
as Internet and Surveillance. The Challenges of Web 2.0 and Social Media (Fuchs, 
Boersma, Albrechtslund and Sandoval 2012), Marx is Back – The Importance of 
Marxist Theory and Research for Critical Communication Studies Today (Fuchs 
and Mosco 2012, see also: Fuchs and Mosco 2016a, 2016b), Critique, Social 
Media and the Information Society (Fuchs and Sandoval 2014), Philosophers of 
the World Unite! Theorising Digital Labour and Virtual Work: Definitions, Forms 
and Transformations (Sandoval, Fuchs, Prodnik, Sevignani and Allmer 2014), 
Social Media, Politics and the State: Protests, Revolutions, Riots, Crime and Polic-
ing in the Age of Facebook, Twitter and YouTube (Trottier and Fuchs 2014), 
Reconsidering Value and Labour in the Digital Age (Fisher and Fuchs 2015). 
In the work on all of these books, Marcuse, Marx and Hegel’s concepts were 
tools of critical thought that helped me to understand the antagonisms of the 
media and communication in twenty-first-century capitalism. In addition to 
Marcuse, Marx and Hegel, I have especially made use of Dallas W. Smythe and 
Raymond Williams’ works for grounding foundations of a critical theory of the 
Internet and social media. In all these years, Marcuse was always there in my 
works and thinking and has been a crucial influence. 
4.1.2. Social Media
In this chapter, I reflect on how some of Marcuse’s theoretical thought can help 
us to critically understand what many today term ‘social media’. ‘Social media’ 
are Internet-based platforms such as blogs (e.g. Blogspot, Wordpress, Tum-
blr), social networking sites (e.g. Facebook, LinkedIn, VK, Renren), user-gen-
erated content sharing sites (e.g. YouTube, Vimeo, Youku), microblogs (e.g. 
Twitter, Weibo) and wikis (e.g. Wikipedia) (Fuchs 2014c). It is evident that 
all media are to a certain extent social because they reflect and transmogrify 
society in complex ways. The actual change that communication systems such 
as Facebook reflect is that the Internet has, since 2005, become more of a sys-
tem of co-operative work and community formation than it was before (Fuchs 
2014c). These media are social because they enable and are means of shar-
ing, communication, community and collaboration. At the same time they 
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are deeply embedded in capitalism’s commodity logic and therefore reflect 
individual private property, individualism and structures of exploitation and 
domination. Capitalist class relations that individualise these social media’s 
sociality limit the sociality of social media as means of informational produc-
tion. This chapter focuses on some, but by far not all dimensions of Marcuse’s 
thoughts for reflecting on social media: the computer (section 2), dialectics 
(section 3), work and labour (section 4), ideology (section 5), and the dialecti-
cal logic of essence (section 6). 
4.2. Herbert Marcuse and the Computer
4.2.1. The Computer as a Tool of Control, Domination 
and Exploitation
Herbert Marcuse lived in a time that saw the rise of the computer and its 
increasing impacts on the economy, politics, culture and everyday life. Marcuse 
again and again reflected on the positive potentials and negative realities of the 
computer. Here are some examples. 
Marcuse on the one hand stressed the role of the computer as a tool of con-
trol, domination and exploitation. 
The formal rationality of capitalism celebrates its triumph in electronic 
computers, which calculate everything, no matter what the purpose, 
and which are put to use as mighty instruments of political manipula-
tion, reliably calculating the chances of profit and loss, including the 
chance of the annihilation of the whole, with the consent of the likewise 
calculated and obedient population (Marcuse 1965, 224–225).
4.2.2. The Computer’s Dialectic
He (on the other hand) identified liberating potentials of the computer writing 
that Marx: 
saw the possibility of reducing alienated labor already in capitalism, 
namely as a consequence of technical progress or, as we would say today, 
increasing automation, mechanization, computerization, whatever you 
want to call it. That, however, is only the anticipation, or the first traces, 
of the liberation of the human being from full-time alienated labor 
(Marcuse 1978, 220).
So Marcuse saw the dialectic of modern technology (Marcuse 1941b, 1964b) 
also at play in computer technology: 
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An electronic computer can serve equally a capitalist or socialist admin-
istration. […] in Marxian theory itself […] the social mode of produc-
tion, not technics is the basic historical factor. However, when technics 
becomes the universal form of material production, it circumscribes 
an entire culture; it projects a historical totality – a “world” (Marcuse 
1964b, 157–158). 
Marcuse, like Marx, considered the antagonism between class relations and 
productive forces to be at the heart of modern technologies such as the com-
puter: the computer socialises the means of production and communication 
and is therefore a foundation of a better society. Its capitalist application turns 
it, however, into a tool for warfare, control, surveillance, advertising’s manipu-
lation of needs, the creation of unemployment and new forms of precarious 
labour, etc. Marcuse did not think that one must simply abolish capitalism and 
can then use the same technologies in a socialist society. Rather, he felt that 
a qualitative change of society would have to come along with a qualitative 
change of technology: 
The technological transformation is at the same time political transforma-
tion, but the political change would turn into qualitative social change only 
to the degree to which it would alter the direction of technical progress –  
that is, develop a new technology. For the established technology has 
become an instrument of destructive politics (Marcuse 1964b, 232). 
The technology which the industrial societies have inherited and 
developed, and which rules our lives, is in its very roots a technology of 
domination. Consummation of technical progress therefore implies the 
determinate negation of this technology. […] The idea of qualitatively 
different forms of technological rationality belongs to a new historical 
project. (Marcuse 1962, 57).
4.2.3. The Computer and Freedom
Marcuse argued that modern technology must in a truly free society be dialec-
tically sublated (aufgehoben) – i.e. at the same time eliminated, preserved and 
lifted to a new qualitative level of existence: 
If the completion of the technological project involves a break with 
the prevailing technological rationality, the break in turn depends on 
the continued existence of the technical base itself. For it is this base 
which has rendered possible the satisfaction of needs and the reduction 
of toil – it remains the very base of all forms of human freedom. The 
qualitative change rather lies in the reconstruction of this base – that is, 
in its development with a view of different ends (Marcuse 1964b, 236). 
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Marcuse expresses the dialectical sublation of technology and society also as 
a reconstruction that helps healing society’s wounds: ‘Perhaps technology is a 
wound that can only be healed by the weapons that caused it: not the destruc-
tion of technology but its re-construction for the reconciliation of nature and 
society’ (Marcuse 1979a, 224).
This means that a truly free society has to abolish repressive uses of the com-
puter, e.g. as automated killing technology operating drones and warplanes, 
and to transform specific repressive designs of computer technologies. Social 
media technologies such as Facebook and Twitter are based on complex terms 
of use that enable the commodification of personal data and the exploitation 
of users’ digital labour (Fuchs 2011, 2014a, 2014c, 2015). Commons-based 
social media in contrast also support and do not abolish social networking. 
They require a redesign of social media in such a way that they are privacy-
enhancing, advertising-free, user-controlled, not-for-profit, and allow the users 
a say in formulating the terms of use. Social media are thereby dialectically sub-
lated: they lose their dominative character and simultaneously retain, realise 
and expand their liberating potentials.
Herbert Marcuse died in 1979 at the age of 81. He did not live long enough 
to see the rise of the World Wide Web (WWW). When discussing the com-
puter, he therefore predominantly spoke about automation, which reflected a 
major issue of his times, namely the question – if the computer in production 
brings about a more repressive or a more liberated economy. Marcuse’s answer 
was dialectical: he saw the liberating, democratic and common potentials of 
the computer that were limited by the repressive realities of capitalism and 
class. Today computer technology has become a networked and mobile means 
of information, communication and collaboration (Fuchs 2008). Marcuse 
could of course not analyse mobile phones, Facebook, Twitter and YouTube. 
His critical thought and concepts are however still well suited to be one of the 
methodological foundations for a critical theory of the Internet, digital and 
social media. 
4.3. Herbert Marcuse, Hegelian Dialectics and Social Media
4.3.1. Soviet Marxism’s Passive Dialectics
Stalinist, Maoist and negative dialectics underestimate the role of human sub-
jects in dialectical processes (Fuchs 2011, chapter 2). They reduce dialectics to a 
structuralist-functionalist scheme that dominates the will of humans who, it is 
argued by dogmatic dialecticians, cannot shape the dialectic. ‘Soviet Marxism 
subjugates the subjective to the objective factors in a manner which transforms 
the dialectical into a mechanistic process’ (Marcuse 1955a, 89; see also Mar-
cuse 1958). In order to avoid a deterministic dialectic, a conception is needed 
that is based on the dialectic of subject and object, human actors and social 
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structures. Such a conception can be found implicitly in the philosophical writ-
ings of Marx and was in the twentieth century explicitly formulated against 
deterministic interpretations of Marx by Marcuse. Marcuse opposed passive 
dialectics by active dialectics – dialectics as the art of ‘not getting captured by 
the contradictions, but to translate them possibly into directed moving forces’ 
(Haug 2007, 12).
4.3.2. Objective Dialectics
Marcuse pointed out that for Marx capitalist crisis is a negating moment of 
economic structures, by which capitalism develops itself. Crisis is for him an 
aspect of objective dialectics: 
Capitalist society is a union of contradictions. It gets freedom through 
exploitation, wealth through impoverishment, advances in production 
through restriction of consumption. The very structure of capitalism is 
a dialectical one: every form and institution of the economic process 
begets its determinate negation, and the crisis is the extreme form in 
which the contradictions are expressed (Marcuse 1941a, 311–312). 
Marcuse considered private property and alienated labour as objective contra-
dictions of capitalism: 
Every fact is more than a mere fact; it is a negation and restriction of real 
possibilities. Wage labor is a fact, but at the same time it is a restraint 
on free work that might satisfy human needs. Private property is a fact, 
but at the same time it is a negation of man’s collective appropriation of 
nature. […] The negativity of capitalist society lies in its alienation of 
labor (Marcuse 1941a, 282).
4.3.3. Subjective Dialectics
Marcuse wanted to avoid deterministic dialectics and to bring about a tran-
sition from a structural-functionalist dialectic towards a human-centred dia-
lectic. Therefore he argued that capitalism is dialectical because of its objec-
tive antagonistic structures and that the negation of this negativity can only be 
achieved by human praxis. 
The negativity and its negation are two different phases of the same his-
torical process, straddled by man’s historical action. The ‘new’ state is 
the truth of the old, but that truth does not steadily and automatically 
grow out of the earlier state; it can be set free only by an autonomous act 
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on the part of men, that will cancel the whole of the existing negative 
state (Marcuse 1941a, 315). 
Necessity happens 
only through societal praxis. [...] In the Marxian dialectic, thought, sub-
jectivity, remains the decisive factor of the dialectical process. [...] The 
result [of the development of society] depends on the conditions of pos-
sibilities for struggle and the consciousness that develops thereby. This 
includes that its bearers have understood their slavery and its causes, that 
they want their own liberation and see ways of how to achieve this. [...] 
The necessity of socialism depends on the societal situation of the prole-
tariat and the development of class consciousness (Marcuse 1966, 224ff).
The antagonisms of capitalism necessarily create crises and are founded on 
class relations. The sublation of capitalism and the realisation of human essence 
can only be achieved based on necessity and the possibilities conditioned by 
necessity and created by the free activity of humans that try to transform pos-
sibilities into concrete reality. The dialectic of society is shaped by a dialectic of 
freedom and necessity. 
Not the slightest natural necessity or automatic inevitability guarantees 
the transition from capitalism to socialism. […] The revolution requires 
the maturity of many forces, but the greatest among them is the subjec-
tive force, namely, the revolutionary class itself. The realization of free-
dom and reason requires the free rationality of those who achieve it. 
Marxian theory is, then, incompatible with fatalistic determinism (Mar-
cuse 1941a, 318–319).
4.3.4. Determinate Negation
Hegel pointed out with his concept of the determinate negation that the nega-
tive is at the same time positive, that contradictions do not dissolve into noth-
ingness, but into the negation of its particular content. Negation is ‘the negation 
of a specific subject matter’ (Hegel 1812, §62). The new contains the old and 
more, therefore it is richer in content (Hegel 1812, §62). In order to stress the 
importance of human subjects in the dialectic of society, Marcuse argued that 
determined negation is ‘determinate choice’ (Marcuse 1964b, 221). Marcuse 
did not, as incorrectly argued by Hans Heinz Holz (2005, 109, 499), refuse the 
notion of determinate negation, but rather embedded this concept into sub-
ject-object-dialectics. Also Wolfgang Fritz Haug (1995, 690) mistakes Marcuse 
when claiming that the latter assumed that the ideology of capitalism surpassed 
the determinate negation historically. In the passage that Haug criticises – the 
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epilogue to Reason and Revolution – Marcuse does not, as claimed by Haug, say 
that determinate negation is impossible today, but rather that repressive ideol-
ogy enables capitalism ‘to absorb its negativity’ (Marcuse 1941a, 437) and that 
at the same time the ‘total mobilization of society against the ultimate libera-
tion of the individual […] indicates how real is the possibility of this liberation’ 
(Marcuse 1941a, 439). The determinate negation of capitalism would be objec-
tively possible, but would be forestalled subjectively, which would be a reality, 
but no necessity. 
Marcuse later worked out this dialectical hypothesis in more depth in One-
Dimensional Man (Marcuse 1964b). It is far from any deterministic logic. The 
historical reality of fascism and the Second World War curbed Marcuse’s belief 
that revolution would take place soon, but he was never a pessimist or defeatist. 
In the late 1960s, the emergence of the student movement convinced Marcuse 
that there are not only potentials for liberation in late-capitalist society, but 
actual political forces that aim at and work for liberation. 
For Marcuse, only specific contradictions that relate to material and men-
tal resources and the degree of freedom in a societal situation are determined. 
These are objective aspects of dialectics, based on which alternative possibilities 
for development result. Humans make their own history based on given con-
ditions. Freedom is comprehended and apprehended necessity. Humans can 
shape society under given conditions if they have understood necessity, the 
possibilities that are inherent in society.  
[The] determinate negation of capitalism occurs if and when the prole-
tariat has become conscious of itself and of the conditions and processes 
which make up its society. […] None of the given alternatives is by itself 
determinate negation unless and until it is consciously seized in order to 
break the power of intolerable conditions and attain the more rational, 
more logical conditions rendered possible by the prevailing ones 
(Marcuse 1964b, 222–223).
4.3.5. The Dialectic of the Objective Dialectic and the 
Subjective Dialectic
Conscious human activity within existing conditions is as a subjective factor an 
important aspect of society’s dialectic. Marcuse understood that the concept of 
human practice is needed for conceiving dialectics in a non-deterministic form 
and that thereby the notion of freedom can be situated in dialectical philoso-
phy. It is a wrong claim that there is a tendency in Marcuse’s works to ‘dissolve 
the objective contradiction into subjective disagreement’ and that he neglects 
immanent contradictions of capitalism (Schiller 1993, 115–116). For Marcuse, 
objective contradictions condition, constrain, and enable subjective action, and 
objective reality is the result of human practices’ realisation of possibilities that 
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are constitutive features of objective reality. Dialectics are for Marcuse based on 
the dialectics of subject/object and freedom/necessity. Dialectics are the unity 
of the subjective dialectic and the objective dialectic. By having elaborated 
such a meta-dialectic, Marcuse was able to work against the ideas and politi-
cal practice of deterministic dialectics. Ideology, structural and direct violence 
can forestall determinate negation, which means that society tends to become 
totalitarian and contradictions are suppressed. But no matter how hopeless a 
situation may seem, there is always still the possibility for determinate nega-
tion. If negating forces are forestalled, it becomes the task of political praxis to 
restore the conditions for change. 
4.3.6. Hegelian Dialectics and Communications
A critical theory of the media, communication, culture, technology, and 
the Internet requires a dialectical-philosophical foundation and therefore a 
renewed engagement not just with Marx, Marcuse and Lukács, but also Hegel 
(Fuchs 2014e). Hegel understands the dialectic in the Science of Logic as a 
process, in which a posited reflection-in-itself externalises itself into a nega-
tive other so that there is what Hegel calls external reflection. The determin-
ing reflection is ‘the unity of positing and external reflection’ (Hegel 2010, 
351). The sublation of the contradiction between one thing and another thing 
determines the emergence of what Hegel terms ‘Gesetzsein’ (Hegel 1813–
1816/1969, 32) – the ‘posited’ (Hegel 2010, 351). Positedness is a reflection-
in-and-for-itself: 
It is positedness – negation which has however deflected the reference 
to another into itself, and negation which, equal to itself, is the unity of 
itself and its other, and only through this is an essentiality. It is, there-
fore, positedness, negation, but as reflection into itself it is at the same 
time the sublatedness of this positedness, infinite reference to itself.’ 
(Hegel 2010, 353). 
But for Hegel, the sublation that is positedness repels itself in an absolute recoil 
so that it posits its own presuppositions and starts the dialectical process all 
over again (Fuchs 2014e). For Hegel, the world is dialectical and therefore 
dynamic and unfinished. 
Marcuse, in his own magnum opus Reason and Revolution, showed how to 
best dialectically interpret Hegel’s dialectical laws of reflection in order to posit 
the dialectic of reflection-in-itself, reflection-in-another, and positedness as 
the dialectic of the subjective dialectic and the objective dialectic, in which the 
‘negativity and its negation are two different phases of the same historical pro-
cess, straddled by man’s historical action’ (Marcuse 1941a, 315). 
Herbert Marcuse and Social Media 121
In a communication process, no matter whether it takes place online or 
offline, an individual posits his/her own identity by relating himself/herself in 
and through a symbolic interaction process to another person, who in return 
posits his/her identity by communicatively responding. So identity as the 
 individual reflection-in-itself is only possible as the communicative reflection- 
into-another. This communicative negation is negated in situations, where the 
communicative process is sublated, either by a rupture that causes the social 
relationship’s breakdown (e.g. a quarrel between friends that ends the relation-
ship, death, etc.) or the emergence of a positive new quality (e.g. an occasional 
acquaintance turns into a friendship). Such a sublation in a social relation is a 
communicative reflection-in-and-for-itself. It however does not stop, but only 
exists in and through further communication between humans so that the sub-
lation of a social relation to a new quality in an absolute recoil goes back to the 
start and is posited as a new dialectic of the communicative reflection-in-itself 
and the reflection-into-another, etc. The result of communication in an abso-
lute recoil becomes the starting point for further communication. Communi-
cation posits its own presuppositions so that the communicative social relation 
between humans develops in and through communication. 
The dialectic is not a teleological process because humans make their own his-
tory based on the conditions they are posited in and that they posit. The only tel-
eology in society is that humans have the capacity to set their own goals, which 
is conditioned, i.e. enabled and constrained, by the sum total of the social rela-
tions they are part of. In modern society, these conditioning relations are class 
and power relations. The Internet in capitalism is an antagonistic dialectical sys-
tem, in which the individual, property, capital, the commodity, and the market 
are reflected into the social, the commons, labour, the gift, and the community 
that in a recoil reflect themselves into their others so that there is an antagonistic 
recoil of mutual positing of opposites. The resulting antagonisms constitute the 
Internet’s actuality, development, and potentiality that face power asymmetries. 
Given these asymmetries, only politics of radical reformism can make a socialist 
sublation more likely. The common and the capitalist Internet are both realities 
with asymmetric powers that are contained in each other as the capitalism of the 
commons-based Internet and the commonism of the capitalist Internet. 
4.3.7. Six Dialectics
Marcuse understood Hegelian dialectics as a) the dialectic of the subject and 
the object, b) the dialectic of the individual and society, c) the dialectic of the 
subjective and the objective dialectic of capitalism, d) the dialectic of chance 
and necessity, e) the dialectic of essence and appearance, f) the dialectic of 
essence and existence. These dialectics can also be found in the realm of con-
temporary social media.
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a) The Dialectic of the Subject and the Object 
Human beings as subjects use social media technologies for creating, sharing 
and communicating information online and for engaging in collaborative work 
and the formation of communities. Through these subjective practices, they 
create and recreate an objective world: they objectify information that is stored 
on computers, servers, cloud storage devices, etc. and that is communicated 
to others. It thereby brings about new meanings and joint understandings and 
misunderstandings of the world. These objective changes of the world con-
dition, i.e. enable and constrain, further human practices that are organised 
offline, online and in converging social spaces. Social media are based on a 
dialectic of human practices and the social structures that these practices cre-
ate and recreate so that structures condition practices and practices produce 
structures. 
b) The Dialectic of the Individual and Society 
In capitalism, individual use-value, i.e. the satisfaction of human needs, can 
mainly be achieved by purchasing commodities, which necessitates exchange-
value, money and the selling of one’s labour power. Individual satisfaction of 
needs can only be achieved by entering social relations of exchange and exploi-
tation. Capitalism’s antagonism between use-value and exchange-value is an 
antagonism between individual needs and the social class relations. On cor-
porate social media, the relationship of the individual and the social is highly 
antagonistic: social media exist only through social relationships that enable 
sharing, communication, collaboration, and community. But these social 
relations are today at the heart of the realisation of neoliberal performance 
principles that render social media platforms perfect tools for individual self-
presentation, individualistic competition, and the individual accumulation of 
reputation and contacts. It is no accident that ‘social’ media are called YouTube, 
MySpace and Facebook and not OurTube, CollectiveSpace and Groupbook. It 
is all about ‘you’ as an individual and not ‘us’ as a collective. The individualistic 
private property character of social media – the fact that user data is sold as 
a commodity to advertisers – is hidden behind social media’s social appear-
ance: you do not pay for accessing Twitter, Facebook, Google or YouTube. The 
obtained use-value seems to be the immediate social experience these plat-
forms enable. The commodity character of personal data does not become 
immediately apparent because there is no exchange of money for use-values 
that the user experiences. The commodity fetishism thereby becomes inverted 
(Fuchs 2014a, chapter 11): the social seems the immediate positive experience 
on social media, whereas the individualistic logic of money and the commodity 
remains hidden from the users.
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c) The Dialectic of the Subjective and the Objective Dialectic of Capitalism 
Social media is embedded into the dialectic of capitalism’s objective and sub-
jective dialectics. It reflects capitalism’s objective contradictions. One of these 
antagonisms is the one between real and fictitious value. Financialisation can 
easily result in the divergence of stock market values and profits. Such a diver-
gence was at the heart of the 2000 crisis of the ‘new economy’. Financialisation 
is a response to contradictions of capitalism that result in capitalists’ attempts 
to achieve spatial (global outsourcing) and temporal (financialisation) fixes to 
problems associated with overaccumulation, overproduction, underconsump-
tion, falling profit rates, profit squeezes, and class struggles (Harvey 2003, 89; 
Harvey 2005, 115). The ideological hype of the emergence of a ‘Web 2.0’ and 
‘social media’ that communicated the existence of a radially new Internet was 
primarily aimed at restoring confidence of venture capital to invest in the Inter-
net economy. The rise of Google, Facebook, Twitter, Weibo and related tar-
geted advertising-based platforms created a new round of financialisation of 
the Internet economy with its own objective contradiction: in a situation of 
global capitalist crisis corporate social media attract advertising investments 
because companies think targeted advertising is more secure and efficient 
than conventional advertising (Fuchs 2014c). Financial investors share these 
hopes and believe in social media’s growing profits and dividends, which spurs 
their investments of financial capital in social media corporations. The click-
through-rate (the share of ads that users click on in the total number of pre-
sented ads) is however on average just 0.1 per cent (Fuchs 2014c), which means 
that on average only one out of 1,000 targeted ads yields actual profits. And 
even in these cases it is uncertain if users will buy commodities on the pages 
the targeted ads direct them to. The social media economy involves high levels 
of uncertainty and risk. A social media finance bubble is continuously build-
ing itself up. If a specific bankruptcy or other event triggers a downfall of the 
stock market value of an important social media company, the bubble could 
suddenly explode because investors may lose confidence in the business model 
and this may quickly spread and intensify. Financial crises involve complex 
dialectics of objective contradictions and subjective behaviour. 
d) The Dialectic of Chance and Necessity 
Capitalism’s objective contradictions with necessity bring about crises. The 
exact causes and times of crises are however contingent and therefore not pre-
determined. This means for the capitalist Internet economy that its next crisis 
will come, but that the point of time and users’ reactions to it are not prede-
termined. Marcuse’s notion of determined negation as determinate choice is of 
particular importance in this respect: The next crisis of the Internet economy 
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will come and may result in new qualities of the Internet. We do, however, not 
know how these changes will look like. They depend on the choices that users 
collectively make in the situation of crisis. The future of the Internet is depend-
ent on the outcomes of class struggles. If users let themselves be fooled by the 
ideologies advanced by marketing gurus, capitalists, the business press, neo-
liberal politicians, and scholars celebrating every new capitalist hype, then no 
alternatives to the capitalist Internet may be in sight in and after the next crisis 
of the Internet. If they, however, struggle for an alternative, non-commercial, 
non-capitalist, non-profit, commons-based and therefore truly social Internet, 
then alternatives may become possible.
These examples suffice to show the relevance of Marcuse’s Hegel interpre-
tation for a critical-dialectical understanding of the contemporary Internet. I 
will discuss dimensions e) the dialectic of essence and appearance and f) the 
dialectic of essence and existence in more detail in sections 5 (ideology) and 6 
(essence). 
4.4. Herbert Marcuse and Digital Labour on Social Media
4.4.1. Three Dimensions of Work
Marcuse (1933, 123) argues that the modern economic concept of labour as 
wage labour has influenced the general understanding of work and has resulted 
in ‘the narrowing of the concept’. He distinguishes between a general form of 
labour (work) that is an essential and foundational category that describes pro-
ductive human activities in all societies and the economic concept of labour 
typical for modern societies.
Work has for Marcuse three dimensions: Arbeiten (working as a process), 
das Gearbeitete (the object of work) and das zu-Arbeitende (the goal of work). 
Marcuse argues that work has three important characteristics: duration, per-
manence and burden. The essential duration of work means that it is never 
finished, work is an ‘enduring being-at and being-in-work’ (ibid., 129). Work 
is permanent because an object as the result of production is ‘worked into 
the “world”’ (ibid., 130). That work involves a burden does not necessarily 
mean for Marcuse that it is toil, but the abstinence from individual pleasure: 
in work ‘man is always taken away from his self-being and toward something 
else: he is always with an other and for an other’ (ibid.). Marcuse stresses that 
work is not just producing a world of goods, but also organises the ‘econom-
ics as life’ (ibid., 134). The ‘first and final purpose’ of work is to ‘bring about 
the being of Dasein itself, in order to ‘secure’ its duration and permanence’ 
(ibid., 135).
Marcuse points out the duality of human activity in capitalism that is founded 
on an antagonism of use-value and exchange-value so that human needs can 
only be satisfied via the mediation through the commodity form and class 
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relations. Human activity is therefore in capitalism simultaneously concrete 
and abstract – work and labour. 
4.4.2. Work and Labour
Marcuse stresses the importance of distinguishing between work and labour in 
capitalism. Work is a social activity that transforms human and social nature 
(culture) in such a way that new qualities emerge that can satisfy human needs. 
Human needs don’t just involve food, housing and clothing, but for example 
also social reproduction through communication, learning and education. 
Work therefore involves the production of physical use-values (such as food, 
housing, clothes) and non-physical use-values (such as social relations, com-
munication, happiness) that satisfy human life. In the last instance this means 
that it is wrong to dualistically separate work and communication as well as 
the economy and culture. In contrast, a cultural materialistic position assumes 
that communication is a specific form of work that satisfies the social need of 
relating to others, being informed, communicating, and forming communities 
(Fuchs 2015).
Based on these assumptions it becomes evident that social media are tools 
of digital work – human social activities that enable information, communica-
tion, collaboration, and community. In capitalism, however, social media invert 
their own social essence: Google and Facebook are not predominantly means 
of communication, but the world’s largest advertising agencies. Social media’s 
dimension of exchange-value and abstract labour dominates over its dimen-
sion of use-value and concrete work. In this context, Dallas Smythe’s (1977) 
notions of audience commodification and audience labour gain new impor-
tance: The users of corporate social media create content, connections, profiles, 
and behaviour data in order to achieve the social use-values of information, 
communication and community. Corporate social media commodify this data 
by selling it to advertisers, who in return can present advertisements targeted to 
the interest of individual users. Wherever there is a commodity, there is labour 
producing this commodity and a class relation that organises the exploitation 
of labour. Therefore corporate social media usage is a form of surplus-value 
creating and exploited digital labour that yields profits for social media capital-
ists (Fuchs 2014a, 2014c, 2015). 
4.4.3. Labour and Play
Capitalism connects labour and play in a destructive dialectic. Tradition-
ally, play in the form of enjoyment, sex, and entertainment was in capitalism 
only part of spare time, which was unproductive and separate from labour in 
time. Sigmund Freud (1961) argued that the structure of drives is character-
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ised by a dialectic of Eros (drive for life, sexuality, lust) and Thanatos (drive 
for death, destruction, aggression). Humans would strive for the permanent 
realisation of Eros (pleasure principle), but culture would only become pos-
sible by a temporal negation and suspension of Eros and the transformation 
of erotic energy into culture and labour. Labour would be a productive form 
of desexualisation – the repression of sexual drives. Freud speaks in this con-
text of the reality principle or sublimation. The reality principle sublates the 
pleasure principle; human culture sublates human nature and becomes man’s 
second nature. 
Marcuse (1955b) connected Freud’s theory of drives to Marx’s theory of capi-
talism. He argued that alienated labour, domination, and capital accumulation 
have turned the reality principle into a repressive reality principle – the perfor-
mance principle: Alienated labour constitutes a surplus-repression of Eros. The 
repression of the pleasure principle takes on a quantity that exceeds the cul-
turally necessary suppression. Marcuse connects Marx’s notions of necessary 
labour and surplus labour/value to the Freudian drive structure of humans. 
He argues that necessary labour on the level of drives corresponds to neces-
sary suppression and surplus labour to surplus-repression. This means that in 
order to exist, a society needs a certain amount of necessary labour (measured 
in hours of work) and hence a certain corresponding amount of suppression of 
the pleasure principle (also measured in hours). The exploitation of surplus-
value (labour that is performed for free and generates profit) means that not 
only are workers forced to work for free for capital to a certain extent, but also 
that the pleasure principle must be additionally suppressed beyond what is nec-
essary for human existence.
“Behind the reality principle lies the fundamental fact of Ananke or 
scarcity (Lebensnot), which means that the struggle for existence takes 
place in a world too poor for the satisfaction of human needs without 
constant restraint, renunciation, delay. In other words, whatever satis-
faction is possible necessitates work, more or less painful arrangements 
and undertakings for the procurement of the means for satisfying needs. 
For the duration of work, which occupies practically the entire exist-
ence of the mature individual, pleasure is ‘suspended’ and pain prevails” 
(Marcuse 1955b, 35). 
In societies that are based on the principle of domination, the reality princi-
ple takes on the form of the performance principle. Domination ‘is exercised 
by a particular group or individual in order to sustain and enhance itself in a 
privileged situation’ (Marcuse 1955b, 36). The performance principle is con-
nected to surplus-repression, a term that describes ‘the restrictions necessitated 
by social domination’ (Marcuse 1955b, 35). Domination introduces ‘additional 
controls over and above those indispensable for civilized human association’ 
(Marcuse 1955b, 37).
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Marcuse (1955b) argues that the performance principle means that Thanatos 
governs humans and society and that alienation unleashes aggressive drives 
within humans (repressive desublimation) that result in an overall violent and 
aggressive society. Due to the high productivity reached in late-modern society, 
a historical alternative would be possible: the elimination of the repressive real-
ity principle, the reduction of necessary working time to a minimum and the 
maximisation of free time, an eroticisation of society and the body, the shaping 
of society and humans by Eros, the emergence of libidinous social relations. 
Such a development would be a historical possibility – but one incompatible 
with capitalism and patriarchy.
4.4.4. Boltanski and Chiapello: The New Spirit of Capitalism
Luc Boltanski and Éve Chiapello (2007) argue that the rise of participatory 
management means the emergence of a new spirit of capitalism that subsumes 
the anti-authoritarian values of the political revolt of 1968 and the subsequently 
emerging New Left such as autonomy, spontaneity, mobility, creativity, net-
working, visions, openness, plurality, informality, authenticity, emancipation, 
etc. The topics of the movement would now be put into the service of those 
forces that it wanted to destroy. The outcome would have been ‘the construc-
tion of the new, so-called “network” capitalism’ (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007, 
429) so that artistic critique that calls for authenticity, creativity, freedom and 
autonomy in contrast to social critique that calls for equality and overcoming 
class (37–38) today ‘indirectly serves capitalism and is one of the instruments 
of its ability to endure’ (490). Play labour is a new ideology of capitalism: objec-
tively alienated labour is presented as creativity, freedom and autonomy that is 
fun for workers. The idea that workers should have fun and love their objective 
alienation has become a new ideological strategy of capital and management 
theory. ‘Facebook labour’ is an expression of play labour ideology as element of 
the new spirit of capitalism. 
4.4.5. The Society of Self-Control
Gilles Deleuze (1995) has pointed out that in contemporary capitalism, disci-
plines are transformed in such a way that humans increasingly discipline them-
selves without direct external violence. He terms this situation the ‘society of 
(self-)control’. It can for example be observed in the strategies of participatory 
management. This method promotes the use of incentives and the integration 
of play into labour. It argues that work should be fun, workers should perma-
nently develop new ideas, realise their creativity, enjoy free time within the fac-
tory, etc. The boundaries between work time and spare time, labour and play, 
become fuzzy. Work tends to acquire qualities of play, and entertainment in 
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spare time tends to become labour-like. Working time and spare time become 
inseparable. 
The factory extends its boundaries into society and becomes what Mario 
Tronti (1966) has termed a social factory: 
The more capitalist development proceeds, i.e. the more the production 
of relative surplus value asserts and extends itself, the more the cycle pro-
duction – distribution – exchange – consumption closes itself inevitably, 
the societal relation between capitalist production and bourgeois soci-
ety, between factory and society, between society and the state become 
more and more organic. At the highest level of capitalist development 
the societal relation becomes a moment of the relations of production, 
and the whole of society becomes cause and expression of production, 
i.e. the whole society lives as a function of the factory and the factory 
extends its exclusive domination to the whole of society. […] When the 
factory raises itself to the master of the whole of society – the entire 
societal production becomes industrial production – then the specific 
characteristics of the factory get lost inside of the general characteristics 
of society (Tronti 1966, 30–31, translation from German). 
At the same time as work time and spare time get blurred in the social factory, 
work-related stress intensifies and property relations remain unchanged. 
Facebook’s exploitation of Internet users is an aspect of this transformation. 
It signifies that private Internet usage, which is motivated by play, entertain-
ment, fun, and joy – aspects of Eros – has become subsumed under capital and 
has become a sphere of the exploitation of labour. It produces surplus-value 
for capital and is exploited by the latter so that Internet corporations accu-
mulate profit. Play and labour are today to a specific degree indistinguishable. 
Eros has become largely subsumed under the repressive reality principle. Play 
is largely commodified, free time and spaces not exploited by capital become 
diminished. Play is today productive, surplus-value generating labour that 
is exploited by capital. All human activities, and therefore also all play, tend 
under the contemporary conditions to become subsumed under and exploited 
by capital. Play as an expression of Eros is thereby destroyed, human freedom 
and human capacities are crippled. On Facebook, play and labour converge 
into play labour that is exploited for capital accumulation. Facebook therefore 
stands for the total commodification and exploitation of time – all human time 
tends to become surplus-value generating time that is exploited by capital. 
Table 4.1 summarises the application of Marcuse’s theory of play, labour and 
pleasure to Facebook and social media.
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4.4.6. Facebook and Play Labour
Work stands in a dialectical relation with play: in play, humans have the free-
dom to do with the objects of play whatever one wants to do: ‘In a single toss 
of a ball, the player achieves an infinitely greater triumph of human freedom 
over the objective world than in the most massive accomplishment of technical 
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(the lack of ownership of 
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Table 4.1: Pleasures in four modes of society (human essence, society with 
scarcity, classical capitalism, capitalism in the age of Facebook), based on a 
table from: Marcuse 1955b, 12.
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essentially in “intervals”, “between” the times of other doings that continually 
dominate human Dasein’ (Marcuse 1933, 128). In societies, where work is toil, 
play would be dialectically related to work in such a way that it is an escape 
from it: 
Play is self-distraction, self-relaxation, self-recuperation for the purpose of 
a new concentration, tension, etc. Thus play is in its totality necessarily 
related to an other from which it comes and at which it is aimed, and this 
other is already preconceived as labor through the characteristics of regi-
mentation, tension, toil, etc. (Marcuse 1933, 128). 
Work is a durable and permanent process that produces objects in the world 
that satisfy human needs. Play in contrast takes place unregularly and does not 
involve the necessity to create use-values that satisfy human needs. Play has 
the freedom to do with objects whatever one likes to. This can involve creating 
new objects, but also destroying existing objects or engaging in unproductive 
activity that is purely joyful and does not create anything new. This means that 
in playing with a ball one can develop a new form of game, destroy the ball or 
just toss it around for fun. 
In play labour (playbour), the relationship between play and labour has 
changed: whereas labour is permanent and play irregular, Facebook playbour 
does not take place at specific times either during ‘free time’ or ‘work time’, 
it rather can take place any time during wage labour time, at home or on the 
move (via mobile devices). Play labour is irregular in the sense that it takes 
place at irregular times and intervals, but it is permanent because users tend 
to return and update their profiles and repeat their activities. Whereas labour 
creates new objects that have a permanency in the world and satisfy human 
needs and play has the freedom to do with object whatever one pleases to, the 
Facebook user has the freedom to design his/her profile however s/he wants 
to. But Facebook sets strict limits such as the available input fields, what kind 
of images, videos and comments are allowed to be uploaded, etc. Every brows-
ing behaviour and activity on Facebook is made permanent in the form of 
data that are stored, processed, analysed and commodified for the purpose 
of targeted advertising. Whereas play is relaxation and distraction from the 
unfreedom and hardships of labour and at the same time recreation of labour 
power, playbour explodes the relative temporal and spatial separateness of play 
and labour: Facebook usage is relaxation, joy and fun and at the same time, 
like labour creates economic value that results or can result in monetary prof-
its. It is recreation that generates value, consumption that is productive, play 
that is labour.
Play is a free activity without duration and permanence, whereas labour is 
unfree activity with duration and permanence. Play labour has the semblance 
of freedom, but is unfree in that it creates wealth and profits that are controlled 
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not by the creators, but by others. It is regular in its irregularity, creating perma-
nence of data storage and usage in its impermanence of usage (irregular times, 
no need to create something new or useful, etc.). It is fun and joy that is not like 
play mainly an end-in-itself or like labouring an end-for-others. It is rather as 
fun an end-in-itself, as social activity an end-for-others and as value-creating 
activity an end-for-capital, i.e. a particularistic end-for-others that monetarily 
benefits private property owners at the expense of play workers.
4.4.7. Liquefaction
Paid labour in the culture industry is also becoming more like play today. The 
playground-like Google offices that at a first glance hide the inhumane reality 
of working long hours are the best example. Among others, Gill (2002) as well 
as Hesmondhalgh and Baker (2011) show the ambivalence of much creative 
industry work that is precarious, but cherished, because of the fun, contacts, 
reputation, creativity, self-fulfilment, and self-determination that it tends to 
involve. The difficulty is that labour feels like play and that exploitation and fun 
thereby become inseparable. Play and labour are today in certain cases indis-
tinguishable. 
The liquefaction of boundaries between labour/play, working time/lei-
sure time, production/consumption, the office and the factory/the home, the 
public/the private is one of the tendencies of contemporary capitalism. It is 
however not the only or main feature of modernity as claimed by Bauman 
(2000/2012) who speaks of liquid modernity. Liquefaction is rather combined 
with other developments of modernity such as neoliberalism, individualisa-
tion, globalisation, financialisation, the commodification of everything, infor-
matisation etc. that are constitutive for the continuity of capitalism through 
creating discontinuities. 
4.5. Herbert Marcuse, Ideology and Social Media
4.5.1. Technological Rationality
Herbert Marcuse used the term ‘technological rationality’ for describing the 
phenomenon of instrumental reason. He wanted to express that ideology and 
manipulation try to make human consciousness and human behaviour func-
tion like an automatic machine that has only a limited set of available response 
behaviours. Technological rationality contains ‘elements of thought which 
adjust the rules of thought to the rules of control and domination’ (Marcuse 
1964b, 138). Technological rationality denies that reality could be other than it 
is today. It neglects alternative potentials for development. It aims at ‘liquidat-
ing the oppositional and transcending elements’ (Marcuse 1964b, 56). Techno-
132 Critical Theory of  Communication
logical rationality causes a one-dimensional thinking, in which ‘ideas, aspira-
tions, and objectives that, by their content, transcend the established universe 
of discourse and action are either repelled or reduced to terms of this universe’ 
(Marcuse 1964b, 12).
Technological/instrumental rationality in capitalism has a dual character. For 
Marx, the commodity and capital accumulation are based on the exploitation 
of labour power, it is the production and appropriation of surplus-value. Class-
based society turns humans into instruments that in capital serve the dominant 
class’ need of capital accumulation. At the same time, the commodity has a spe-
cific aesthetic and subjective appearance: the labour involved in its production 
disappears behind the commodity and money form. One can only see a thing 
devoid of social relations. The social is hidden behind the commodity form 
that appears natural and endless. Ideology operates the same way: it naturalises 
domination and exploitation by presenting them as best option, essential, natu-
ral, and without alternatives. 
4.5.2. Capitalist Media and Technological Rationality
Capitalist media are modes of reification and therefore expressions of instru-
mental/technological rationality in a dual sense. First, they reduce humans 
to the status of consumers of advertisements and commodities. Second, cul-
ture is in capitalism to a large degree connected to the commodity form: 
there are cultural commodities produced by cultural wage-workers that are 
bought by consumers and audience commodities that the media consumers 
become themselves by being sold as an audience to capitalist media’s adver-
tising clients. Third, in order to reproduce its existence, capitalism has to 
present itself as the best possible (or only possible) system and makes use of 
the media in order to try to keep this message (in all its differentiated forms) 
hegemonic. The first and the second dimension constitute the economic 
dimension of instrumental reason, the third dimension the ideological form 
of instrumental reason. Capitalist media are necessary means of advertis-
ing and commodification and spaces of ideology. Advertisement and cul-
tural commodification make humans an instrument for economic profit 
accumulation. Ideology aims at instilling the belief in the system of capital 
and commodities into human subjectivity. The goal is that human thoughts 
and actions do not go beyond capitalism, do not question and revolt against 
this system and thereby play the role of instruments for the perpetuation 
of capitalism. It is of course an important question to what extent ideology 
is successful and to what degree it is questioned and resisted, but the cru-
cial aspect about ideology is that it encompasses strategies and attempts to 
make human subjects instrumental in the reproduction of domination and 
exploitation. 
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4.5.3. One-Dimensional and Dialectical Thought
One-dimensional thought and reductionism are characteristic for domina-
tive societies that want to legitimatise the domination of one group or class 
over another and employ simplifications of reality for doing so. Critical theory 
opposes ideology, fetishism, reification, false consciousness, instrumental rea-
son, technological rationality, and one-dimensional consciousness by the con-
cept of dialectical thinking. Dialectical thinking sees reality as complex, a devel-
oping process, full of potentials for change, and as contradictory. It assumes 
that for each pole of reality there is a second pole that opposes (negates) the 
first pole and points towards a different reality. Dialectical thought is therefore 
‘two-dimensional’ (Marcuse 1964b, 85). It operates with ‘transcendent, criti-
cal notions’ (Marcuse 1964b, 85): ‘The dialectical concepts transcend the given 
social reality in the direction of another historical structure which is present as 
a tendency in the given reality’ (Marcuse 1937a, 86).
4.5.4. The Engaging/Connecting/Sharing-Ideology
At the level of ideology, social media-capitalists, -gurus and -demagogues try 
to destroy and forestall the complexity, multi-dimensionality and dialecticity of 
communication and society by presenting only potential advantages and being 
silent about social media’s aspects of domination, exploitation, control, surveil-
lance, repression, manipulation and neoliberal individualism. Social media ide-
ologies present capitalist online platforms as something purely advantageous. 
They advance the engaging/connecting/sharing-ideology. Here are some exam-
ples (Fuchs 2015, chapter 7):
• Facebook says it provides ‘the power to share and to make the world more 
open and connected’.1 
• Google argues its goal is the organisation of ‘the world’s information’ in 
order to ‘make it universally accessible and useful’ and ‘make money with-
out doing evil’.2 
• YouTube conceives the essence of freedom as possibility ‘to connect, inform 
and inspire others across the globe and acts as a distribution platform for 
original content creators and advertisers large and small’.3 
• For Twitter, the freedom of social media is ‘to connect with people, express 
yourself and discover what’s happening’ and ‘give everyone the power to 
create and share ideas and information instantly’.4 
• Instagram says it is a ‘fast, beautiful and fun way to share your life with 
friends and family’.5 
• Pinterest describes itself as enabling ‘collecting and organising things you 
love’.6 
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• LinkedIn claims it helps to ‘connect the world’s professionals to make them 
more productive and successful’.7 
• tumblr says it enables you to ‘share the things you love’.8
• VK sees itself as ‘a web resource that helps you stay in touch with your old 
and new friends’.9 
• Baidu’s says it mission is ‘providing the best way for people to find what 
they’re looking for online’, ‘We provide our users with many channels to 
find and share information’.10
• Sina Weibo says it is designed to ‘allow users to connect and share informa-
tion anywhere, anytime and with anyone on our platform’ and provides ‘an 
array of online media and social networking services to our user to create 
a rich canvas for businesses and brand advertisers to connect and engage 
with their targeted audiences’.11 
• Renren’s self-understanding is that it ‘enables users to connect and commu-
nicate with each other, share information, create user generated content, play 
online games, watch videos and enjoy a wide range of other features and ser-
vices. We believe real name relationships create a stronger and more endur-
ing social graph that is essential in the mobile internet world and difficult to 
replicate. […] Our vision is to re-define the social networking experience 
and revolutionize the way people in China connect, communicate, entertain 
and shop. To achieve this, we are focused on providing a highly engaging 
and interactive platform through technology that promotes connectivity, 
communication and sharing. The mobile internet is making the world more 
connected, and Renren stands at the forefront of this evolution’.12
• Tencent’s (QQ, WeChat) mission is ‘to enhance the quality of human life 
through Internet services’.13 WeChat is a ‘value-added Internet, mobile and 
telecom services and online advertising under the strategic goal of provid-
ing users with “one-stop online lifestyle services”’ that provides users the 
possibility to ‘connect with friends across platforms’.14
4.5.5. Inverted Commodity Fetishism
Social media ideology inverts commodity fetishism. In inverted commodity 
fetishism (Fuchs 2014a), the users do not immediately experience the com-
modity form because they do not pay money for accessing a commodity. 
Rather they get access without payment to social media platforms that are 
not commodities. The commodity form takes place without an exchange that 
users are involved in: the platforms sell usage data to advertising clients, who 
in return for paying money get targeted access to users’ profiles that become 
advert spaces. It is rather difficult for users to think of corporate social media 
use as labour or exploitation because inverted commodity fetishism creates a 
social experience and social use-value for them and tries to ideologically hide 
the role of the commodity.
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Social media corporations, advertising and management gurus and uncriti-
cal social media scholars that celebrate capitalist platforms associate with social 
media that it enables everyone to get and share information, to communicate, 
engage, produce and distribute content, connect with others. A further claim 
is that producing, connecting, sharing, communicating, engaging via social 
media enhances humans’ quality of life and society’s quality and transparency. 
In the analysed statements, there is an underlying assumption that social media 
makes society necessarily more open, transparent, and connected, whereas 
aspects of closure and power are not considered. If they are considered, they 
are only framed in such a way that social media empowers users. Social media 
ideology reflects Henry Jenkins’ concept of participatory culture that assumes 
that social media enables a culture ‘in which fans and other consumers are 
invited to actively participate in the creation and circulation of new content’ 
(Jenkins 2008, 331) and in which there is ‘strong support for creating and shar-
ing creations with others’ (Jenkins et al. 2009, 5). 
The problem of this approach is the simplistic understanding of participation 
as content-creation and sharing that ignores the political connotation of par-
ticipation as participatory democracy, a system, in which all people own and 
control and together manage the systems that affect their lives (Fuchs 2014c, 
chapter 3). The engaging/connecting/sharing-ideology is an ideology because 
it only views social media positively and is inherently technological-determin-
istic. It assumes that social media technologies as such have positive effects and 
disregards the power structures and asymmetries into which it is embedded. 
This engaging/connecting/sharing-ideology is however not just typical for 
Western corporate social media such as Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, Pinterest, 
Tumblr or Instagram, but is also shared and communicated by Chinese corpo-
rate social media companies such as Baidu, Sina Weibo, Renren and Tencent. 
This circumstance indicates that both Chinese and Western Internet capital-
ism use quite comparable neoliberal ideologies for legitimatising themselves. 
Social media ideology is a form of one-dimensional thought both in the East 
and the West: It is silent about exploitation and disadvantages that users may 
have from capitalism’s and the capitalist state’s control of the Internet. Eastern 
and Western social media capitalists not just share the engaging/connecting/ 
sharing-ideology, but also the same capital accumulation model that is based 
on targeted advertising and the exploitation of users’ digital labour (Fuchs 
2015, chapter 7). 
4.5.6. Repressive Tolerance in the Social Media Age
Marcuse argued that tolerance is repressive and administered pseudo-tolerance 
and intolerance when there are ‘indoctrinated individuals who parrot’ (Mar-
cuse 1969, 90) so that alternative voices are not present and when monopolies 
and ideologies dominate the media and the public sphere. ‘But with the con-
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centration of economic and political power and the integration of opposites 
in a society which uses technology as an instrument of domination, effective 
dissent is blocked where it could freely emerge: in the formation of opinion, in 
information and communication, in speech and assembly’ (Marcuse 1969, 95). 
The consequence of all of this is that ‘tolerance mainly serves the protection and 
preservation of a repressive society’ (Marcuse 1969, 111). 
Social media in capitalist society has taken repressive tolerance to a new level. 
The engaging/connecting/sharing-ideology often associated with social media 
presents these forms of communication as pure freedom, in which everyone 
can participate without constraints, where everyone can speak and be visible, 
heard and seen. Thereby the image of a tolerant, free and pluralist society is 
conveyed. Capitalist social media’s tolerance is, however, a form of repressive 
tolerance. Social media ideology tries to hide the repressive character of cen-
sorship and power asymmetry that is at play.
The difference between broadcasting and social media is that in the first 
kind of medium there are centres that control the dissemination of informa-
tion. In social media, every consumer of information can be a producer who 
creates and disseminates information. It is, however, mere semblance and 
ideological appearance that the emergence of prosumption democratises the 
media because the ownership of Facebook, Twitter and YouTube is not collec-
tive and there are hierarchies of reputation, visibility and voice on these media 
(Fuchs 2014a). 
Rank User Role Followers
1 Katy Perry Singer 79,085,600
2 Justin Bieber Singer 71,382,728
3 Barack Obama Politician 67,082,573
4 Taylor Swift Singer 66,696,238
5 YouTube Web platform 56,969,330
6 Lady Gaga Singer 53,248,260
7 Rihanna Singer 53,113,377
8 Ellen DeGeneres Entertainer 51,033,240
9 Justin Timberlake Singer 50,151,574
10 Twitter Web platform 48,403,275
Table 4.2: The users with the largest number of followers on Twitter (data 
source: http://twitaholic.com, accessed on December 16, 2015).
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4.5.7. Twitter’s and Facebook’s Repressive Tolerance
Is Twitter really a tolerant, free and pluralist medium that allows you ‘to con-
nect with people, express yourself and discover what’s happening’ and gives 
‘everyone the power to create and share ideas and information instantly’15? 
How many followers do you have on Twitter? A few hundred? Or if you are 
really very active, maybe you have 2,000 followers? 2,000? Not bad, that’s just 
84 411 368 fewer followers than Katy Perry!16 So who has the largest number 
of followers? Celebrities and online platforms operated by the world’s largest 
advertising and online companies Google and Facebook (table 4.2). 
Do you have a Facebook page that users can like? How many likes does it 
have? Maybe 5,000 if it your page is really doing well? That’s just 511,028,965 
fewer ‘likes’ than the page ‘Facebook for Every Phone’ has. What are the most 
‘liked’ pages on Facebook (see table 4.3)? Apps and Internet technologies oper-
ated by the world’s largest Internet and advertising companies Google and 
Facebook, sports, celebrities, and a soft drink company.
Does Facebook really give you the ‘the power to share and to make the world 
more open and connected’?17 The reality is that these are empty promises and 
that hierarchies of ownership and reputation create asymmetries of voice and 
visibility. As a consequence, some are more connected, visible, read and heard, 
re-tweeted, re-posted than others, which in turn cement and advances status 
hierarchies. The tolerance, freedom and plurality that social media promise in 
capitalism turn out to form an ideology. Tolerance, freedom and plurality are 
repressive in a social media world that operates within a capitalist society. 
Rank Page Role Likes
1 Facebook for Every 
Phone
App 511,033,965
2 Facebook WWW platform 169,699,777
3 Cristiano Ronaldo Footballer 108,291,324
4 Shakira Singer 103,836,997
5 Vin Diesel Actor 96,412,163
6 Coca-Cola Drink 94,779,402
7 Eminem Singer 92,286,038
8 FC Barcelona Football team 88,833,993
9 Real Madrid C.F. Football team 85,870,787
10 Leo Messi Footballer 81,587,230
Table 4.3: The Facebook pages with the largest number of likes (data source: http://
www.socialbakers.com/facebook-pages/, accessed on 16 December 2015).
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4.5.8. The Contradiction between Social Media’s Essence and 
Appearance
Social media ideology constitutes an antagonism between social media’s 
essence and appearance: the very essence and task of the media is to bring 
people together, capitalist reality is however that social media’s sociality fos-
ters new forms of exploitation, commodification, individualism, and private 
property. Social media ideology makes social media appear as something 
purely positive, it splits off the negative reality of domination and exploitation 
from social media. It makes social media one-dimensional and is a form of 
reductionist technological rationality that justifies the instrumentalisation of 
humans’ activities for capitalist purposes by disguising exploitation as sociality, 
fun and play.
4.6. Herbert Marcuse, the Logic of Essence and Social Media
4.6.1. The Concept of Essence
Marcuse (1941a) has argued that the Nazis’ notion of essence that sees the Jews’ 
nature as being parasitic, greedy, and money-oriented is based on particularism 
and is therefore opposed to the Hegelian and Marxian notion of essence that 
assumes the existence of universal qualities of humans and society. For Hegel, 
essence is not a particularistic, but a universalistic concept. He argues: ‘The 
Absolute is the Essence’ (Hegel 1830, §112). ‘Essence is the ground of existence. 
The ground is the unity of identity and difference [...] It is essence put explicitly 
as a totality’ (Hegel 1830, §121). 
In Marx’s philosophical writings, Hegelian essence is interpreted as sociality 
and co-operation. ‘The individual is the social being’ (Marx 1844, 105). ‘By 
social we understand the co-operation of several individuals’ (Marx and Engels 
1846, 50). The implication of this assumption is that co-operation is something 
that all humans share, that capitalism alienates co-operative potentials, and that 
societal conditions should be created that allow all humans to participate, to 
have equally realised rights, and to live in equity. It is this stress on universal 
equity that led to the Nazis’ hostility towards Hegel and Marx. So, for example, 
in the main work by Alfred Rosenberg (1930), the Nazis’ primary ideologist, 
Hegel was opposed because for him the state was a universal concept. Rosen-
berg argued that Hegel and Marx’s writings were foreign to the notion of blood 
(‘blutfremd’) (Rosenberg 1930, 525), whereas he celebrated Nietzsche as some-
one who destroyed all values and stood for the breeding of a higher race (‘ras-
sische Hochzucht’) (Rosenberg 1930, 525). Herbert Marcuse summarised the 
Nazi’s opposition towards Hegel’s universalism: 
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The state as reason – that is, as a rational whole, governed by universally 
valid laws, calculable and lucid in its operation, professing to protect the 
essential interest of every individual without discrimination – this form 
of state is precisely what National Socialism cannot tolerate (Marcuse 
1941a, 413).
4.6.2. Sociality and Co-operation as Human Essence
An alternative to postmodern relativism and fascist naturalism is to assume, 
as Herbert Marcuse did, that there are universal human characteristics such as 
sociality, co-operation, or the desire for wealth, happiness, freedom, reason, and 
that conditions should be created that allow the universal realisation of these 
qualities, that societies that do not guarantee the realization of these human 
potentials are false societies, and that consciousness that wants to perpetuate 
such false societal conditions is false consciousness. Such a form of universalism 
is not totalitarian, but should be read as a form of humanism that struggles for 
universal equity. Only the assumption that there is something positive that all 
humans have in common allows the envisioning of a state where all humans are 
guaranteed equal fundamental rights. Such essential conditions are not given 
and envisioned automatically, they have historical character and under given 
economic, political, cultural, and technological conditions they can be reached 
to a certain degree. Humans have the ability to struggle and to act consciously in 
transformative ways. Therefore each societal epoch is shaped by the question if 
humans will or will not act to create and realise the epoch’s inherent and dynami-
cally developing potentials or not. They shape and potentially enhance the space 
of possibilities and at the same time act or do not act to realise these created pos-
sibilities. The moments of human essence are substantial, if they are achieved or 
not and to which extent they can be realized and how they develop is completely 
historical, which means that it is based on human agency. In Marx’s works:
the negativity of reality becomes a historical condition which cannot be 
hypostatized as a metaphysical state of affairs. […] The given state of affairs 
is negative and can be rendered positive only by liberating the possibilities 
immanent in it. […] Truth, in short, is not a realm apart from historical 
reality, nor a region of eternally valid ideas. […] Not the slightest natural 
necessity or automatic inevitability guarantees the transition from capital-
ism to socialism. […] The revolution requires the maturity of many forces, 
but the greatest among them is the subjective force, namely, the revolu-
tionary class itself. The realization of freedom and reason requires the free 
rationality of those who achieve it. Marxian theory is, then, incompatible 
with fatalistic determinism (Marcuse 1941a, 314–315, 318–319).
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4.6.3. Society’s Essence
Marcuse anticipated the critique of postmodern relativism when he argued in 
1936 for a Marxist notion of essence: ‘A theory that wants to eradicate from 
science the concept of essence succumbs to helpless relativism, thus promot-
ing the very powers whose reactionary thought it wants to combat’ (Marcuse 
1937a, 45). It makes practical political sense to argue that there is a truth imma-
nent in society that is not automatically realised and that this truth is given in 
the need and possibility of a good life for all. Oppression takes on different 
forms and contexts and that oppressed individuals and groups frequently stand 
in contradictory relations to each other. Truth is subdivided into partial truths 
that are interconnected. Oppressed groups and individuals share common 
interests because they are all confronted by the same global system of oppres-
sion, at the same time they also have differing sub-interests because oppression 
is contextualised in many forms. What is needed is a differentiated unity, a 
form of politics that is based on unity in diversity. 
For Hegel, the essence of things means that they have fundamental character-
istics and qualities as such that frequently are different from their appearance. 
Truth for Hegel is the direct correspondence of essence and existence, only true 
existence is real and reasonable. In Marxism, Herbert Marcuse is one of the 
authors who has taken up Hegel’s notion of essence and stresses that essence 
is connected to possibilities and that a true society is one that realises the pos-
sibilities that are enabled by structural aspects such as technological forces, 
economic productivity, political power relations, world-views, etc. Essence in 
society is connected with what humans could be (Marcuse 1937a). Ernst Bloch 
(1959) utilises in this context the ontological category of ‘not yet’ in order to 
signify concrete potentials that can be realised, but have not yet been attained. 
Marcuse has given the following definition of the essence of man and society: 
Connecting at its roots the problem of essence to social practice restruc-
tures the concept of essence in its relation to all other concepts by orienting 
it toward the essence of man. […] Here the concept of what could be, of 
inherent possibilities, acquires a precise meaning. What man can be in a 
given historical situation is determinable with regard to the following fac-
tors: the measure of control of natural and social productive factors, the 
level of the organization of labor, the development of needs in relation to 
possibilities for their fulfilment (especially the relation of what is necessary 
for the reproduction of life to the ‘free’ needs for gratification and happiness, 
for the ‘good and the beautiful’), the availability, as material to be appropri-
ated, of a wealth of cultural values in all areas of life (Marcuse 1937a, 71). 
What humans can be in a given situation can be described when taking the fol-
lowing factors into account: 
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the measure of control of natural and social productive forces, the level 
of the organization of labor, the development of needs with respect to 
possibilities for their fulfilment (especially the relation of what is neces-
sary for the reproduction of life to the ‘free’ needs for gratification and 
happiness, for the ‘good and the beautiful’), the availability, as material 
to be appropriated, of a wealth of cultural values in all areas of life (Mar-
cuse 1937a, 72). 
The ethico-political is connected to questions of what can and should be 
because society can be based on the existing preconditions and reduce pain, 
misery, and injustice (Marcuse 1964b, 106), use existing resources and capaci-
ties in ways that satisfy human needs in the best possible way, and minimise 
hard labour (Marcuse 1964b, 112). 
4.6.4. Human Essence and Communications
Media are tools for communication and therefore promise to realise human 
essence. Capitalist media however subsume this communicative use-value 
under the logic of exchange-value so that the commodification of content, 
audiences, users, and access turns them into means for capital accumulation 
and the diffusion of ideologies. Media thereby become individual private prop-
erty that enhances the wealth of the few by exploiting the labour of the many 
and reach the masses with ideas often representing particularistic interests 
and realities. Capitalist social media such as Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube 
promise a new level of sociality, but at the same time literally commodify soci-
ality, they impose the logic of private property and commodities on online 
communications. 
Non-commercial commons-based and public service online media, such 
as Wikipedia, non-commercial free software and creative commons projects, 
sharing platforms that operate on a gift logic, alternative online news media, 
peer to peer sites, etc. question and transcend the logic of the online commod-
ity and are expressions of human essence and the Internet’s essence. The antago-
nism between the online commons and the online commodity form is complex 
because it not just involves users and capitalists, but also artists, whose income 
partly depends on the profits of media companies who exploit them so that 
the online freeconomy doesn’t just challenge capitalist profits, but also online 
wage labour. Radical reforms are the only potential solution to this antagonism, 
namely radical reforms that make public funds available to alternative projects 
so that they can employ workers and afford resources. It is a mistake to take 
an immanent defensive political position that opposes transcendental projects 
with the argument that they destroy jobs of cultural workers. We need reforms 
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and platforms that strengthen the alternative realities on the Internet so that 
the latter can increasingly realise its own essence. 
4.6.5. The Ethics of Co-operation
For Marcuse, ethics is connected with questions of what can and should be 
because society can reduce pain, misery, and injustice (Marcuse 1964a, 106) 
and use existing resources and capacities in ways that satisfy human needs in 
the best possible way and minimise hard labour (Marcuse 1964a, 112). A false 
condition of society or of a social system would mean that its actuality and its 
potentiality differ. Marcuse stresses that in capitalism oppressed humans are 
alienated because they do not possess the means of production and the fruits 
thereby produced. He says that alienation means that humans and society are 
alienated from their essence. The sublation of the alienation of labour and man 
by establishing a realm of freedom means the realisation of the human and 
social essence. One can read the works of Marx as a deconstruction of ideology, 
the identification of potentials that strengthen the realisation of human free-
dom, and the suggestion that humans should act in ways that realise potentials 
that increase the co-operative character of society. 
Here both chance and necessity are important: existing structures, social 
relations and forces of production in economy, polity, and culture, determine 
certain potentials of societal development (necessity). Human beings in social 
practices realise potentials by creating actuality (chance). Freedom here is 
freedom to create novelty that is conditioned (enabled and constrained) by 
societal reality. Marx’s works can be interpreted as ethics of liberation and co-
operation in so far as they suggest that humans should act in ways that bring 
society closer to the latter’s co-operative essence. Marx’s stress on socialisation 
(Vergesellschaftung) shows that he saw co-operation as an essential societal 
phenomenon and considered the realm of freedom as the realisation society’s 
co-operative essence. This is what Marx means when he for example speaks 
of ‘the return of man from religion, family, state, etc., to his human, i.e., social 
mode of existence’ (Marx 1844, 103), the ‘complete return of man to himself as 
a social (i.e., human) being’ (Marx 1844, 102), ‘the positive transcendence of 
private property as human self-estrangement, and therefore as the real appro-
priation of the human essence by and for man’ (Marx 1844, 102). For Marx, 
co-operation is an objective principle that results in a categorical imperative 
that in contrast to Kant stresses the need for an integrative democracy and to 
overthrow all relations of domination and exploitation.
Such a reading of Marxian works implies the ethics of co-operation. Co-
operation is a type of social relationship for achieving social integration that 
is different from competition. Co-operation is a specific type of communica-
tion and social relationship, in which actors achieve a shared understanding 
of social phenomena, make concerted use of resources so that new systemic 
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qualities emerge, engage in mutual learning, all actors benefit, and feel at home 
and comfortable in the social system that they jointly construct. Co-operation 
in this sense is (or at least can be visualised as being) the highest principle of 
morality. It is the foundation of an objective dimension of ethics, co-operative 
ethics. All human beings strive for happiness, social security, self-determina-
tion, self-realization, inclusion in social systems so that they can participate in 
decision processes, co-designing their social systems. Competition means that 
certain individuals and groups benefit at the expense of others, there is an une-
qual access to structures of social systems. This is the dominant organisational 
structure of modern society. Modern society hence is an excluding society. 
Co-operation as it is understood here includes people in social systems. It 
lets them participate in decisions and establishes a more just distribution of 
and access to resources. Hence co-operation is a way of achieving and realising 
basic human needs. Competition in contrast is a way of achieving and realising 
basic human needs only for certain groups and by excluding others. Co-oper-
ation forms thus the essence of human society, whereas competition alienates 
humans from their essence. For Hegel, essence means 
things really are not what they immediately show themselves. There 
is something more to be done than merely rove from one quality to 
another, and merely to advance from qualitative to quantitative, and 
vice versa: there is a permanence in things, and that permanence is in 
the first instance their Essence (Hegel 1830, §112). 
Essence is ‘the sum total of all realities’ (Hegel 1812, §810). ‘The truth of being 
is essence’, essence is the ‘background [that] constitutes the truth of being’ 
(Hegel 1830, §807). 
One can imagine a society that functions without competition. A society 
without competition is still a society. One can, however, not imagine a society 
that functions without a certain degree of co-operation and social activity. 
A society without co-operation is not a society. It is rather a state of perma-
nent warfare, egoism, and mutual destruction that sooner or later destroys 
all human existence. If co-operation is the essence of society, then a truly 
human society is a co-operative society. Full co-operation is just another for-
mulation for participatory democracy. Co-operation as the highest principle 
of morality is grounded in society and social activity itself. It can be ration-
ally explained within society. For doing so, there is no need for referring to 
a highest transcendental absolute principle such as God that cannot be justi-
fied within society. Co-operative ethics is a critique of lines of thought and 
arguments that want to advance exclusion and heteronomy in society. It is 
inherently critical and subjects commonly accepted ideas, conventions, tradi-
tions, prejudices, and myths to critical questioning. It questions mainstream 
opinions and voices alternatives to them in order to avoid one-dimensional 
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thinking and strengthen complex, dialectical, multi-dimensional think-
ing. Co-operation is the immanent essence of all societies. It is grounding 
human existence. Competitive class-based societies estrange society from its 
very essence. To transcend estrangement and the false state of society means 
to constitute transcendental political projects that struggle for the abolition 
of domination so that the immanent essence of society can be realised. This 
transcendence is grounded in society itself, in the co-operation process of 
humans. It is an immanent transcendence.
4.6.6. Immanent Transcendence
The notion of immanent transcendence as the dialectic of essence and existence 
is based on Hegel’s notion of truth and actuality as correspondence of essence 
and existence. ‘Actuality is the unity, become immediate, of essence with exist-
ence, or of inward with outward’ (Hegel 1830, §142). Not all existence (Sein) 
is actual (Wirklichkeit). Only existence that is reasonable corresponds to its 
essence and therefore has become true and is therefore actual. Marx saw the 
lack of control of the means of production, the labour process, and the results 
of labour by the immediate producers as an alienation of society and humans 
from their essence. 
Estranged labour turns thus man’s species-being, both nature and his spir-
itual species property, into a being alien to him, into a means to his indi-
vidual existence. It estranges man’s own body from him, as it does external 
nature and his spiritual essence, his human being (Marx 1844, 76).
Marcuse (1932) was one of the first critical scholars who had in the twentieth 
century seen the logic of essence as foundation of immanent transcendence: 
The fact from which the critique and the interpretation set out was the 
alienation and estrangement of the human essence as expressed in the 
alienation and estrangement of labor, and hence the situation of man in 
the historical facticity of capitalism. This fact appears as the total inver-
sion and concealment of what the critique had defined as the essence of 
man and human labor. [...] Regarding the situation and praxis from the 
standpoint of the history of man‘s essence makes the acutely practical 
nature of the critique even more trenchant and sharp: the fact that capi-
talist society calls into question not only economic facts and objects but 
the entire ‘existence‘ of man and ‘human reality‘ is for Marx the decisive 
justification for the proletarian revolution as total and radical revolu-
tion, unconditionally excluding any partial upheaval or ‘evolution.’ The 
justification does not lie outside or behind the concepts of alienation 
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and estrangement – the justification is rather precisely this alienation 
and estrangement itself (Marcuse 1932, 104, 91). 
Crawford Brough Macpherson’s (1973) theory of participatory democracy 
is also based on the Marxian notion of essence. He considers the essence of 
humans as developmental power, i.e. ‘the capacity for rational understanding, 
for moral judgement and action, for aesthetic creation or contemplation, for 
the emotional activities of friendship and love, and, sometimes, for religious 
experience’ (Macpherson 1973, 4). Participatory democracy would be the 
realisation of human essence, which would presuppose the sublation of private 
property and the technological maximisation of free time. 
4.6.7. Social Media’s Essence and Existence
Capitalist social media are founded on an antagonism between essence and 
existence: they promise to advance human sociality – sharing, communica-
tion, collaboration and community – but by doing so in a particular form they 
advance the exploitation of human labour, the domination of the capitalist 
class, capital accumulation that spurs inequality in society (Piketty 2014, Fuchs 
2014f), and a particularistic one-dimensional ideology that only stresses social 
media’s potentials and neglects its negative realities. Social media’s capitalist 
existence thereby comes into contradiction with the very social essence that it 
promises. At the same time social media is not pure exploitation, domination 
and ideology. It advances the contradiction between the class relations and the 
social relations of communication as means of production. Facebook, Google 
and Twitter have potentials to enhance human life’s sociality by providing new, 
more intense and extended forms of sharing, communication, collaboration 
and community. These potentials are however limited by social media’s capital-
ist and class character. Truly social media require a non-capitalist framework as 
well as a qualitative redesign. Social media are an expression of how capitalism 
produces germs of commonism that turn into its own opposite and stabilises 
and deepen capitalist exploitation and domination. Social media’s essence can 
therefore only be realised by a user revolution that struggles for truly social 
media.
4.7. Conclusion
Herbert Marcuse has grounded a critical theory that is dialectical, practical, 
humanistic, and oriented on structural contradictions. Such a theory focuses 
on contradiction through class struggle. It takes ideology – just like the poten-
tials for ideology’s sublation – seriously. It connects the dialectics of capitalism 
to the dialectics of communication and technology.
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This chapter has tried to show that although Herbert Marcuse’s works pre-
dated Facebook, Twitter, Google and similar online platforms, his critical 
theory can today provide an epistemology, method and political impetus for 
understanding and changing capitalist social media’s antagonisms, class struc-
tures and ideologies. 
The reality of social media in capitalism shows the ‘the tension between 
potentiality and actuality, between what man and things could be and what 
they are in fact’ (Marcuse 1937a, 69). Social media points towards, and forms 
together with other technologies, a material foundation of a democratic 
socialist society, in which the means of physical and informational production 
are collectively controlled. Social media’s reality contradicts this potential and 
the human essence of co-operation by fostering new forms of exploitation and 
ideology. 
Critical theory is ethical. It has a ‘concern with human happiness’ (Marcuse 
1937b, 135). It is a critique of domination and exploitation. It holds that ‘man 
can be more than a manipulable subject in the production process of class soci-
ety’ (Marcuse 1937b, 153). Corporate social media fosters human play, social-
ity, fun and happiness in appearance only because it at the same time hides the 
reality of exploitation. It inverts the commodity fetishism so that the commod-
ity logic is hidden behind social benefits that foster the exploitation of digi-
tal labour. At the same time, the use-value dimension of social media points 
towards commonist forms of ownership, control, democracy and communica-
tion and has anticipatory character. These commonist potentials are however 
limited by the capitalist reality of social media.
If, for instance, it is said that concepts such as wages, the value of labor, 
and entrepreneurial profit are only categories of manifestations behind 
which are hidden the ‘essential relations’ of the second set of concepts, it 
is also true that these essential relations represent the truth of the mani-
festations only insofar as the concepts which comprehend them already 
contain their own negation and transcendence – the image of a social 
organization without surplus value. All materialist conceptions contain 
an accusation and an imperative. When the imperative has been ful-
filled, when practice has created men’s new social organization, the new 
essence of man appears in reality (Marcuse 1937a, 86).
The concept of social media is a manifestation of class-based society. It hides 
its own potential and ideologically presents the reality of the exploitation of 
digital labour as truth, play, fun, democracy, wealth, revolution, rebellion, and 
participation. Social media as a concept however also points towards its own 
unrealised essence – a truly social and co-operative society that can never be 
attained under capitalist rule and in a class-based society. The capitalist reality 
of social media contradicts its own essence.
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Herbert Marcuse’s critical theory was a dialectical theory in many respects. 
One of these dimensions was his focus on political praxis as dialectical struggle 
for democratic socialism and against capitalism. In the world of social media 
this means that we have not yet attained social media, but that there are poten-
tials in the media and society today for achieving truly social media. Reading 
Herbert Marcuse today reminds us that truly social media and a true society 
are still possible and can be attained in and through social struggles. 
Capitalist social media is one of the latest proofs of the continuation of 
exploitation and fetishism. It shows how much an alternative society is 
urgently needed. Just like always in capitalism and especially in the situation 
of capitalist crisis, we must today think about how to overcome heteronomy 
and replace it by a true democracy. Social media and society are not-yet truly 
social. For doing so, they need to overcome the particularisms that limit 
human life.
Herbert Marcuse’s theory is not just political in that it provided a political-
economic analysis of the repressive organisation of economy, politics and 
culture. It is also political because it deeply cares about political subjects and 
struggles and the way revolutionary subjectivity is articulated, constrained, 
repressed and withheld. Marcuse analysed and politically related especially 
to the working class movement, the student movement, feminism, the envi-
ronmental movement, and the civil rights movement. At the end of his life, 
Marcuse summarised his assessment of political movements of his time by 
writing that movements ‘such as the worker opposition, citizens’ initiatives, 
communes, student protests, are authentic forms of rebellion determined by 
the particular social situation, counterblows against the centralization and 
totalization of the apparatus of domination’ (Marcuse 1979b, 414). Adding the 
‘anti-authoritarian movement, the ecology movement, and the women’s move-
ment’, he argued, that they are ‘the manifestation (still very unorganized and 
diffuse) of an instinctual structure, the ground of a transformed consciousness 
which is shaking the domination of the performance principle and of alienated 
productivity’ (Marcuse 1979b, 411).
The capitalist crisis that started in 2008 conditioned new struggles and 
expressions of political subjectivity. These included especially far left, fascist 
and religious fundamentalist movements all over the world. In Europe, fascist 
and far right groups and parties have been growing in many countries, whereas 
the strengthening of the Left has had particular significance in southern Europe 
(e.g. Greece, Portugal, Spain) and has expressed itself in other parts of Europe 
in the form of anti-austerity, Occupy and student movements. A decisive politi-
cal task is to weaken the far right forces and to strengthen the Left in order to 
fill the void that the convergence of social democracy and conservatives that is 
accompanied by a strengthening of the far right has created. 
An often-discussed question has in this context been what role social media 
and the Internet play in new forms of political struggles all over the world (for 
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overviews see Fuchs 2014a, 2014b, 2014c). The positions range from techno-
euphoric celebrations that see new struggles such as the Arab Spring as revolu-
tions 2.0 and Facebook or Twitter revolutions to outright neglect and denial 
of any media-dimension of contemporary protests (‘Protests take place on the 
streets and occupations on the square, not on the Internet’). A more nuanced 
dialectical position that can be backed up by empirical research (Fuchs 2014c) is 
that digital and social media are in contradictory dialectical ways connected to 
political movements: there is a contradiction between movements’ use of com-
mercial and non-commercial social media and a dialectic of online and offline 
communication, in which activists who are on the streets and in the squares use 
face-to-face communication and online media in mutually enhancing ways for 
protest information, communication and mobilisation (Fuchs 2014c). Com-
mercial social media pose new potentials for protest mobilisation as well as new 
risks such as corporate and state surveillance and control of movements. The 
point is that we understand the contradictions these media entail and that we 
find institutionalised ways of support for alternative, critical, non-commercial 
and non-profit media with money, work, personnel, infrastructure, time and 
space. The task is to create critical, alternative media as counter-institutions, 
which requires ‘working against the established institutions, while working in 
them’ (Marcuse 1972, 55). This means specifically in the realm of social media 
that we need our own alternatives to Google, Facebook and Twitter that are 
controlled and run by users. Achieving this aim requires political and insti-
tutional reforms, support by left-wing parties, groups and governments, and 
media reforms. Radical reforms of the media system are urgently needed for 
this purpose (see Fuchs 2014d). 
Notes
 1 https://www.facebook.com/FacebookUK/info, accessed on 10 April 2014. 
 2 https://www.google.de/intl/en/about/company/philosophy/, accessed on 
10 April 2014. 
 3 http://www.youtube.com/yt/about/en-GB/, accessed on 10 April 2014.
 4 https://about.twitter.com/company, accessed on 10 April 2014.
 5 http://instagram.com, accessed on 10 April 2014.
 6 http://uk.about.pinterest.com/, accessed on 10 April 2014.
 7 http://www.linkedin.com/about-us, accessed on 10 April 2014.
 8 https://www.tumblr.com/, accessed on 10 April 2014.
 9 http://vk.com/terms, accessed on 10 April 2014.
 10 http://ir.baidu.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=188488&p=irol-homeprofile, 
accessed on 9 April 2014.
 11 http://corp.sina.com.cn/eng/sina_intr_eng.htm, accessed on 9 April 2014.
 12 http://ir.renren-inc.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=244796&p=irol-irhome, 
accessed on 9 April 2014.
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 13 http://www.tencent.com/en-us/at/abouttencent.shtml, accessed on 9 April 
2014.
 14 http://www.wechat.com/en/, accessed on 9 April 2014.
 15 https://about.twitter.com/company, accessed on 10 April 2014.
 16 Data source: http://www.socialbakers.com/statistics/twitter/profiles/, 
accessed on 15 March 2014.
 17 https://www.facebook.com/FacebookUK/info, accessed on 10 April 2014.
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CHAPTER 5
The Internet, Social Media and Axel 
Honneth’s Interpretation of Georg Lukács’ 
Theory of Reification and Alienation
 5.1. Introduction 
This chapter asks: what are the potentials of the concept of alienation/reifica-
tion for a critical theory of society today? Can we hold on to Lukács’ grounding 
of the notion of alienation in Hegel’s dialectic of essence and existence in the 
contemporary world or do we have to drop such foundations? How can we 
understand alienation in the realm of the media?
The basic epistemological assumption underlying this chapter and other of my 
works (Fuchs 2008, 2011, 2014a, 2014b, 2015) is that Internet research is pre-
dominantly a positivist science that lacks grounding in social theory and tends 
not to reflect on the Internet’s larger presuppositions in society. For grounding 
a social theory and a critical theory of the Internet, we therefore need to pro-
foundly engage with and re-interpret contemporary critical theory approaches 
in order to reformulate them in such a way that basic concepts can be applied to 
the realm of digital media that shape and are shaped by contemporary society.
For providing answers to the questions this chapter asks, I first briefly revisit 
Lukács’ theory of reification and alienation that he set out in History and Class 
Consciousness (section 2). How to formulate the concept of alienation today has 
been vividly discussed in contemporary German critical theory. Hartmut Rosa, 
Rahel Jaeggi and Axel Honneth have made important contributions to this 
debate. I engage with their notions of alienation in sections 2 and 3. Hartmut 
Rosa has been professor of sociology at Friedrich Schiller University Jena since 
2005. His main interest is the critical theory of modern society’s acceleration. 
Rahel Jaeggi was a PhD student of Axel Honneth at the University of Frankfurt. 
How to cite this book chapter: 
Fuchs, Christian. 2016. Critical Theory of  Communication. Pp. 153–175. London: Uni-
versity of Westminster Press. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.16997/book1.e. License: 
CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0
154 Critical Theory of  Communication
Her dissertation focused on the theory of alienation. She has been professor of 
philosophy at Humboldt University of Berlin since 2009. Axel Honneth was a 
research assistant to Jürgen Habermas at the University of Frankfurt’s Institute 
of Social Research in the years 1983–19891 and obtained his habilitation with 
a work on the theory of recognition at the same university in 1990. Honneth 
became the director of the University of Frankfurt’s Institute of Social Research 
in 2001 and is Professor of Philosophy. 
The Frankfurt School’s first generation, thinkers such as Adorno, Horkheimer 
and Marcuse, was directly influenced by Lukács’ concept of reification. This 
notion had impact on Horkheimer and Adorno’s concept of instrumental 
reason and Marcuse’s notion of technological rationality. Habermas as the 
main representative of the Frankfurt School’s second generation reinterpreted 
Lukács’ notion in his theory of communicative action as the colonisation of the 
lifeworld. Honneth is the key thinker in the Frankfurt School’s third genera-
tion, whereas Jaeggi and Rosa can be considered to be fourth generation critical 
theorists. The question arises how the third and fourth generation, the theoreti-
cal heirs of Adorno, Horkheimer and Habermas, understand alienation. I deal 
with this question in sections 2 and 3.
In section 4, I try to outline some foundations of a dialectical, materialist and 
Hegelian concept of alienation that is based on Honneth’s approach, but simul-
taneously quite substantially departs from it. In section 5, I use this approach 
for reflecting on alienation and the Internet with the help of the example of 
corporate social media. 
5.2. Lukács’ Theory of Reification and Alienation
5.2.1. Objectification and Alienation
Georg Lukács (1971) argues in the preface to the 1967 edition of History and 
Class Consciousness that he wrote the book before publication of Marx’s Economic 
and Philosophic Manuscripts and that the latter changed his view of this reifica-
tion and alienation. It would be necessary to discern between objectification and 
alienation. The first would be part of any production process in any society: ‘If 
we bear in mind that every externalization of an object in practice (and hence, 
too, in work) is an objectification, that every human expression including speech 
objectifies human thoughts and feelings, then it is clear the we are dealing with a 
universal mode of commerce between men’ (Lukács 1971, xxiv). 
The use of the term ‘commerce’ is unfortunate in the English translation. The 
German original says ‘Verkehr[s] der Menschen miteinander’ (Lukács 1967, 26), 
which can best be translated as ‘forms of intercourse among humans’, a term that 
has often been used in the English translation of Marx’s term ‘Verkehrsform’. 
Translating ‘Verkehr’ as ‘commerce’ creates the impression that Lukács reifies 
market societies, although his very thinking is anti-reifying. 
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Alienation is for Lukács based on Marx’s chapter on commodity fetishism in 
Capital Volume 1, a form of objectification that takes on dominative and class 
character: 
Only when the objectified forms in society acquire functions that bring 
the essence of man into conflict with his existence, only when man’s 
nature is subjugated, deformed and crippled can we speak of an objec-
tive societal condition of alienation and, as an inexorable consequence, 
of all the subjective marks of an internal alienation (Lukács 1971, xxiv). 
The commodity structure conceals ‘every trace of its fundamental nature: the 
relation between people’ so that ‘a relation between people takes on the char-
acter of a thing and thus acquires a “phantom objectivity”’ (Lukács 1971, 83). 
In the modern rationalisation of the labour process, there is a ‘mathematical 
analysis of work-processes’ so that qualities are reduced to quantities that ‘can 
be calculated’ (88). The measurement of labour time is decisive in this context. 
‘The transformation of the commodity relation into a thing of “ghostly objectiv-
ity” cannot therefore content itself with the reduction of all object for the grati-
fication of human needs to commodities. It stamps its imprint upon the whole 
consciousness of man’ (100). ‘Reification requires that a society should learn to 
satisfy all its needs in terms of commodity exchange’ (91), which includes ‘the 
separation of the producer from his means of production’ (91), etc. Reification 
tries to eliminate qualities, dialectical logic, and non-instrumental action from 
the economy and society as a whole. 
Authors in the newer generation of German critical theory, such as Axel 
Honneth, Rahel Jaeggi and Hartmut Rosa, have revived Marx’s concept of 
alienation. Jaeggi and Rosa argue that there is no essence to which one needs to 
returns to and that is predetermined, but that in appropriation one creates the 
self and the world. They have problems with Lukács’ objectivist understand-
ing of Marx and a notion of alienation that is grounded in Hegel’s dialectic of 
essence and existence. Honneth, in contrast, takes an approach more inspired 
by Hegel and Lukács that assumes that there is an essence of the human and 
social world that is important for a moral philosophy. 
5.2.2. Hartmut Rosa and Rahel Jaeggi on Alienation
For Hartmut Rosa (2012, 300–323), acceleration results in contemporary 
modernity in a five-fold alienation from space, things, our own actions, time 
(e.g. lack of time), and social relations. The social theorist would not have to 
identify ‘true needs’, but to analyse disappointments of human expectations. 
‘According to my analysis, we are not alienated from our true inner essence, but 
from our ability to appropriate the world in its spatial, temporal, social, practi-
cal and objective dimensions’2 (Rosa 2012, 322, translation from German).
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For Rahel Jaeggi (2005, 14), alienation means a form of appropriation of soci-
ety, an ethical perspective of how to change the world, whereas Kant’s concept 
of autonomy neglects social institutions and their pathologies as well as the 
harms they cause. She argues that the critique of alienation is connected to the 
question of how we want to live (Jaeggi 2005, 14). The alienation concept has 
an objective and a subjective meaning (41): the loss of power and the loss of 
sense/meaning. Alienation is for her not a lack of relations, but a relationship 
to something, albeit ‘a relationship of unrelatedness’3 (19, 43, translation from 
German). For Jaeggi, there are two main problems of the concept of alienation: 
a) the objective definition of what is good independent from human self-defi-
nitions, b) the notion of reconciliation with an original essence. The notion of 
alienation as estrangement from an essence was according to Jaeggi first for-
mulated by Rousseau and then also by Hegel, Marx, Lukács, Heidegger, and the 
Frankfurt School. The problem would be that a prescription of what is good for 
humans would be an objectivistic-perfectionistic paternalism (47). 
Jaeggi wants to have a qualified subjective notion of alienation that gives up met-
aphysics and the notions of essence and reconciliation. Alienation for her has to 
do with the conditions of successful relations to oneself and the world (51) and Ernst 
Tugendhat’s question: can we control ourselves in what we want? (52). Such an 
approach would take human wants seriously, but also have the possibility to ques-
tion them (58–59). Alienation means for Jaeggi obstructions of the realisation of 
what one wants (53). It obstructs the positive freedom to determine oneself. ‘Alien-
ation is prevented appropriation of the world and the self”4 (Jaeggi 2005, 183). It 
means that one cannot relate to and appropriate one’s own preconditions (185). 
Self-alienation is a lack of power of and presence in what one does, lack of identifi-
cation with one’s own actions and wants or lacking participation in one’s own life.
Jaeggi understands appropriation as something active that changes the thing 
that is appropriated (56–57) and creates the self (184). One’s wishes, interests 
and actions take place in the world. Therefore self-appropriation would also 
be appropriation of the world (Jaeggi 2005, 184). Appropriation is a process 
with open results (185). The self is relational (197), so self-appropriation is a 
change of social relations so that one is empowered in social relations. Self-
appropriation means that we can articulate ourselves in the world and in our 
social relations (198) and that one becomes and is present in one’s own actions, 
controls one’s life, appropriates social roles, can identify with one’s wants, and is 
involved in the world (187). The self that is appropriated does not already exist 
as essence, but is created in the process of self-appropriation (Jaeggi 2005, 184) 
and invented in this process (self-invention).
5.2.3. Limits of Revised Concepts of Alienation
Rosa and Jaeggi share the critique of Hegel’s, Marx’s and Lukács’ notions of 
alienation. They therefore cannot qualify objective social conditions as true or 
false independent of human consciousness, which makes it difficult to make 
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moral judgements in situations when protest is forestalled and the slaves love 
their masters. Rosa and Jaeggi argue for de-Hegelianising and de-Lukácianis-
ing the notion of alienation, which takes out the potential of universalism and 
makes alienation a cultural contextual, relative, purely immanent and non-
universal concept that lacks transcendental and universal potentials. Honneth 
(2007a) argues that Foucault, under the influence of Nietzsche, brought about 
a shift in social philosophy that displays ‘a distaste for universalism’ (39), but 
whose problem is that ‘normative criteria remain on the whole […] obscure and 
[…] overshadowed by epistemological perspectivism’ (40). The task for a critical 
theory would be to ground principles that allow ‘to assess certain developments 
in social life as pathologies in a context-transcending way’ (42) so that ‘institu-
tions and practices can be taken as ‘pathological’ for the very reason that, upon 
unbiased reflection, they contradict the conditions of the good life’ (60). 
Rosa and Jaeggi’s approaches bring up the question: how should one under-
stand the notion of strangeness in estrangement and Fremdheit in entfrem-
den? What is the origin or essence that one is estranged from in class-based 
societies? Alienation implies that one has externalised something, e.g. activ-
ity, to whose control one has a moral right. Externalisation in alienated social 
relations is lost control because objectification is combined with asymmet-
ric power relations that result in a loss of ownership of property, political 
influence, and cultural significance in the economic, political, and cultural 
system that in all societies are created by humans in common, but in class-
based societies controlled by elites. One does not have to give up the notion 
of essence for a theory of alienation because it can be interpreted as an 
immanent feature of all societies that has transcendental importance. Rec-
onciliation means to take control of what humans have produced, but cannot 
control in class-based societies. In a classless society, not elites, but the crea-
tors themselves, control objects. The logic of essence goes to the ground of 
humanity and society in order to show what capitalism and domination rob 
from humans so that they can no longer be fully social and as humans are 
social beings not fully social. 
Rosa and Jaeggi fail to provide foundations for a universal, critical and dialecti-
cal theory of morality. I will try to show next that Axel Honneth’s reinterpretation 
of Lukács is not without problems, but shares basic insights with the Hegelian 
approach so that it can be connected to a materialist and dialectical moral theory. 
5.3. Axel Honneth’s Interpretation of Lukács’ Concept of 
Reification in the Critical Theory of Recognition
5.3.1. Honneth’s Theory of Recognition
Honneth bases his theory on the assumption that humans are psychological 
beings that strive for ‘self-confidence, self-respect, and self-esteem’ (Honneth 
1992, 196) and suffer if they are disrespected. He subdivides recognition into 
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three forms: love, equality, and achievement. Honneth (1996) grounds this 
approach in the works of Hegel and George Herbert Mead. He argues that 
both Hegel and Mead advanced stage theories of recognition, in which there 
are three forms of recognition that build on each other. For Hegel these are 
the recognition of the need for love provided in the family, the recognition of 
human autonomy in civil society and the legal system, and the recognition of 
individual particularity by the state and in ethical life and processes of solidar-
ity (Honneth 1996, 25). The absence of such forms or recognition would be the 
foundation of struggles for recognition. 
For Mead, the three crucial forms of recognition are love, legal rights, and 
solidarity (Honneth 1996, 94). Honneth (1996, 129) reformulates Hegel and 
Mead’s approaches and argues that emotional support provided by the family 
and friends, cognitive respect by legal rights, and social esteem given by soli-
dary communities of value are the three modes of recognition in society. 
Taken together, the three forms of recognition – love, rights, and 
esteem – constitute the social conditions under which human subjects 
can develop a positive attitude towards themselves. For it is only due to 
the cumulative acquisition of basic self-confidence, of self-respect, and 
of self-esteem – provided, one after another, by the experience of those 
three forms of recognition – that a person can come to see himself or 
herself, unconditionally, as both an autonomous and an individuated 
being and to identify with his or her goals and desires (169). 
Social recognition would be the ‘presupposition of all communicative action’ 
(Honneth 2007a, 71). Disrespect would mean a lack of recognition. In relation 
to the three dimensions of social activity, disrespect would mean abuse and rape, 
exclusion and the denial or rights, denigration and insult (Honneth 1996, 129). 
Honneth (1996, 94) argues that the distinction of three realms of society can 
be found in many social theories, not just in Hegel and Mead’s works. There-
fore ‘a division of social life into three spheres of interaction has a high degree 
of plausibility’ (94). Honneth however argues that it ‘is evidently quite natural 
to distinguish forms of social integration according to whether they occur via 
emotional bonds, the granting of rights, or a shared orientation to values’ (94). 
5.3.2. Marx and Recognition
Honneth (1996) argues that Marx discusses the struggle for recognition in a 
‘narrowed version’ (146) that focuses on the alienation caused by the prole-
tariat’s lack of control over the means of production. ‘Marx narrows Hegel’s 
mode of the “struggle for recognition” in the direction of an aesthetic of pro-
duction’ (148). By ‘reducing the goals of class struggle to only those demands 
that are directly connected to the organization of social labour, he made it easy 
The Internet, Social Media and Axel Honneth’s Interpretation of  Georg Lukács’ Theory 159
to abstract from all the political concerns stemming from the violation of moral 
claims as such’ (149). Certainly there are not just class struggles, but also other 
political struggles in heteronomous societies. But Honneth disregards the fact 
that all structures, including decision-making structures and morals, are the 
outcome of social co-production processes, which gives a special relevance to 
the notion of production that Marx foregrounds in his theory and that Honneth 
rather neglects in favour of the concept of recognition.
So Honneth claims that Marx has an economic reductionist theory of soci-
ety, but the dimensions of work and the economy are rather missing in his 
own theory of recognition. His book from 1996 does not make evident how his 
distinction between emotions/rights/esteem relates to the realm of the produc-
tion and control of use-values that satisfy human needs, i.e. the realm of work, 
which renders his approach prone to the accusation that it is a form of philo-
sophical idealism that disregards society’s materiality. 
5.3.3. Honneth and Habermas’ Distinction between System and 
Lifeworld
Although Honneth (1996) does not make it explicitly evident in The Strug-
gle for Recognition, his approach seems to presuppose Habermas’ distinction 
between system integration and social integration. Habermas bases his catego-
ries of the system and the lifeworld on this differentiation. 
I have proposed that we distinguish between social integration and 
system integration: the former attaches to action orientations, while 
the latter reaches right through them. In one case the action system is 
integrated through consensus, whether normatively guaranteed or com-
municatively achieved; in the other case it is integrated through the non-
normative steering of individual decisions not subjectively coordinated 
(Habermas 1987, 150). 
Although Habermas can account for the reification of communication as the colo-
nisation of the lifeworld, he separates the systems of the economy and politics 
from the realm of communication, arguing that communication is pure, non-
instrumental, and emancipatory. Communication is however part of systems of 
accumulation and domination. There is a whole field of studies termed ‘strate-
gic communication’ – defined as the ‘purposeful use of communication by an 
organization to fulfill its mission’ (Hallahan et al. 2007, 3), which includes the 
four clusters of corporate communication, marketing/advertising/public rela-
tions, business communication skills, and organisational communication. Strate-
gic communication focuses on how to use communication in order to accumulate 
monetary capital, which shows that communication is also a tool and instrument 
for system integration, rendering the distinction between social and system inte-
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gration meaningless. For Habermas, colonisation is a process, in which money 
and power substitute and replace communicative action. But in reality, commu-
nication often mediates the accumulation of money and power and thereby has 
itself an instrumental character.
So if one assumes that Honneth leaves out aspects of the economy because he 
sees it as part of systems integration and only wants to cover social integration, 
then this separation fails theoretically. If however he thinks of social integra-
tion as covering all aspects of society, then the economy and work are the blind 
spots of his theory. In both cases, his approach does not adequately account for 
the production of social life and the role of economic processes in it.
5.3.4. Recognition, the Economy and Work
Whereas Honneth focuses in The Struggle for Recognition (Honneth 1996) 
on recognition as love provided by the family, rights provided by the legal 
system, and esteem provided by communities of value and tends to ignore a 
direct discussion of the economy, work and exploitation, he gives more atten-
tion to these issues in his book The I in We (Honneth 2014). He argues that 
liberal theories of justice tend to be individualistic by assuming that distribu-
tion of resources must account for ‘ensuring individual autonomy’ (39) and 
individual freedom so that everyone enjoys enough private property and ‘the 
use or enjoyment of goods’ (38). Distributive justice is reduced to possessive 
individualism. 
For Honneth, autonomy is in contrast relational and intersubjective (41) 
and can only be achieved by individuals recognising each other. ‘Individuals 
achieve self-determination by learning, within relations of reciprocal recogni-
tion, to view their needs, beliefs and abilities as worthy of articulation and pur-
suit in the public sphere’ (46). ‘It does not suffice to conceive of autonomy as 
arising solely from intersubjective respect for subjects’ decision-making com-
petence; rather, subjects need to be appreciated from their particular needs and 
individual deeds’ (48). 
Alongside legal relationships, we must also include familial relation-
ships and societal relations of work within our theory of justice. […] 
Just as in the egalitarian legal relations under the democratic rule of 
law, individuals are also obligated within the family and the exchange of 
services to recognize each other as free and equal (49). 
A reconstructive theory of justice would need three normative principles: 
deliberative equality, justice of needs, and justice of achievement (49). In 
the realm of work, recognition would mean an ‘“organic” form of solidarity’ 
because workers’ ‘reciprocal recognition of their respective contributions to the 
common good gives them a sense of being connected to each other’ (69). Work 
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relations would not just have to be concerned with the systemic organisation of 
the economy, but also with social integration in the form of solidarity as mutual 
recognition (71–72).
Comparing the two books published in 1996 and 2014, one sees that Hon-
neth continues to see the family and the legal system as two important realms 
of society, but in the second book defines the third realm no longer as com-
munities of value, but the realm of work, i.e. the economy. Whereas in the first 
book, Honneth tends to speak of love, rights and esteem as the three realms of 
recognition, in the second one he speaks of needs, equality and achievements 
of work. Although in the second book he gives more attention to the economy, 
the question remains how the economy, politics, and everyday life are related to 
each other in a theory of society and justice. 
Honneth (2014, 57–58) argues that the concept of labour – and thereby the 
true analysis of the economy – has almost disappeared from the social sci-
ences because efforts to emancipate labour appear to have lost their credibility. 
Although he does not mention it explicitly, it is clear that the breakdown of 
‘actually existing socialism’ in Eastern Europe has caused a crisis of the idea of 
a classless society. But at the same time, ‘the hardships, fears and hopes of those 
immediately affected by societal working conditions revolve around this notion 
more than ever’ (57). Neoliberalism would have resulted in the ‘economization 
of social contexts’ and new paradoxes (176). There would be a de-differentia-
tion of private and professional life, entrepreneurs and employees (‘entreploy-
ees’, 179), instrumental and non-instrumental action, the private and the pub-
lic, the formal and the informal (179–181). It ‘becomes increasingly difficult for 
subjects to distinguish between instrumental and non-instrumental aspects of 
intersubjective relationships’ (180). ‘[N]etwork capitalism is colonizing spheres 
of action that were previously distant from utility’ (180). The colonisation of 
(almost) everything by capitalist logic calls modernity’s relative separation of 
spheres into question. 
Also in his debate with Nancy Fraser on the relationship of redistribution 
and recognition, Honneth argues for a ‘“moral” monism’ (Fraser and Hon-
neth 2003, 254), in which three spheres of society represent three forms of 
demands for recognition. Moral recognition is for Honneth the unifying 
principle of society. Love, law and achievement would be the three forms of 
recognition in modern society (138). The achievements created by a ‘produc-
tive citizen’s labour emerged in capitalist society as a ‘third sphere of recog-
nition alongside love and the new legal principle in the developing capital-
ist society’ (141). The spheres of intimacy, the legal system and working life 
would bring about three forms of recognition: ‘“Love” (the central idea of 
intimate relationships), the equality principle (the norm of legal relations), 
and the achievement principle (the standard of social hierarchy) represent 
normative perspectives with reference to which subjects can reasonably argue 
that existing forms of recognition are inadequate or insufficient and need to 
be expanded’ (143).
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5.3.5. Honneth, Lukács, Tomasello
Axel Honneth (2008) does – in contrast to other contemporary social theorists – 
not drop, but (in the book Reification: A New Look at an Old Idea) re-interpret 
Lukács’ concepts of alienation and reification for a contemporary critical theory 
of society. He bases his approach on Michael Tomasello (2008)’s development 
psychology. Tomasello presents research based on development psychology and 
socialisation findings that recognition precedes cognition: children learn to take 
over the perspective of another, which enables thinking and communication. In 
the ‘9 month revolution’, the child starts perceiving an attachment figure whose 
perspective s/he takes over. S/he develops an emotional relation to this person 
and starts relating to the world and objects by observing how the attachment 
figure relates to objects. The child imitates the attachment figure’s behaviour. 
Children thereby depersonalise themselves and become social. 
At around 9 months of age, infants begin displaying a whole new suite 
of social behaviors, based both on their ability to understand others as 
intentional and rational agents like the self and on their ability to par-
ticipate with others in interactions involving joint goals, intentions, and 
attention (shared intentionality) (Tomasello 2008, 139).
Developmental psychology confirms for Honneth that recognition by and of 
others and empathetic engagement precedes cognition: ‘the acknowledgement 
of the other constitutes a non-epistemic prerequisite for linguistic understand-
ing’ (Honneth 2008, 50). Honneth says that Georg Lukács, Martin Heidegger, 
John Dewey, and Stanley Cavell made this point philosophically. Related to it 
would also be Georg Herbert Mead’s concept of seeing ourselves through the 
eyes of the other and Adorno’s notion of the libindial cathexis of a concrete 
other through which children develop by imitating others. 
5.3.6. Three Forms of Critique
Honneth (2007b, 57–69) distinguishes between a constructive, transcendental 
critique; a reconstructive, immanent critique; and a Foucauldian genealogical 
critique. Critical theory would combine all three forms. In the debate with Fraser, 
he characterises this combination as immanent transcendence. Transcendence 
must be attached to a form of practice or experience which is on the one 
hand indispensable for social reproduction, and on the other hand – 
owing to its normative surplus – points beyond all given form of social 
organization. […] “transcendence” should be a property of “imma-
nence” itself, so that the facticity of social relations always contains a 
dimension of transcending claims (Fraser and Honneth 2003, 244).
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Recognition and sociality is for Honneth the immanent quality of society that 
allows moral judgements that can have a transcendental political meaning, i.e. 
constitute a political categorical imperative that society as it is, is unfair and 
unjust and should be politically changed. 
For Honneth, reification is ‘forgetfulness of recognition’ (Honneth 2008, 56): 
we forget that our knowledge, being and cognition are based on recognition 
and empathetic engagement. If this knowledge is lost, then others are viewed 
as things (57). Honneth distinguished three forms of reification: reification in 
our relationship to others, nature/world, and ourselves. So for him there are 
intersubjective, objective, and subjective forms of alienation. 
Judith Butler argues that whereas Lukács’ approach is subject-oriented, 
Honneth’s is action-theoretical and interactionist (in: Honneth 2008, 98). Both 
would however retain ‘an Arcadian myth’ of a ‘before’ (108). She argues that 
both ‘love and aggression’ would be ‘coextensive with human being’ (109). The 
problem with this assumption becomes evident, when considering the conse-
quences of it. It there are two equally important substances of humans – love 
and aggression – then they must both equally matter in child development. 
This assumption applies that parents have treat their kid both with love and 
aggression in order that the child develops, which indirectly justifies violence 
against children. In contrast, Tomasello stresses the importance of love, care, 
and communication as primary and essential in child development. Chil-
dren cannot develop without love, care, and communication. However, they 
develop even better if they do not experience hate, violence, and isolation. This 
is just another formulation for saying that love, care, and communication form 
human and society’s social essence. 
5.4. Towards a Materialist Theory of Morality as Theory of 
Co-operation and Social Co-Production
The bottom line of Honneth’s social theory is that humans are social and moral 
beings and that this essence has ethical implications for what we should con-
sider the good life. The economic, the political, and the intimate are seen as 
manifestations of human social and moral being. Although Honneth identifies 
a unifying social principle – morality – he sees the three realms of society as 
relatively independent on the one hand and reduces them to morality on the 
other hand. There is not doubt that sociality is a crucial dimension of soci-
ety’s materiality: human beings cannot exist in isolation, but only in social 
relations. Humans are capable of distinguishing what is good and bad and so 
make assessments of the qualities of their social and natural environments 
that guide their actions. Morality is however just one feature of the human. 
Another crucial aspect is that humans are self-conscious beings that actively 
create, recreate and transform the social and natural world. They are produc-
ing and working beings. 
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5.4.1. Lukács: Teleological Positing
Georg Lukács has in his Ontology of Social Being therefore characterised human 
activity as ‘teleological positing’ that results in ‘the rise of a new objectivity’ 
(Lukács 1978, 3). Human production is teleological because in it a ‘conscious 
creator’ (human beings) produces with a purpose, orientation and goal (5). 
Such goals are not necessarily instrumental and aimed at domination. For 
example peace, love, care and understanding are also goals. Human activity 
presupposes that humans reflect on how, why and what they want to produce in 
the world. Lukács considers teleological positing (the conscious and active pro-
duction of changes by realising subjective intentions in the objective world) as 
a common feature of work and communication, i.e. the economy and culture. 
There is an ‘ontological similarity of base and superstructure as they are both 
based on teleological positings and their causal effects’5 (Lukács 1986, 424). In 
the economy, where work creates goods, the intentional goals tend to be much 
more clearly defined, whereas in culture, where communication influences 
social behaviour, there is much more scope for what is considered desirable 
and undesirable, for ‘reactions to societal matters of fact, situations, tasks, etc.’6 
(Lukács 1986, 417). Lukács says that in the economy, the value of a product 
depends on whether it is ‘immediately useful or non-useful, whereas in artistic 
creation the field and possibilities of value and non-value are extraordinarily 
widely stretched and hardly determinable in advance’7 (535).
Conscious and active production is an inherently social activity in society. 
Lukács’ notion of teleological positing allows overcoming the separation of 
work and ideas. Teleological positing is a production of physical, social, and 
informational use-values that satisfy human needs. We can take from Honneth 
the insight that many social theories agree that there are three realms of society 
and combine it with Lukács’ insight that production as social process of tele-
ological positing creates the unity of these spheres. Honneth’s moral idealism 
that sees the importance of sociality can thereby be turned into a materialist 
ethics and social theory. Humans produce use-values that satisfy human needs 
in the economy, collective decisions in the political system, and meanings/defi-
nitions of the world (including moral judgments and identities) in the cultural 
system. Use-values, collective decisions, and definitions are the fundamental 
objects posited by human social activities in the three realms of society. The 
three realms of the economy, politics and culture are however not independent: 
economic activities posit use-values, collective decisions and definitions how-
ever also use-values satisfying the needs of organisation and understanding. 
5.4.2. Political and Cultural Production
Political and cultural production are economic and non-economic at the same 
time: both require political and cultural workers that create together with others 
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political and cultural objects. These objects do however not just have an eco-
nomic role, but as rules and definitions shape society outside of the economy too. 
Politics and culture have an economic foundation and emergent, non-economic 
qualities (Fuchs 2015, chapters 2 and 3). 
What are the implications of this approach for moral theory? How can we 
ground ethics in such a materialist and dialectical theory of society? Hegel 
argues that the world is often not what it appears to be, but that its truth lies 
hidden behind immediate existence. The essence is a ‘background’ that ‘con-
stitutes the truth of being’ (Hegel 1812/1833, 337). For Hegel, not everything 
that exists is actual. Actuality is rather an existence that corresponds to its 
essence, the truth of a phenomenon: ‘Actuality is the unity, become imme-
diate, of essence and existence, or of what is inner and what is outer’ (Hegel 
1830, §142). In contrast to poststructuralism, Honneth does not give up on the 
notions of essence and alienation, but rather seeks to ground them in society 
itself as immanent standard of ethical judgement that allows principles that 
can transcend dominative relations towards a just, good and fair society. He 
finds this the immanent essence of society in the social recognition that all 
humans – already as children – experience in their socialisation. Love, rights 
and solidarity are the basic forms of recognition that as a unity for him forms 
moral human essence. Reification means social relations that forget the need 
for recognition and thereby humiliate and disrespect others. 
5.4.3. Social Production and Co-Production
The missing link in Honneth’s theory is social production. Humans not just 
mutually recognise themselves in order to exist, they together produce the 
social world in processes of co-operation. No individual and no society can 
exist and survive without a basic level of co-operation, i.e. the solidary work-
ing together of humans in order to achieve certain goals. A club of egoistic 
individuals that only compete and do not aim to collaborate will sooner or later 
end up in constant warfare, violence, and hatred. It will not be socially sustain-
able, but rather destroy itself. This thought experiment shows that social co-
production of the world is society’s essence. If we apply Hegel’s dialectical logic 
of essence and existence as moral principle, then this means that co-operation 
as the principle of social co-production of society is society’s essence. In rela-
tions of domination and exploitation, humans encounter each other negatively 
so that one person or group tries to benefit themselves at the expense of others. 
The result is that certain humans are reified, they are reduced to the status of 
instruments and things that serve particularistic interests. 
Axel Honneth shows the importance of the logic of essence and of the social 
as the essence of society and humans. Morally recognising each other is how-
ever just one form of co-producing the world. In processes of communication, 
humans can encounter each other and co-produce joint understandings of the 
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world. Recognition is the cultural process of co-producing the world. Humans 
however also need to engage in collaborative work that creates use-values in the 
economy and in political debates and governance that creates collective deci-
sions in the political system. If social systems take on a co-operative character 
at a whole and eliminate domination, then they correspond to their essence. 
This essence is morally grounded within society itself. It is an immanent stand-
ard of morality. A true economy is therefore commonly owned and controlled, 
a true political system commonly governed, and a true cultural system – one 
that fosters mutual understanding and recognition. The ethical implication 
is that capitalism, dictatorships, and fundamentalisms are false forms of eco-
nomic, political and cultural interaction. 
5.4.4. Reification
Reification is the process in which classes and elites separate humans and society 
from their essence. It brings ‘the essence of man into conflict with his existence, 
only when man’s nature is subjugated, deformed and crippled can we speak 
of an objective societal condition of alienation’ (Lukács 1971, xxiv). Whereas 
reification is the process that implements domination, alienation is the condi-
tion that results from reification. If humans appropriate their own essence in 
social struggles, then they do not return to a historical origin that once existed 
and was lost, but they struggle for social conditions that enable a humane exist-
ence and correspond to the immanent co-operative standards of sociality itself. 
Social struggles in class-based societies are struggles with potential results that 
lie on a spectrum between alienated and appropriated social conditions. 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 give an overview of processes of reification and appro-
priation in society’s three realms. The general distinction is the one between 
social systems that are alienated and that are under common control. Aliena-
tion means that humans do not control basic social structures in a way that 
advances the common good so that a particular class or elite is in control and 
takes advantage of others. 
5.4.5. Three Subsystems of Society – Three Dimensions of Reification
Honneth (2008) distinguished three forms of reification: reification in our rela-
tionship to others, the world, and ourselves. So for him there are intersubjective, 
objective and subjective forms of alienation. This distinction points towards the 
dialectic of subject and object in social processes: human subjects have their 
own identities and personalities, based on which they encounter each other 
in the social world and in processes of social activity create, reproduce and 
transform the objective world. They co-produce the social world in processes 
of teleological co-positing. Human subjects interact in the social world and 
thereby co-produce objects.
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Exploitation is alienation and reification’s economic form, political domi-
nation its political form, and the two forms of cultural domination (cultural 
imperialism: unity without diversity; cultural fragmentation: diversity without 
unity) constitute cultural alienation. A commons-based economy, participa-
tory democracy and cultural understanding (unity in diversity) are true social 
forms, in which social existence corresponds to its essence and humans have 
appropriated this essence.
In an alienated economic system, humans are exploited and produce property 
that is owned by a dominant class. In a self-managed economy, humans co-pro-
duce, co-own and co-control property. In an alienated political system, an elite 
centralises political decision-making power and excludes citizens. In an appropri-
ated political system, people have the power and co-decide in a system of participa-
tory democracy, which constitutes political rights. In an alienated cultural system, 
an elite centralises meaning, making it so that others’ identities and moral values 
are disregarded and disrespected. In an appropriated cultural system, humans co-
produce meanings of the world, mutually understand and morally recognise each 


















































































Table 5.1: Forms of reification/alienation in society’s three realms.
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5.4.6. Subjective Alienation
At the level of subjectivity, humans experience the world through their behav-
iours. They also emotionally interpret the world. Humans can feel alienated or 
non-alienated in an objectively alienated or non-alienated world. Objective and 
intersubjective alienation can, but does not necessarily have to result in emo-
tionally experienced alienation. Slave workers, citizens in a dictatorship and 
people in a theocracy do not necessarily hate the slave masters, dictators, and 
theocrats. Physical, structural and ideological violence can make them accept 
domination, which can also result in a moral accommodation with their situ-
ation so that they cannot imagine a different situation and feel emotionally at 
ease with the dominant order. Objective alienation however nurtures poten-
tials for emotional alienation, i.e. emotional experiences of dissatisfying labour, 
political dissatisfaction and cultural discontent. 
Such subjective alienation may just express itself as apathy, disinterestedness, 
or apathy. It can however, especially in situations of crisis, also nurture poten-








































































Table 5.2: Forms of appropriation in society’s three realms.
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movements can trigger individual empowerment (anti-capitalism, politicisa-
tion, cultural literacy) that at a social level can as aggregated and networked 
social phenomenon result in class struggles, political protests and struggles for 
recognition. There is no guarantee that such struggles are successful. If they 
however are successful, then non-alienated social conditions can be the result. 
There can however also be counter-struggles so that non-alienated conditions 
can turn into alienated ones.
Non-alienated subjectivity means self-realising activity, active citizenship 
and general intellectuality. General intellect means not just a high level of gen-
eral education and intellectual engagement, but also moral intelligibility so that 
humans provide recognition of each other. Humans can feel non-alienated in 
alienated social conditions: an employee may, for example, love his/her job and 
feel it’s a form of self-realisation and therefore accept that the company owners 
get richer and richer from the many hours of unpaid overtime in the com-
pany and the long working hours that damage his/her social life outside profes-
sional life. In such a situation, economic self-realisation can come along with 
social alienation in the realm of culture and everyday life that expresses itself 
for example in a lack of friendships, family life, sexual satisfaction, etc. Another 
example is that active citizens can feel happy in fostering a racist right-wing 
extremist political agenda that aims to harm immigrants. They feel emotion-
ally non-alienated at the political level, but advance an alienated political sys-
tem. Honneth argues in this context that social recognition can ‘just as well be 
sought in small militaristic groups, whose code of honor is dominated by the 
practice of violence, as it can be in the public arenas of a democratic society’ 
(Honneth 2007a, 77). Struggles for appropriated social systems must take into 
account the fact that humans are only truly at home in society when they feel 
individually satisfied and exist under intersubjective and objective conditions 
that are commonly controlled and benefit all. This can require disrespect for 
structures and practices that foster disrespect and respect for those that disre-
spect disrespect. 
Given these basic reflections on alienation, the question arises how this con-
cepts matters for the critical analysis of mediated communication. 
5.5. The Media, Alienation and Morality 
I want to discuss the question how alienation relates to the media with a specific 
example, namely Facebook. Facebook is the world’s most widely used social 
networking site and Internet platforms. It enables registered users to share and 
comment on content with their network of contacts. It is an expression of the 
blurring of the boundaries between the public and the private, the home and 
the workplace, work time and leisure time, labour and leisure, production and 
consumption (Fuchs 2015, chapter 8): Facebook brings together activities and 
contacts from such different realms on the same profiles, which enables users 
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to observe people not just in the social roles they are familiar with them, but 
also other ones. It is however mistaken to see Facebook as a communications 
company: it does not sell communication or access to communication, but user 
data and targeted advert space. Facebook is one of the world’s largest advertis-
ing agencies.
5.5.1. Mark Andrejevic and Eran Fisher on Digital Alienation
Some authors have discussed what alienation means in the world of Facebook. 
Mark Andrejevic (2012) argues that corporate social media only promise to 
overcome alienation, but in reality constitute digital alienation, a ‘form of the 
enclosure of the digital commons’ (84). ‘Users have little choice over whether 
this [surveillance] data is generated and little say in how it is used’ (85). Such 
‘external, storable, and sortable collection of data about’ users’ ‘social lives’ is 
‘separated from us and stored in servers owned and controlled by, for example, 
Facebook’ (2011, 88). ‘The result of the form of separation facilitated by Face-
book is […] the alienability of the product of their online social activity: the fact 
that the fruits of this activity can become a resource whose uses range far beyond 
their control’ (88). ‘The data shadow is a figure of the alienated self ’ (Andreje-
vic 2014, 182) and results in ‘algorithmic alienation’ (189) that determines life 
chances based on data mining, big data analysis and statistical correlations. 
Eran Fisher (2012) in contrast to Mark Andrejevic argues that alienation 
‘signals an existential state of not being in control over something (the labour 
process, the product, etc.)’ (173). Less ‘alienation refers to a greater possibil-
ity to express oneself, to control one’s production process, to objectify one’s 
essence and connect and communicate with others. Thus, for example, work-
ing on one’s Facebook page can be thought of as less alienating than working 
watching a television program’ (173). 
The two processes that SNS [social networking sites] facilitate – the exac-
erbation of exploitation and the mitigation of alienation – are not sim-
ply co-present but are dialectically linked. SNS establish new relations of 
production that are based on a dialectical link between exploitation and 
alienation: in order to be de-alienated, users must communicate and 
socialize: they must establish social networks, share information, talk to 
their friends and read their posts, follow and be followed. By thus doing 
they also exacerbate their exploitation (179).
5.5.2. Nine Forms of Alienation on Facebook
Andrejevic and Fisher both take a critical theory perspective and agree that 
Facebook usage means exploitation of users’ digital labour (see also: Fuchs 
2014a, 2014b, 2015). They however have different understandings of aliena-
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tion and therefore conceive Facebook either as alienated (Andrejevic) or de-
alienated (Fisher). My argument is that these claims are not mutually exclusive 
in a dialectical concept of alienation. Honneth’s distinction between subjec-
tive, intersubjective, and objective alienation helps us to map these differences: 
Andrejevic refers to the objective dimension (data as objects), whereas Fisher 
refers to subjective experiences. Table 5.3 outlines nine dimensions of aliena-
tion on Facebook.
On an intersubjective and objective level, alienation on Facebook means on 
the economic level the exploitation of users’ digital labour that generates a data 
commodity and thereby value and the loss of control over how their data is 
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Table 5.3: Nine dimensions of alienation on Facebook.
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existence of a surveillance-industrial complex, in which Facebook and other 
communications companies collaborate, as Edward Snowden has shown, with 
state institutions such as the police and secret services in order to make a large 
amount of online communications visible to the state, which threatens liberal 
freedoms and shatters liberalism’s promises. On the cultural level, objective and 
intersubjective alienation means that attention and online visibility that enable 
meaning-making are asymmetrically distributed so that everyday users are at a 
disadvantage and celebrities and powerful organisations at an advantage.
Corporate social media have a contradictory character: they enable users 
to easier stay and get in touch with others at the micro-level of everyday life, 
which enhances the quality of their lives, but at the same time this advantage 
comes at the price of digital economic, political and cultural alienation and 
reified data that serve purposes that allow powerful organisations to exploit, 
control and exclude the large mass of users. Given that these forms of domina-
tion are data-mediated, they tend not to be immediately visible and experi-
enceable by the users. You do not feel and see that your data is a commodity, 
that the state stores and accesses citizens’ communications, and how many 
people talk about what you have posted on Facebook or about what the mar-
keting teams of Shakira or Eminem, who have pages that are among the most 
‘liked’ ones, have published. 
The subjective level of alienation refers to the experiences and attitudes of 
users, i.e. if they feel alienated when using Facebook. Attitudes can in this 
respect be alienated, non-alienated, or a combination of both. Table 5.3 indi-
cates prototypical attitudes. Alienated and non-alienated subjectivity in respect 
to Facebook do not necessarily exclude each other: users can think that social 
media sociality as such is advantageous, but that such platforms are problem-
atic if they foster exploitation, surveillance, control and exclusion. Such an atti-
tude implies on the level of political organisation the demand for an alternative 
form of design and organisation.
5.5.3. Digital Fetishism
The political problem is that it is easier to perceive Facebook as less alienating 
than a nuclear power plant that pollutes a river or lake. You can more easily use 
and enjoy Facebook, even when it exploits and monitors you, but you cannot 
swim in a nuclear contaminated lake or drink its water without seriously threat-
ening your health. The damages caused by digital alienation are more indirect, 
mediated, long-term, and invisible. This does however not imply that they are 
unproblematic, but rather that they are more difficult to challenge and contest in 
social struggles. Users who argue that Facebook is great because it is social and 
that they therefore do not feel or do not mind digital exploitation, surveillance 
and exclusion express a partial truth, namely that social media can pose social 
advantages. At the same time their consciousness is reified because they cannot 
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see beyond immediacy, only think about immediate individual advantages and 
not about the disadvantages that some users may unjustly suffer for example from 
being excluded from obtaining a mortgage, losing their jobs or being suspected 
of terrorism because of data mined from social media and analysed with predic-
tive algorithms by credit scoring companies, employers or state institutions. 
Digital fetishism means that the immediacy of online sociality enabled by 
digital media veils the realities of digital exploitation, control, surveillance and 
exclusion that are more abstract. Digital media’s concrete social and communi-
cative use-value obscures the more abstract forms of digital commodities and 
power that underpin usage. 
5.6. Conclusion
Axel Honneth has reformulated Georg Lukács’ theory of reification and aliena-
tion in a critical theory of recognition. Recognition is for him the social essence 
of society that grounds a moral theory that allows moral standards for criticis-
ing the disrespect for care, rights and solidarity. The advantage of this theory is 
that it is based on the distinction of three subdomains of society, reformulates 
Hegel’s dialectic of essence of existence in moral theory and thereby transcends 
postmodern moral relativism, stresses the importance of sociality as moral 
essence, and distinguishes between alienation’s subjective, intersubjective, and 
objective dimensions. 
Honneth’s moral monism however also makes recognition and morality the 
foundation of society and thereby ignores the importance of humans’ co-pro-
duction of the social world and the relevance of the economy in society as being 
simultaneously part and no-part of all social systems. I have reformulated basic 
assumptions of theoretical concepts of morality and alienation in a way that 
takes social co-production and co-operation to be the essence of humans and 
society. Based on this foundation, I have identified nine dimensions of aliena-
tion along the distinction between economy, politics, and culture on one axis 
and the subject, intersubjective communication and the object on another axis. 
Social struggles can challenge alienation and result in humans’ appropriation of 
the conditions that shape their lives. 
The example of Facebook shows that alienation has not ceased to exist in the 
world of digital media, but has become more complex. The exploitation of digi-
tal labour, the surveillance-industrial complex and centralised online visibility 
constitute forms of digital alienation. The contradictory and mediated charac-
ter of the online world makes it sometimes difficult for users to perceive and 
describe objectively alienated digital conditions as such. They tend tend to mis-
take digital alienation for digital freedom. Digital fetishism and digital aliena-
tion can only be overcome by social struggles that aim at appropriating the 
Internet and put it into the control of users. Digital media that are alternatively 
designed, shaped and used can advance achieving and living  commonism, 
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participatory democracy, mutual understanding and respect. Attaining such 
a world requires not just alternative projects and social movements, but also 
political parties, programmes and demands that make media reforms that ena-
ble and provide space, time and resources for alternatives. 
Notes
 1 http://philosophy.columbia.edu/directories/faculty/axel-honneth
 2 German original: ‘Nach meiner Analyse sind wir nicht von unserem wah-
ren inneren Wesen entfremdet, sondern von unserer Fähigkeit, uns die 
Welt in ihren räumlichen, zeitlichen, sozialen, handlungspraktischen und 
dinglichen Dimensionen “anzuverwandeln”’ (Rosa 2012, 322).
 3 German original: ‘Beziehung der Beziehungslosigkeit’.
 4 Translation from German: ‘Entfremdung ist verhinderte Welt- und Selbsta-
neignung’.
 5 Translation from German: ‘ontologischen Gleichartigkeit von Basis und 
Überbau, daß sie nämlich beide auf teleologischen Setzungen und deren 
kausalen Folgen beruhen’.
 6 Translation from German: ‘Spielraum gewünschter (oder unerwünschter) 
Reaktionen auf gesellschaftliche Tatbestände, Situationen, Aufgaben etc.’
 7 Translation from German: ‘daß auf je einer konkreten Produktionsstufe der 
Wert des Produkts der Arbeit sich scharf danach scheidet, ob es unmit-
telbar brauchbar oder unbrauchbar ist, während im künstlerischen Schaf-
fen das Feld, die Möglichkeit von Wert oder Unwert außerordentlich weit 
gestreckt, im voraus kaum bestimmbar ist’.
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Beyond Habermas: Rethinking Critical 
Theories of Communication
6.1. Introduction
6.1.1. Information Society or Capitalism?
One can often hear that we live in an information or knowledge society. These 
claims are overstated and often driven by businesses expectations that digital 
media is an investment area that can help achieving large profits. In 2014, 
13.1 per cent of the 2,000 largest transnational corporations’ revenues and 
17.3 per cent of their profits were located in the information sector.1 
The FIRE (finance, insurance, real estate) sector held 19.8% of the revenues, 
24.0 per cent were held by the mobilities industry,2 and 21.7 per cent by the 
classical manufacturing sector. These sectors’ shares of the 2,000 largest TNCs 
combined profits were 33.5 per cent (FIRE), 19.0 per cent (mobilities) and 18.6 
per cent (manufacturing). It would therefore be an overestimation to character-
ise contemporary capitalism as information capitalism. Contemporary global 
capitalism is not just an information capitalism, it is also a financial capital-
ism, mobilities capitalism, hyperindustrial capitalism, etc. It is, however, also 
a mistake to ignore that labour that creates information plays a significant role 
in contemporary capitalism. The analysis that information labour has become 
more important in capitalism is not simply a post-industrial ideology. Critical 
political economy and critical theory should not dismiss this hypothesis as ide-
ology, but use its own theoretical categories for interpreting it. A key question 
that arises in this context and that this chapter asks is: what is the relationship 
of labour and communication? If there is a significant role of information and 
communication labour in the contemporary economy, then a separation of the 
economy as base and the realm of meaningful information that is communi-
cated among humans (culture) as superstructure cannot be held up so easily. 
How to cite this book chapter: 
Fuchs, Christian. 2016. Critical Theory of Communication. Pp. 177–205. London: 
University of Westminster Press. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.16997/book1.f. License: 
CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0
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6.1.1. Jürgen Habermas’ Theory of Communicative Action 
and Beyond…
Jürgen Habermas has drawn attention to the importance of integrating commu-
nication into a critical theory of society. Any critical theory of communication 
must therefore inevitably take Habermas’ works as one of its starting points. 
However, this does not imply that Habermas’ theory is the ultimate truth of 
communication theory. It should be read in a critically constructive manner so 
that we can build on Habermas and go with Habermas beyond Habermas. In 
this chapter, I will engage with Habermas and other critical theorists’ notions 
of communication and will especially look at how communication in these 
approaches relates to the economy.
Given that information labour and the culture industry collapse the bound-
ary between base and superstructure, we have to ask the question how the 
economy and culture are related. This chapter does so by discussing several 
approaches: Alfred Sohn-Rethel, Jean Baudrillard, Jürgen Habermas, Lev 
Vygotsky, Valentin Vološinov, Ferruccio Rossi-Landi, and Raymond Williams. 
These are important critical theory approaches that have dealt with the ques-
tion of how work and communication are related. It is not possible to give a 
complete discussion of all approaches that exist, which is why engagement with 
the mentioned authors must suffice for the purpose of this chapter.
They are representatives of four different approaches. There are four ways, 
two categories (such as labour and communication) can be related (Hofkirch-
ner 2013): 
1) B is reduced to A (reductionism, in which A is dominant), 
2) A is reduced to B (reductionism, in which B is dominant), 
3) A and B are separate (dualism), 
4) A and B are identical and non-identical at the same time (dialectic). 
This chapter therefore discusses examples four different theoretical ways of 
how labour and communication can be related: economic reductionism, cul-
tural reductionism, dualism, and the dialectic.
6.2. Economic Reductionism: Alfred Sohn-Rethel
Alfred Sohn-Rethel3 (1899–1990) was a Marxist economist and philosopher. 
He stood in close academic contact with Adorno. After having fled from Ger-
many, he lived in Great Britain and moved back to Germany in the early 1970s. 
Intellectual and Manual Labour: A Critique of Epistemology is his main book. 
Sohn-Rethel (1978) is interested in how economic forms and thought forms 
are related. He conceptually connects the base and the ‘mental superstructure’ 
(2) by constructing mental production in analogy to commodity abstraction. 
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Marx would not have worked out a theory of mental and manual labour, which 
would however be important because abolishing the division of labour is a ‘pre-
condition of a classless society’ (21). 
6.2.1. Real Abstraction
Commodity abstraction means that for Marx, value-generating labour (abstract 
labour) abstracts from single use-values and exchange ‘excludes use’ (28). 
Human minds in such exchange are however concretely reflecting on what they 
are doing. ‘The abstractness of their action will […] escape the minds of the 
people performing it. In exchange, the action is social, the minds are private’ 
(29). Sohn-Rethel terms the abstraction that can be found in the capitalist pro-
cess itself a real abstraction (20). Speaking of a real abstraction also implies that 
this kind of abstraction is distinct from what Sohn-Rethel terms the ‘thought 
abstraction in the theory of knowledge’ (21).
Sohn-Rethel distinguishes communication ‘by signs’ from commodity 
exchange (40). Commodity exchange would be practical solipsism: 
commodity exchange does not depend on language, on what we com-
municate to each other. Nothing regarding the essence of things need be 
communicated. Some semantics for ‘yes’ and ‘no’, for pointing to this or 
that, and to indicate quantity, is sufficient to the essentials of a transac-
tion of exchange whether it is carried on between two village gossips or 
between two strangers who do not speak each other’s language’ (41). 
Commodity exchange ‘impels solipsism’ (41–42). 
6.2.2. Conceptual Abstraction 
For Sohn-Rethel, the equivalent to exchange abstraction in the world of knowl-
edge is abstract thinking (58) and conceptual thought (67). The separation 
between head and hand would in the thought world have found its first mani-
festation in Greek philosophy (66). Abstract conceptual thinking would find 
its typical expression in mechanistic, quantifying, mathematical reasoning that 
for Sohn-Rethel consists of ‘concepts deriving from exchange abstraction’ and 
is based on the ‘logic of intellectual labour divided from manual labour’ (73). 
The separation of intellectual and manual activities would be a consequence of 
class-based societies (4). 
According to Sohn-Rethel, twentieth-century capitalism’s abstract thought in 
the form of the separation of manual and mental labour found its expression in 
Taylorism and automation. The ‘unity of mental and manual work’ (181), the 
abolition of the division of labour, would be a precondition for the establish-
ment of socialism. 
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Sohn-Rethel’s approach is politically important because it stresses that mech-
anistic thinking and the division of labour are problematic dimensions of class-
based societies that need to be thought of in socialist strategies. But he situ-
ates communication and knowledge outside of the economy, which becomes 
evident in his distinction between the economy’s real abstraction and knowl-
edge and communication’s conceptual abstraction. Sohn-Rethel makes a strict 
separation between the economy and culture. The phenomenon of cultural 
and communication labour makes it difficult to separate these two spheres. A 
software engineer creates a highly abstract and mechanistic form of concep-
tual knowledge: software code. This code is an intellectual product. It is part of 
the Sohn-Rethelian real economy in a double sense: a) Abstract and concrete 
labour produce software that b) is sold as a commodity. The abstract logic of 
the commodity and of exchange and the abstract logic of thought cannot be 
separated in this case. The one can also not be reduced to the other. Abstract 
thought and labour rather collapse into one: the software commodity is objecti-
fied abstract thought and the result of abstract labour.
6.2.3. Knowledge and the Economy 
Sohn-Rethel does, however, not separate the economy and knowledge in a 
dualist manner. He rather reduces knowledge to the economy by arguing that 
the economic world determines the thought world. He speaks in this context 
of a conversion, replication and correlation: ‘the real abstraction [is] being 
converted to its ideal reflection into intellectual form’ (61, see also 31). The 
‘basic categories of intellectual labour […] are replicas of the elements of real 
abstraction’ (76). ‘Capital and mathematics correlate: the one wields its influ-
ence in the fields of economy, the other rules the intellectual powers of social 
production’ (112). Formulations such as the ones in which the real abstraction 
is converted into the ideal reflection, or where the intellectual is a replica of the 
real, or in which there is a correlation, imply that the economy’s real abstraction 
determines culture’s intellectual abstraction. Sohn-Rethel’s approach in the last 
instance is a form of economic reductionism and determinism.
6.2.4. Money as the Language of Commodities
Sohn-Rethel’s dual separation of the real and knowledge also results in the fact 
that he considers economic exchange as being separate from communication. 
He argues that commodity exchange is a practical solipsism that does not 
need communication. This separation is not just questioned by informational 
exchange-values such as commercial software, but also by the communicative 
logic of exchange-value itself. Money is a particular form of communication 
that is instrumental, non-verbal, mediated, anonymous, impersonal, abstract, 
fetishised (abstracted from direct social relations), reified, and void of mean-
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ing. Money communicates commodity prices on the market. Money is the 
form of communication that facilitates the abstract equalisation of commodi-
ties on the market in the exchange process. Marx therefore speaks of value as 
the ‘language of commodities’: 
We see, then, that everything our analysis of the value of commodities 
previously told us is repeated by the linen itself, as soon as it enters 
into association with another commodity, the coat; Only it reveals its 
thoughts in a language with which it alone is familiar, the language 
of commodities. In order to tell us that labour creates its own value 
in its abstract quality of being human labour, it says that the coat, in 
so far as it counts as its equal, i.e. is value, consists of the same labour 
as it does itself. In order to inform us that its sublime objectivity as a 
value differs from its stiff and starchy existence as a body, it says that 
value has the appearance of a coat, and therefore that in so far as the 
linen itself is an object of value [Wertding], it and the coat are as like as 
two peas. Let us note, incidentally, that the language of commodities 
also has, apart from Hebrew, plenty of other more or less correct dia-
lects. The German word ‘Wertsein’ (to be worth), for instance, brings 
out less strikingly than the Romance verb ‘valere’, ‘valer’, ‘valoir’ that 
the equating of commodity B with commodity A is the expression of 
value proper to commodity A. Paris vaut bien une messe! (Marx 1867, 
143–144).
In Marx’s equation (20 yards of linen = 1 coat = 2 ounces of gold), money 
has the role that it makes commodities commensurable and comparable in the 
exchange process by communicating prices. Marx, other than Sohn-Rethel, 
saw money as a peculiar form of economic communication.
6.3. Cultural Reductionism: Jean Baudrillard
6.3.1. Baudrillard against Marx
Jean Baudrillard4 (1929–2007) was a postmodern French philosopher. He 
specialised in theorising the world of signs and consumer culture. Whereas 
there is some positive influence of Marx visible in Baudrillard’s early works, 
he later became profoundly anti-Marxist. Jean Baudrillard (1975) developed a 
fundamental criticism of Marx and Marxism. ‘All the fundamental concepts of 
Marxist analysis must be questioned’ (Baudrillard 1975, 21). ‘Marx offers only a 
critical theory of exchange value. The critical theory of use value, signifier, and 
signified remains to be developed’ (Baudrillard 1981, 129)
Baudrillard claims that Marxist concepts such as labour, production, produc-
tive forces, class relations of production, capitalism, mode of production, base/
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superstructure cannot explain the radical novel logic of the sign, the symbolic 
realm, culture, and language. Marxism ‘never challenges human capacity of 
production’ (Baudrillard 1975, 31) and would celebrate labour. It would dis-
regard ‘non-work or play’ (Baudrillard 1975, 38). The Marxist understanding 
of social wealth as material ‘has nothing to do with symbolic wealth’ (Baudril-
lard 1975, 42–43). Whereas labour would put something into value, the sym-
bol would put something into play (Baudrillard 1975, 44). The ‘real rupture’ is 
‘between symbolic exchange and work (production, economics)’ (Baudrillard 
1975, 45). 
Marxism would focus on nature as the reality in the economic process 
(Baudrillard 1975, 54). For Baudrillard, society has been transformed so radi-
cally by the importance of the sign, that Marxism is no longer an adequate 
means for understanding reality. In the symbolic realm, the distinctions 
between producer/product, producer/user, producer/labour-power, users/
needs and product/utility (Baudrillard 1975, 102–103) would become blurred. 
So for example in language, there would be no separation between producers 
and consumers (Baudrillard 1975, 97). Also the distinction between base and 
superstructure would break down (Baudrillard 1975, 118). 
6.3.2. The Material and the Immaterial
The ‘Marxist theory of production is irredeemably partial, and cannot be 
generalized. Or again: the theory of production […] is strictly homogeneous 
with its object – material production – and is non-transferable, as a postu-
late or theoretical framework, to contents that were never given for it in the 
first place’ (Baudrillard 1981, 165). One implication of Baudrillard’s approach 
is that he draws a boundary between the material and the immaterial. It is 
therefore no surprise that in another work he says: ‘The content of the mes-
sages, the signifieds of the signs are largely immaterial. We are not engaged 
in them, and the media do not involve us in the world, but offer for our con-
sumption signs as signs, albeit signs accredited with the guarantee of the real’ 
(Baudrillard 1998, 34). 
Baudrillard argues that Marxism is a productivism that frames the whole 
world in the language of production and disregards symbolic exchange. But he 
overlooks the dynamic nature of the world: everything that exists must come 
into existence. It is produced. The world is not static, but is at some level of 
organisation always in movement. Even if things at one level remain the same, 
they can only do so because of underlying changes. Reproduction requires and 
reproduces production, and production produces reproduction. Communica-
tion and signs do not simply exist, but need to be produced and reproduced. 
Communication is not a form of exchange, but humans’ social production of 
shared meanings through which they interpret each other and the natural, 
social, economic, technical, political and cultural world. 
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Baudrillard basically argues that the economy and production are material, 
whereas culture and consumption are for him immaterial. The most basic ques-
tion that philosophy and indeed also religion ask is: What is the world? Why 
does it exist? How does it exist? There can either be one or several fundamental 
substances that the world is made of and through which it transforms itself. If 
there is more than one, then there must be some causal relation between them. 
If one assumes that a spiritual substance (such as God) either exists besides and 
outside of matter or determines matter, then the world cannot be explained in 
the first instance because the question arises: who created the God-like spirit? 
If we in contrast assume that matter is the process-substance of the world, is 
its own cause (causa sui), and has the capacity to produce and organise itself, 
then a different explanation of the world becomes possible: The world is mat-
ter-in-process that produces itself, is its own origin, and has the capacity to 
produce new organisational levels. Such reasoning also implies that there is no 
God because any assumption of the existence of God is an over-specification of 
theory that is unnecessary. Separating mind from matter, as Baudrillard does, 
cannot adequately explain the world’s origin and development. 
The human brain is a material system connected to the human body. A human’s 
semiosis ceases when s/he dies. S/he can then no longer interpret the world and 
give meaning to it. We cannot see thoughts, but they are tied to a material sub-
stratum (the brain) that makes them material. They are intangible and non-phys-
ical, but material. We can also materialise thoughts in the form of textual, visual, 
audio, audio-visual forms that are stored in some material. The immaterial does 
not exist. Information is a specific form of matter. It is real and material, although 
it is more often non-physical and intangible than physical and tangible. 
6.3.3. Sign Value as Replacement, Collapse and Abolition of 
Economic Value
Baudrillard does not, as for example Habermas, dualistically separate the eco-
nomic and the symbolic, but rather reduces labour and the economic to the 
sign and culture. Sign value would replace economic value, symbolic manipula-
tion would replace exploitation: 
It is a matter of the passage of all values to exchange-sign value, under 
the hegemony of the code. […] [The sign] is an operational structure 
that tends itself to a structural manipulation compared with which the 
quantitative mystery of surplus value appears inoffensive. The super-
ideology of the sign […] has replaced good old political economy as the 
theoretical basis of the system (Baudrillard 1975, 121–122).
The sign would have become the hegemonic reality. ‘The sign no longer desig-
nates anything at all. […] All reality then becomes the place of a semi-urgical 
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manipulation, of a structural simulation’ (Baudrillard 1975, 128). All reality 
has for Baudrillard become symbolic. The economic would collapse into the 
symbolic: the ‘structural configuration of value simply and simultaneously puts 
an end to the regimes of production, political economy, representation and 
signs. With the code, all this collapses into simulation’ (Baudrillard 1993, 8). 
Production would collapse into culture and consumption: ‘The entire sphere of 
production, labour and the forces of production must be conceived as collaps-
ing into the sphere of “consumption”, understood as the sphere of a generalised 
axiomatic, a coded exchange of signs, a general lifestyle’ (Baudrillard 1993, 14). 
The economy and politics would turn into hyperreality: ‘the two spheres are 
abolished in another reality or media hyperreality’ (Baudrillard 1993, 65).
When Baudrillard speaks of replacement, collapse and abolition, then he 
means that the whole world today is symbolic, cultural, and ideological. There 
is for him outside to the world of signification. Signification is for Baudrillard 
the world. Baudrillard claims that Marxism is a theoretical imperialism of the 
economy. His theoretical answer to Marxism is a cultural imperialism that dis-
solves everything into the world of signs, the media, communication, language, 
thought, and consumption. By rejecting Marxism he turns against materialism 
and aims to revive philosophical idealism. The social world is in human soci-
ety always at the same time economic, political and cultural: all social systems 
have resources, decision-making mechanisms, and social meanings. Society 
and social systems can never be dissolved into pure information. A university 
is a social system, in which non-information resources (buildings, classroom 
furniture, food and drinks in the cafeteria, etc.) and informational resources 
(teachers and students’ knowledge and skills, books in the library, research 
databases, etc.) form an economy, specific rules determine the institution’s poli-
tics, and certain pedagogical and research norms shape its culture. Researchers 
and students together in this economic, political and cultural environment pro-
duce systematic knowledge about the world. This is not simply possible because 
of pre-existing information, but also because of a diverse infrastructure. 
6.3.4. Why Communication is Not Symbolic Exchange
Baudrillard argues that the mass media are not real media because they do 
not enable responses and reciprocity. They are ‘anti-mediatory and intransitive’ 
and ‘fabricate non-communication’ (Baudrillard 1981, 169). He defines com-
munication in this context as ‘a reciprocal space of a speech and a response, 
and thus of a responsibility […] We must understand communication as some-
thing other than the simple transmission reception of a message’ (Baudrillard 
1981, 169). Mass media would make ‘all processes of exchange impossible’ 
(Baudrillard 1981, 170). It is paradoxical that Baudrillard argues that the media 
world eliminates the economy, but at the same time uses the term ‘exchange’ 
for describing communication’s essence. The modern use of the English term 
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exchange and the French term échanger goes back to the late fourteenth century 
and took on the meaning of barter and mercantile business.5 So the terms are 
in both languages in modern times bound up with markets and the commodity 
form x commodity A = y commodity B, in which a certain amount of one com-
modity is exchanged for a certain amount of another one. 
When we form sentences or speak with others, we do not perform measure-
ments and do not weigh one word or sentence against another word or sen-
tence in a quantitative manner. Money has the role of expressing and represent-
ing the amount of average labour objectified in commodities so that they can be 
exchanged. It quantifies the value of commodities. Human language is funda-
mentally different from money. It is first and foremost qualitative in character, 
it has certain general rules agreed by custom over hundreds of years (syntax), 
operates with meanings of combinations of symbols (semantics), and is used 
in specific contexts that interact with meanings (pragmatics). It is a combina-
tion of linguistic form and structure, social interpretation, and societal effects. 
Language does not function based on the logic x commodity A = y money M. 
Its essence is that it is qualitative and transcends the logic of measurement. 
This does, however, not mean that the products of labour cannot be turned 
into commodities. In commodity-producing societies, the access to linguistic 
products can certainly be commodified, which then results in exchange-rela-
tionships and measurements such as: 1 hour of psychological consultation = 
£60, 1 hour of financial advice = £100, entry to 1 theatre performance = £12.50, 
translation costs per word a text = £0.1, etc. Communication as such is alien 
to the commodity form. It can in a capitalist society, however, be force-fit into 
measurements such as 1 linguistic unit = £y.
Baudrillard is a prototypical representative of a cultural reductionism that 
reduces and dissolves labour and production into culture and sign systems. 
6.4. Labour/Communication Dualism: Jürgen Habermas
Habermas’ theory of communicative action makes a sharp distinction between 
on the one hand purposive (instrumental, strategic) action (including labour) 
that is orientated on success and on the other hand communicative action that 
is orientated on reaching understanding (Habermas 1984, 285–286). Work is 
for Habermas always an instrumental, strategic and purposive form of action, 
whereas communication’s goal is to reach understanding. Habermas separates 
work and communication. This separation goes back to Hegel’s philosophy.
6.4.1. Work and Interaction
In the article Arbeit und Interaktion (Work and Interaction), Habermas (1968) 
argues that Hegel (1803/1804, 1805/1806) in his Jena lectures on the philoso-
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phy of spirit argued that work and interaction are two ways by which human 
beings relate to the world, organise the relationship between subject and object, 
and thereby constitute their self-conscious minds. Habermas (1968) based on 
Hegel’s Jena system of philosophy argues that consciousness and the mind 
would be media of communication. The difference between work and interac-
tion would be that the first is a form of strategic action and the second oriented 
on understanding. Strategic action would make decisions without trying to 
reach understanding with others (Habermas 1968, 22).
Also in his main work, The Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas 
(1984a, 1987) draws a distinction between strategic action (as for example in 
labour) and communicative action. For Habermas (1984a, 85), teleological 
action (that he also terms purposive-rational action, see page 285) means that 
an ‘actor attains an end or brings about the occurrence of a desired state by 
choosing means that have promise of being successful in the given situation 
and applying them in a suitable manner’. Strategic action is teleological action 
in a social situation, instrumental action teleological action in a non-social 
situation (1984a, 85). 
6.4.2. Teleological Action and Communicative Action
Habermas strictly separates teleological action and its steering media of money 
and power from communicative action and language:
Finally the concept of communicative action refers to the interaction of 
at least two subjects capable of speech and action who establish inter-
personal relations [whether by verbal or by extra verbal means]. The 
actors seek to reach an understanding about the action situation and 
their plans of action in order to coordinate their actions by way of agree-
ment. The central concept of interpretation refers in the first instance to 
negotiating definitions of the situation which admit of consensus. As we 
shall see, language is given a prominent place in this model (Habermas 
1984a, 86). 
I shall speak of communicative action whenever the actions of the 
agents involved are coordinated not through egocentric calculations of 
success but through acts of reaching understanding. In communicative 
action participants are not primarily oriented to their own individual 
successes; they pursue their individual goals under the condition that 
they can harmonize their plans of action on the basis of common situa-
tion definitions (Habermas 1984a, 285–286).
Linguistic communication is for Habermas inherently non-dominative, ori-
ented on understanding and reaching a good society. He essentialises linguistic 
communication as naturally pure, fair, good, etc.: 
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Reaching understanding is the inherent telos of human speech. Natu-
rally, speech and understanding are not related to one another as means 
to end. But we can explain the concept of reaching understanding only if 
we specify what it means to use sentences with a communicative intent. 
The concepts of speech and understanding reciprocally interpret one 
another (Habermas 1984a, 287).
Habermas does not deny that money and power are forms of communication. 
He however sees them as alienated media of communication that colonize, 
delinguistify, control, steer, dominate, replace and curtail authentic communi-
cative action in the lifeworld and thereby create social pathologies: 
The transfer of action coordination from language over to steering 
media means an uncoupling of interaction from lifeworld contexts. 
Media such as money and power attach to empirical ties; they encode 
a purposive-rational attitude toward calculable amounts of value and 
make it possible to exert generalized, strategic influence on the deci-
sions of other participants while bypassing processes of consensus-ori-
ented communication (Habermas 1987, 183).6
Teleological-purposive action (as in labour or exchange) could also take place 
through language, but language would only be authentic in communicative 
action: 
The teleological model of action takes language as one of several media 
through which speakers oriented to their own success can influence 
one another in order to bring opponents to form or to grasp beliefs and 
intentions that are in the speakers’ own interest. […] Only the commu-
nicative model of action presupposes language as a medium of uncur-
tailed communication whereby speakers and hearers, out of the context 
of their preinterpreted lifeworld, refer simultaneously to things in the 
objective, social, and subjective worlds in order to negotiate common 
definitions of the situation (Habermas 1984a, 95). 
The concept of communicative action presupposes language as the 
medium for a kind of reaching understanding, in the course of which 
participants, through relating to a world, reciprocally raise validity 
claims that can be accepted or contested (Habermas 1984a, 99). 
So in these formulations it becomes again evident that, for Habermas, language 
and linguistic communication are authentic forms of social relations that he 
considers to be expressions of the normative good and potentials for a good 
society.
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6.4.3. Media Dualism
Habermas bases his theory on a ‘media dualism’ (Habermas 1987, 281) that 
separates money and power on the one hand from linguistic communica-
tion on the other hand. The world of labour and politics are conceptually split 
off from the world of communication. There are several theoretical limits of 
Habermas’ work/communication-dualism:
• Habermas connects linguistic communication to human speech and 
thereby neglects that there are also other forms of language, which is why 
Marx (1867, 143) describes money as the ‘language of commodities’.
• In a general sense, we can say that reaching communicative understand-
ing and any form of communication is a form of purposeful action: the 
means of language is used for achieving the goal of relating oneself to other 
humans and reaching a joint understanding of the world.
• Communication in modern society is not an immune or innocent sphere: 
ideologies are forms of communication and language that are highly instru-
mental. Ideologies instrumentalise language and meanings for justifying 
exploitation and domination. Communication thereby becomes an instru-
ment of domination. Within communication studies, a specific field called 
strategic communication has developed. It studies how communication can 
be used for influencing and persuading specific audiences of particular pur-
poses, especially in marketing and politics (see Hülsmann and Pfeffermann 
2011, Paul 2011). Strategic communication is just another term for propa-
ganda that serves capitalist and bureaucratic ends. So communication is not 
immune from the logic of the instrumentalisation of humans and speech 
for domination, but can serve quite different purposes. 
• Work not only serves strategic-instrumental purposes, but can be quite 
altruistic and motivated by helping others and fostering the common good 
that benefits all. Marx was convinced that an entire society could be built on 
the logic of common goods. Limiting the notion of work to strategic-instru-
mental action deprives theory of a vocabulary for conceptualising social 
activities that produce use-values in a society based on solidarity, common 
goods and voluntary work. 
6.4.4. Horst Holzer on Habermas
Horst Holzer7 (1935–2000) was a German sociologist of the media and one of 
the most prominent victims of the occupational ban in public services that was 
enforced against members of the German Communist Party (DKP). Holzer 
criticises Habermas for claiming that Marx reduces ‘the self-generative act of 
the human species to labor’ and has a ‘restricted conception of the species’ self-
reflection through work alone’ (Habermas 1971, 42). Marx rather would see 
Beyond Habermas: Rethinking Critical Theories of  Communication 189
work as all forms of “societal production”8 (Holzer 1987, 23). Habermas ‘is not 
able to see societal production’s essential determination, namely that not only 
the productive forces are developed in the process of production, but also the 
societal relations, including communication and interaction, that humans enter 
in this production process’9 (Holzer 1987, 27). 
Communication is neither automatically good nor bad. It is not the moral 
essence of society. Just like a voluntary fire brigade has to communicate in order 
to save a child from a burning house as an act of altruistic social action, so too 
does a group of suicide bombers have to communicate in order to co-ordinate 
mass killings as a sinister form of social action. Communication is a necessary 
symbolic mediation of all social relations. It is a form of symbolic production 
that creates and sustains social relations. It is basic to all social systems and 
societies and serves the rational goal of organising social relations. If one wants 
to draw a moral distinction between different forms of rationality, as Haber-
mas does, then the dualism of teleological action and communicative action 
fails. A more appropriate distinction is the one between instrumental action 
that aims at instrumentalising humans and society for fostering the domina-
tion of some over others and co-operative action that is based on the logic that 
actions benefit all (Fuchs 2008). Habermas (1984b, 477–490) discusses Marxist 
humanists’ criticisms of his theory. They advance the argument that he over-
looks the fundamental importance of work as creative production in society 
and its potentials for a non-alienated society of well-rounded individuals. He 
describes these approaches as romantic and doubts that work is as essential for 
society as communication. 
Habermas’ theory strictly separates communication and labour, the lifeworld 
and the economy. It is, as he says himself, based on a media dualism.
6.5. Towards a Dialectic of Labour and Communication: 
Lev Vygotsky, Valentin Vološinov, Ferruccio Rossi-Landi,  
Raymond Williams
6.5.1. Lev Vygotsky’s Activity Theory
Lev Vygotsky (1896–1934)10 was a Marxist psychologist from Belarus. He 
developed a theory of activity, whose basic point is that human cognition and 
language are grounded in human activity.
Vygotsky (1978) argues, based on Marx, that human speech and practical 
activity develop in dialectical interconnection with each other. ‘The sign acts as 
an instrument of psychological activity in a manner analogous to the role of a 
tool in labor’ (Vygotsky 1978, 82). Tools as means of labour and signs as means 
of communication have for Vygotsky in common that they are both forms of 
mediated activity. The difference is for him that the tool is externally oriented 
on changing nature and the sign is internally oriented: the sign ‘is a means of 
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internal activity aimed at mastering oneself ’ (55). In sign use, external events 
are internalised.
Vygotsky’s approach is a step to conceiving labour and communication not 
in a reductionist or determinist, but a dialectical manner. The dialectic is for 
Vygostky that work and communication have common and different aspects 
at the same time. Vygotsky however ascertains an overall dualist approach that 
keeps the realms of work and communication separate: labour is oriented on 
nature, on ‘mastering, and triumphing over, nature’ (55), and not also on culture. 
And sign production is for him not a specific form of work. Cultural work that 
produces information can on such foundations not be adequately understood.
6.5.2. Valentin Vološinov: Marxism and the Philosophy of Language
Valentin Vološinov11 (1895–1936) was a Russian linguist. He was interested in 
establishing foundations of the Marxist philosophy of language. The founda-
tions of this approach have been formulated in his book Marxism and the Phi-
losophy of Language.
Vološinov (1986, 9) argues that a sign is not part of the natural or social real-
ity, but ‘reflects and refracts another reality outside itself ’. The Leninist theory 
of reflection’s basic assumption is that there is a reflection of the outside reality 
in consciousness and knowledge. Vološinov argues in contrast that a sign ‘is 
also itself a material segment of that very reality’ (11), from which it is different 
and that it reflects and retracts. Vološinov (1986, chapter 2) explicitly asks the 
question about the relationship of base and superstructure in the context of his 
theory of signs and language. The basic argument is that the sign’s materiality 
are the social relations, in which humans communicate with the help of signs. 
The ‘forms of signs are conditioned above all by the social organization of the 
participants involved and also by the immediate conditions of their interaction. 
When these forms change, so does sign’ (21). 
Horst Holzer makes an argument similar to Vološinov by saying work is a 
form of social production in society and that by creating use-values, work also 
produces a social environment of meanings and for meaning-making: ‘Societal 
work (that takes place physically and mentally) creates a “meaningful” environ-
ment in so far as through the purposes that are objectified in societal labour with 
the goal of securing and developing life, meaning is realised’12 (Holzer 1987, 62).
In class-based societies, signs would also form an ‘arena of the class struggle’ 
(Vološinov 1986, 23) so that signs are contradictory. Vološinov distinguishes 
between inner and outer signs and argues that both are social in nature. Com-
munication can, based on this distinction, be understood as the dialectic of the 
externalisation of inner signs (utterance) and the internalisation of outer signs 
(introspection) (36). For Vološinov, communication and language are therefore 
activity and ‘meaningful creativity’ (48). It also means a ‘we-experience’ that is 
based on an ‘I-experience’ (88). 
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Vološinov’s theory of language is not a mechanic theory of reflection, in which 
thought is part of the superstructure and a linear reflection and copy of mate-
rial reality that is communicated from A to B. Lenin, for example, wrote: ‘Mat-
ter is a philosophical category denoting the objective reality which is given to 
man by his sensations, and which is copied, photographed and reflected by our 
sensations, while existing independently of them’ (Lenin 1908, 130). In such an 
understanding, language and communication are separate from material reality 
and matter in a linear way determines the content of thought and speech. 
Vološinov in a at a first glance rather counterintuitive manner says that a sign 
is part and not-part of reality. He thereby wants to express that the world of signs 
is its own world that is part of material reality and is mediated dialectically with 
other realities through cognition and communication. Symbolic interaction of 
humans with the outside social and physical reality is non-linear (‘refracted’), 
which means that it is not calculable, but shaped in a complex way by social and 
societal contexts. With the notion of linguistic creativity (98), Vološinov points 
out the fact that communication is a form of production, the production of signs 
in human interaction. But he leaves open the question how communication and 
signs relate to work and labour. The term ‘labour’ is in fact only used twice in 
his book Marxism and the Philosophy of Language. So although Vološinov pro-
vided some foundations for a dialectical-materialist theory of communication, 
he never clarified the relationship of communication and signs to labour. 
6.5.3. Ferruccio Rossi-Landi’s Marxist Semiotics
Ferruccio Rossi-Landi13 (1921–1985) was an Italian Marxist semiotician. His 
main theoretical insight is that language and communication are not just semi-
otic production processes, but specific forms of work.
Rossi-Landi’s semiotic theory is partly problematic (see Fuchs 2016, 
61–63), but at the same time helps to clarify the dialectic of work and com-
munication: language-use and communication are work that produce words, 
sentences, interconnected sentences, arguments, speeches, essays, lectures, 
books, codes, artworks, literature, science, groups, civilisation and the lin-
guistic world as totality (Rossi-Landi 1983, 133–136). As ‘words and mes-
sages do not exist in nature’ (Rossi-Landi 1983, 36), they must be the prod-
ucts of human work that generates use-values. They are use-values because 
they satisfy the human needs of expression, communication and social rela-
tions (Rossi-Landi 1983, 37). ‘Like the other products of human work, words, 
expressions and messages have a use-value or utility insofar as they satisfy 
needs, in this case, the basic needs for expression and communication with 
all the changing stratifications that have historically grown up around them’ 
(Rossi-Landi 1983, 50). 
Wulf D. Hund14 is a professor of sociology at the University of Hamburg. He 
specialises in the critical theory of racism and in the 1970s was among those 
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German authors who worked on the foundations of the Marxist political econ-
omy of communication. Wulf Hund (1976, 273) argues that traditional com-
munication theories separate work and interaction and assume that ‘society 
is essentially constituted through communication’.15 ‘Just like any work, com-
munication occurs always just as production’16 (163). Based on Rossi-Landi, 
Hund argues for a materialist theory of communication that analyses ‘the work 
character of communication’17 (271). 
6.5.4. Raymond Williams’ Cultural Materialism
Raymond Williams18 (1921–1988) was a Welsh literary critic, cultural and 
communication theorist, and novelist. He developed the approach of Cultural 
Materialism and not just worked on British literature, but also on topics such as 
communications, television, everyday culture, the sociology of culture, politi-
cal theory, ecology, language, etc.
In his later works, Raymond Williams advanced the insight that most critical 
theories are not ‘materialist enough’ (Williams 1977, 92) because they separate 
culture and the economy (for a detailed discussion, see: Fuchs 2015, chapter 2). 
Culture understood as ‘language, ideas, values, beliefs, stories, discourses and 
so on’ is ‘itself material’ (McGuigan and Moran 2014, 176). Williams (1977, 
78) argues that Marx opposed the ‘separation of “areas” of thought and activ-
ity’. He formulates as an important postulate of Cultural Materialism that ‘[c]
ultural work and activity are not […] a superstructure’ (111). The importance 
of cultural labour in the information society would be one of the reasons why 
the separation of the economy and culture cannot be upheld: 
Thus a major part of the whole modern labour process must be defined 
in terms which are not easily theoretically separable from the traditional 
‘cultural’ activities. […] so many more workers are involved in the direct 
operations and activations of these systems that there are quite new 
social and social-class complexities (Williams 1981, 232).
Williams (1977) in Marxism and Literature’s chapter on language to a certain 
extent brings together insights from Vygotsky, Vološinov and Rossi-Landi. He 
argues that Vygotsky and Vološinov enabled a break with mechanic reflection 
theory in Marxist theory, ‘a new starting point’ (34) for ‘the way to a new kind 
of theory’ (35) by stressing language as social activity and creation. For both 
authors, signification would be ‘a practical material activity; it is indeed, literally, 
a means of production’ (38). Vygotsky and Vološinov have provided foundations 
for understanding language as dialectic of structural conditioning and produc-
tive agency. This becomes for example evident when Vološinov says that commu-
nication is a dialectic of introspection and utterance and a dialectic of refracted 
reflection and creativity. The exact relation between work and communication 
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remains however unexplained in both approaches. Williams indicates that Rossi-
Landi takes steps towards overcoming such limits (43). 
The works of Lev Vygotsky, Valentin Vološinov, Ferruccio Rossi-Landi, Ray-
mond Williams are important foundations for a dialectical critical theory of 
communication. They give some insights into the dialectical relations between 
structures/agency, technology/practices, reflection/production, sociality/indi-
viduality, externalisation/internationalisation, economy/culture that are cru-
cial for such a theory. In the final section, I will try to bring together some of 
these insights.
6.6. Towards a Dialectical Critical Theory of Communication
6.6.1. What is Communication?
Communication is the social production of meaning in society. It is the social 
process of shared and joint meaning-making with the help of symbol produc-
tion and symbolic interaction. All social relations are communicative. Humans 
via communication together make sense of the world, i.e. of nature, society 
and each other. Not all behaviour is communicative. Non-social behaviour is 
not communicative. Singing alone in your bathtub while taking a shower and 
thinking about the world is a form of self-reflection, self-understanding and 
symbol production, but it is not communication because it lacks a social con-
text. Other than the professional singer, in the shower you only sing for yourself, 
not for others. If, however, someone listens and finds the quality of your singing 
appalling and complains to you (‘Stop making such horrible noises while show-
ering’), then your individual singing turns into communicative social action. 
The boundary between the individual and the social is also the boundary 
between non-communication (behaviour) and communication. Behaviour and 
communication are not separate, but there is a dialectic of the individual and 
the social: the individual is the social being that can only individualise himself/
herself in relations to others. The social is the productive relation between indi-
viduals that produces and reproduces structures in society and social systems. 
The individual/social dialectic is also one between cognitive information and 
social information. The individual constantly produces and reproduces cogni-
tive information that is a foundation of communication, in which social infor-
mation is jointly co-constructed. Social information enables and constrains an 
individual’s information and cognition.
6.6.2. Structure and Agency
Communication is based on a structure/agency-dialectic. It is neither a 
mechanic reflection of the world nor an isolated individual behaviour. Mean-
ingful information is not simply a passive cognitive resource that is expressed 
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and transmitted. It is also not simply a copy of outside reality. Communica-
tion is, as Vološinov says, a dialectic of the utterance of inner signs (cognitive/
individual information) in processes of externalisation that share information 
in a social environment and the introspection of outer signs (social informa-
tion) that internalise social information and transform individual information. 
Communication is a meaningful, productive and creative social activity.
6.6.3. Communication and Communications: Practices and 
Media Systems
In order to stress the dialectic of structure and agency, Raymond Williams dis-
tinguishes between communications (communication systems, means of com-
munication) and communication. Communications are the ‘institutions and 
forms in which ideas, information, and attitudes are transmitted and received. 
I mean by communication the process of transmission and reception’ (Wil-
liams 1976, 9). He draws a distinction between structures and practices of com-
munication. Such structures that Williams terms communications can also be 
termed media, information and communication technologies, or means of 
communication. 
There is no communication without a medium of communication and no 
medium without communication. A separation between media studies and 
communication studies is therefore artificial. It is rather an expression of 
institutional power struggles in the academic world. A medium is a structure 
that helps humans to organise communication. It conditions, i.e. enables and 
constrains communication. Even in face-to-face communication there is a 
medium: the air that transmits light and sound waves so that humans can see 
and hear each other in a social situation of co-present individuals who commu-
nicate at the same time in the same place. There are different kinds of media in 
human communication. Information technologies are the structures or media 
of communication. They are means of communicative production. The body is 
a medium of non-verbal communication. Language is a means of textual and 
verbal communication. Nature is a medium of interpersonal communication 
(the air as medium for communicating sound and light wave). Socio-technical 
structures such as computer networks, broadcast technologies, printed paper, 
etc. are media of socio-technologically mediated communication. Money, 
power, love, collective beliefs, etc. are symbolically generalised media of com-
munication. Symbolically generalised media are social structures that have the 
role of sign systems in non-verbal communication. Money, for example, com-
municates the exchange-value of commodities on markets. 
In the Sociology of Culture, Williams (1995/1981, 88) discerns means of com-
munication that use the human body and those that use non-human material 
objects. He further subdivides this division and so distinguishes seven means of 
cultural production (Williams 1995/1981, 89–91): bodily resources (e.g. human 
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speech), the combination of external and bodily resources (e.g. use of masks 
in theatre performance), performance instruments (e.g. musical instruments), 
culturally significant objects (e.g. sculptures), material systems of signification 
(e.g. writing), and complex amplificatory, extending and reproductive techni-
cal systems (e.g. television, telephone, radio). In another work, Williams (1989, 
174–175) distinguishes between amplifying, storage and instrumentally alter-
native media (alternatives to bodily resources). Elsewhere he speaks of amplifi-
catory, durative and alternative media (Williams 1980, 55). In a fourth form, 
humans only make use of the body for verbal and non-verbal communication 
(Williams 1989, 174; Williams 1980, 54–55). 
Williams does not provide a true media typology because the features he 
identifies can overlap. He rather identifies some possible features of commu-
nications systems. A computer network for example is not primarily based on 
the human body. It can potentially multiply and thereby amplify the attention 
given to voices, texts, images, videos, etc. It is also a storage medium that stores 
content as digital data that is transmittable at high speed. It provides textual, 
visual and audio-visual alternatives to human activity: it can, for example, 
record, store and transmit a short story that a storyteller invented so that s/he 
only needs to tell the story once and not repeatedly in order for it to become 
available to a wider public. 
Communication requires media for the encoding, diffusion and decoding of 
information (production, distribution, consumption). Media in each of these 
steps can be technologised and/or based on nature and human capacities. Pro-
duction, distribution and consumption of information can be based on pure 
human activities or be technologically mediated. The networked computer is a 
medium, in which the production, distribution and consumption of informa-
tion converge. Digitisation makes the computer a universal machine for univer-
sal communication. In computer-mediated communication, the production, 
distribution and consumption of information are all three based on technology. 
Consumption can at the same time be production of information. Digital com-
munication is, however, not simply technological, but based on human activi-
ties, i.e. writing, typing, human speech and bodies that are recorded in audio-
visual digital formats (digital images, digital videos, etc.). So we here have an 
example of how the media of the human body, the human mind and computer 
technology work together. Social systems are organised in space and time. 
Not all of them are based on face-to-face communication, in which humans 
are in the same place at the same time. Communication can be mediated and 
stretched in time and over space. If such a stretching takes place, then commu-
nication is either spatially (synchronous communication with spatial distance) 
or temporally (asynchronous communication without spatial distance) or spa-
tio-temporally distanced (asynchronous communication with spatial distance). 
All technological and symbolically generalised media spatio-temporally distan-
ciate communication, but are at the same time grounded in and dialectically 
mediated with the media of the human body and the human mind. 
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6.6.4. Niklas Luhmann’s Fetishism of Modern Media
One must be very careful to distinguish between anthropological and histori-
cal means of communication, especially in respect to symbolically generalised 
media. Money and markets are not eternal, but historical features of commu-
nication in societies that are based on exchange-value. Economic relations 
can also be organised as gifts and co-operatives instead of as exchange and 
markets. The institutions of liberal democracy are dominant in contemporary 
modernity, but are not co-extensive with and not the only means of political 
communication. Liberal democracy contains as the negative dialectic of its 
own enlightenment also totalitarian tendencies. There are specific historical 
forms of communication media’s organisation. Economic institutions organis-
ing production, distribution and consumption, political institutions organising 
decision-making, and cultural institutions organising collective meaning-pro-
duction are the most fundamental symbolically generalised media of com-
munication. Money, markets, parliaments, dictatorships, etc. are only specific 
historical expressions of these media. In class-based society, such structures 
and the practices they mediate are contradictory and contested. The problem 
of Luhmann’s theory of communication is that it is a theory of modern society 
that presents the structures of modernity as general structures characteristic 
for all societies. 
We would like to call “symbolically generalized” the media that use gener-
alizations to symbolize the nexus between selection and motivation, that 
is, represent it as a unity. Important examples are: truth, love, property/
money, power/law; and also, in rudimentary form, religious belief, art, 
and, today, standardized “basic values”. In all these cases this – in a very 
different way and for very different interactive constellations – is a matter 
of conditioning the selection of communication so that it also works as a 
means of motivation, that is, so that it can adequately secure acceptance 
of the proposed selection. […] Further discussion of this must be left to a 
theory of society, but the general theory of social systems and their com-
municative processes can serve to draw attention to the highly selective 
character of these functionally privileged modes of communication. Lan-
guage, media of dissemination, and symbolically generalized communi-
cation media are thus evolutionary achievements that interdependently 
ground the processing of information and increase what can be produced 
by social communication. This is how society produces and reproduces 
itself as a social system (Luhmann 1995, 161–162). 
Power is, for Luhmann, a negative form of violence and domination. He 
speaks of money, power and religion in the context of a theory of general-
ised communication media and a general theory of social systems. He pro-
jects contemporary Western capitalist societies as models for all societies and 
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thereby categorically eliminates theorising non-capitalist societies. He thereby 
also underestimates the contradictory character of modern society as advanc-
ing antagonistic potentials of domination (instrumentalisation) and co-oper-
ation. Luhmann’s theory is a fetishistic, uncritical theory of communication 
and society. 
6.6.5. Communication History and Institutions
The mediation of communication is connected to different organisations of 
spaces and times of communication. Communication can take place at the 
same time or at different times (synchronous/asynchronous communication) 
and at the same place or at different places. Means of communication allow the 
temporal and spatial distanciation of communication and are at the same time 
constructing joint social spaces of communication that re-embed disembedded 
communication. Humans can traverse distances and stay connected to each 
other and communicate with each other in a mobile manner with the help of 
communication technologies. 
The history of communication technology is however not simply a history 
of spaces and times of communication or of scientific-technological progress. 
There are actual social needs and institutions that bring about new spatial and 
temporal organisations of communication and new communications systems. 
Class rule, political rule and their combination in specific forms of political-
economic rule (empires, nation states, imperialism, global capitalism, etc.) 
require communicative orders that organise social relations of domination in 
time and space. The history of communication(s) is therefore bound up with 
history of class, domination and class struggles. Williams (1989, 172) therefore 
stresses that communications are not simply technologies, but at the same time 
social relations, which is why ‘communications systems have always to be seen 
as social institutions’.
6.6.6. Work and Communication: Communication at Work and the 
Work of Communication
There is an etymological difference between work and labour (Fuchs 2015, 
24–25). Marx (1867) expresses this duality as the dialectic of concrete and 
abstract labour. Work is the social production of novelty that satisfies human 
needs. It is the concrete dimension of human production. Abstract labour in 
contrast refers to the class dimension of work organised in class-based socie-
ties. So whereas work is a general feature of society, labour is the organisation 
of work in class-based societies, which implies unequal ownership, surplus 
appropriation, and exploitation. What is the relationship between work and 
communication? 
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We must distinguish between communication at work and the work of com-
munication. Work is a social relation, in which humans co-operate in order to 
co-produce new reality that satisfies human needs. Communication is a social 
co-ordination in the work process. Communication at work means that all 
work is a social relation and therefore requires communication for the co-ordi-
nation of social production. Williams writes that ‘communication and its mate-
rial means are intrinsic to all distinctively human forms of labour and social 
organization’ (Williams 1980, 50). Besides communication, also anticipatory, 
creative cognition is a key aspect of work, as Marx (1867, 284) stresses: 
But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is that 
the architect builds the cell in his mind before he constructs it in wax. 
At the end of every labour process, a result emerges which had already 
been conceived by the worker at the beginning, hence already existed 
ideally. Man not only effects a change of form in the materials of nature; 
he also realizes [verwirklicht] his own purpose in those materials.
From Rossi-Landi and Hund, we can take the idea of the work character of 
communication and the work of communication: communication is human 
work because it produces social meaning in the form of shared words, sen-
tences, arguments, texts, discourses, and entire languages. In communication, 
humans are co-producers of meaningful information in society. The work of 
communication is a metaphor for foregrounding the productive, active and 
creative character of social information. Also Marx stresses that the symbolic 
realm is one, in which humans engage in real, active production: ‘Men are the 
producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc., that is, real, active men, as they are 
conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and of the 
intercourse corresponding to these, up to its furthest forms’ (Marx and Engels 
1845/1846, 36).
But communication is not just work, but also the foundation for understand-
ing: through communication, humans learn to understand the world and the 
motivations and individual information of others. Other than Habermas, we 
should not assume that understanding automatically means moral agreement, 
but rather only the interpretation of the social world in order to make meaning 
of it. So communication is a specific form of work, but it is as social meaning 
and as the process of understanding the world at the same time also more than 
work. Work that is not purely individual, but a social relation conducted in 
a group, is also communicative in character. It is a productive social activity 
organised by communication that creates novelty and satisfies human needs. 
But it is not just, but more than communication.
Work and communication are therefore seen from both sides identical and 
non-identical, which is just another formulation for the work/communication 
dialectic. Human production is social and therefore a communicative relation 
(communication at work). Communication is itself productive and therefore 
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a specific form of work (the work of communication). Work is the productive 
aspect of human activity, whereas communication is human activity’s aspect 
of meaning-making in social relations. Meaning and social relations are them-
selves particular forms of production – symbolic and social production. They 
do not simply exist, but need to be created and reproduced.
6.6.7. Communication Work
Communication work is a particular form of work that creates information 
(see figure 6.1). All work is based on a dialectic of the body and the brain, 
physical activity and mental activity. But we can distinguish between work that 
is predominantly physical and work that is predominantly cognitive and com-
municative. Physical work creates tangible products that you can touch and feel. 
Information is in contrast an intangible product that stores and communicates 
meaning and represents something else for which it stands as a symbol. Com-
munication work is a social production process that creates information and 
information technologies. Information is often produced, disseminated and 
received by information technologies such as the networked computer. The 
production of these physical information technologies is also part of communi-
cation work, but is physical work. A subset of physical work is communication 
work that creates information technologies. In contrast, information work is 
mental communication work that produces social meaning. Physical work and 
information work are two connected aspects of communication work – they 
create communications and communication.
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Sohn-Rethel has shown that class-based societies have created a division 
between physical and communication labour. Communication labour has turned 
into the specific profession of managers, bureaucrats, administrators, planners, 
and politicians, who plan, execute and control power in social systems. Class 
rule is based on inequalities. Wherever there is inequality, some form of man-
agement and control is needed in order to contain actual or possible resistance 
with the help of direct, structural and ideological violence. It would, however, 
be a mistake to assume that communication labour only has an administrative-
bureaucratic role because since the rise of the culture industry in the twentieth 
century, communication has also taken on the commodity form. Communica-
tion commodities (the large-scale sale of professional knowledge in the form 
of music, films, software, advertisements, consultancy, news, entertainment, 
information technologies, etc.) are like all commodities produced by labour. 
Communication labour in information capitalism has therefore also been ‘pro-
letarianised’ so that we can observe the exploitation of communication workers 
in diverse class relations. Communication labour is not a clear-cut emancipatory 
or repressive category. There is dominative communication labour that produces 
and diffuses dominant ideology and proletarianised communication labour that 
produces communication commodities. Partly these roles are overlapping (e.g. 
when information workers who sell their labour power share neoliberal and 
managerialist ideology), but this is no necessity. 
6.6.8. Going Beyond Habermas: The Rationality of Action
Habermas (1984a, 22) understands rationality as action for ‘for which there 
are good reasons or grounds’. An action is the more rational, the more it ‘is 
connected with them can be defended against criticism’ (Habermas 1984a, 9). 
Habermas requires this concept of rationality in order to be able to argue that 
social relations based on communicative action are more rational than those 
mediated by money and power. But the Latin etymological root of the term 
rationality, the word ratio, only means that our actions are based on reasoning 
and thought: humans reflect and have certain goals when acting. The outcome 
of action is not always morally good, but rationality as goal-making and antici-
patory reflection is what distinguishes humans from animals. Even a suicide 
bomber who wants to kill as many people as possible bases his/her actions on 
reflection and has specific goals. Most of us will consider these goals and moti-
vations as morally reprehensible, but their irrationality has a clear rationality 
of irrationality.
Communication is like all human behaviour always goal-oriented and pur-
poseful. But against Habermas, we have to say that communication is not 
automatically or intrinsically morally good. Communication is fundamental 
to human sociality and society, but it is not inherently sacred, enlightening, 
redemptive, or liberating. It also does not automatically generate consensus and 
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agreement. Communication is the symbolic way we produce and reproduce 
social relations and thereby our social systems and society. The SS henchmen, 
who killed Jews in Auschwitz, had to communicate in order to co-ordinate their 
crimes against humanity. Altruistic people, who organise clothes, shelter and 
food for the homeless, also communicate with each other in order to organise 
aid. Both forms of communication are rational, but certainly have fundamental 
differences. Habermas is right to draw a distinction between dominative and 
liberating action. But it is doubtful that this distinction is co-extensive with 
the one between purposive and communicative action. All action has certain 
purposes and all social action is communicative. The key distinction is between 
rational action that serves domination and rational action that aims to tran-
scend domination. 
6.6.9. Instrumental and Co-operative Communication
By domination we mean social relations, in which one group controls and 
uses resources and exerts physical, structural or ideological violence in such 
a way that it derives benefits for one group at the expense of others. Domina-
tion can result in economic privileges through labour exploitation, political 
privileges through control, cultural privileges through ideological domi-
nance. We can therefore distinguish between the accumulation of economic 
resource-power, political decision-power and cultural definition power as 
forms of economic, political and cultural domination. Domination is based 
on instrumental rationality and instrumental communication: dominative 
social relations are organised in such a way that one group instrumentalises 
others. Exploitation, control, manipulation, and exclusion are expressions 
of instrumental rationality. Instrumental communication is communication 
based on instrumental rationality. Co-operative rationality is opposed to 
the dominative logic of instrumental rationality. It does not aim at creat-
ing, reproducing or deepening domination. Its goal is social relations that 
transcend domination and create contexts that allow all humans to benefit 
and lead a good life. Co-operative rationality aims politically at participa-
tory democracy, whereas instrumental rationality in the last instance means 
fascism. Co-operative communication is communication that is based in co-
operative rationality. 
The history of class-based societies is also a history of the clash between 
instrumental and co-operative rationality. Whereas dominant groups aim 
to find ever newer ways of how to instrumentalise humans in their interests 
and how to communicate such domination as ideological necessary, inevita-
ble and without alternatives, dominated groups have the potential to resist, to 
self-organise alternatives that challenge instrumental rationality by embryonic 
forms and social systems of co-operation and to collectively communicate their 
opposition and the need for a society grounded in co-operative rationality. 
202 Critical Theory of  Communication
6.6.10. The Rationalities of Communication and Raymond Williams’ 
Distinction Between Authoritarian, Paternal, Commercial and 
Democratic Communications
The distinction between instrumental and co-operative rationality is important 
for the world of communications. Raymond Williams (1976, 130–137) distin-
guishes between authoritarian, paternal, commercial and democratic organisa-
tional forms of the media. The first three can be understood as political, cultural 
and commercial expressions of instrumental reason in the organisation of media 
systems. Authoritarian communications mean that there is state control, manip-
ulation and censorship of the media. Such systems’ ‘purpose of communication 
is to protect, maintain, or advance a social order based on minority power’ (131). 
Paternal communications are authoritarian systems ‘with a conscience: that is to 
say, with values and purposes beyond the maintenance of its own power’ (131). 
There is ideological control that aims to impose certain moral values on audi-
ences because it is assumed that such morals are good for citizens and that the 
latter are too silly to understand the world. In commercial communications, 
there is commercial control: ‘Anything can be said, provided that you can afford 
to say it and that you can say it profitably’ (133). All three forms are instrumen-
tal: they instrumentalise the media as tools for control and domination.
In contrast democratic communications are based on co-operative rational-
ity. Communications are ‘means of participation and of common discussion’ 
(134). Williams argues for a ‘cultural democracy’ that combines public-service 
media and local media. ‘The idea of public service must be detached from the 
idea of public monopoly, yet remain public service in the true sense’ (134) of 
public service content. Instrumental and co-operative media are contradic-
tory forces. Williams observes the tendency that the commercial colonisation 
of communications dominates: ‘All the basic purposes of communication – the 
sharing of human experience – are being steadily subordinated to this drive 
to sell. […] The organization of communications is then not for use, but for 
profit’ (Williams 1976, 25). The ‘commercial has been steadily winning’ (Wil-
liams 1976, 137). This tendency holds true until today. Only cultural forms of 
class struggle can drive back the capitalist colonisation of communications. 
6.6.11. Towards A Dialectical Critical Theory of Communication 
Beyond Habermas
A critical theory of communication is dialectical in a manifold sense. It theo-
rises that the dialectics of work/communication, body/mind, individuality/
sociality, internalisation/externalisation, subject/object, practices/technology, 
communication/media, agency/structures, communication/communications, 
instrumental communication/co-operative communication that are funda-
mental determinants of communication. 
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Jürgen Habermas has made important contributions for theorising com-
munication, but his dualist idealisation of communication falls short of a dia-
lectical critical theory of communication. It is therefore time to go beyond 
Habermas in critically theorising communication. This goal can be achieved by 
drawing on the diverse tradition of cultural Marxism in an open manner that 
is curious about less well-known texts, tries to connect thoughts from various 
authors, including the Frankfurt School and other versions of cultural Marx-
ism, and relates to new developments in society and theory. 
Notes
 1 Sectors in the Forbes 2000 data included in the information sector for this 
calculation were: advertising, broadcasting, communications equipment, 
computer and electronic retail, computer hardware, computer services, 
computer storage devices, consumer electronics, electronics, Internet shop-
ping and distribution, printing and publishing, semiconductors, software 
and programming, telecommunications. 
 2 The mobilities industry included for this calculation the following indus-




 5 See: Exchange, in: Online Etymology Dictionary, http://www.etymonline.
com/index.php?term=exchange (accessed on 12 December 2015).
 6 Compare also the following formulations: ‘modern societies attain a level of 
system differentiation at which increasingly autonomous organizations are 
connected with one another via delinguistified media of communication: 
these systemic mechanisms – for example, money – steer a social inter-
course that has been largely disconnected from norms and values, above 
all in those subsystems of purposive rational economic and administra-
tive action that, on Weber’s diagnosis, have become independent of their 
moral-political foundations’ (Habermas 1987, 154). ‘I have distinguished 
the steering media that replace language as a mechanism for coordinating 
action from the forms of generalized communication that merely simplify 
an overly complex nexus of communicative action, and that in doing so 
remain dependent on language and on a lifeworld, however rationalized’ 
(Habermas 1987, 277).
 7 https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Horst_Holzer
 8 ‘gesellschaftliche Produktion’ (translation from German)
 9 Translation from German: Habermas ist ‘nicht imstande, die wesentli-
che Bestimmung der gesellschaftlichen Produktion zu erkennen: daß im 
Prozeß der Produktion eben nicht nur die Produktivkräfte entwickelt 
werden, sondern auch die gesellschaftlichen Beziehungen – eingeschlossen: 
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‘Kommunikation’, ‘Interaktion’ – die die Menschen in diesem Produktion-
sprozeß miteinander eingehen’.
 10 See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lev_Vygotsky
 11 See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Valentin_Voloshinov
 12 Translation from German (CF): ‘Vielmehr wird über die gesellschaftli-
che (sich materiell und geistig vollziehende) Arbeit eine ‘bedeutungsvolle’ 
Umwelt geschaffen, und zwar insofern, als sich mittels der Zwecke, die 
in der gesellschaftlichen Arbeit mit dem Ziel der Lebenssicherung und 
-entwicklung vergegenständlicht werden, Bedeutungen realisieren’.
 13 See: http://www.ferrucciorossilandi.com
 14 https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wulf_D._Hund
 15 Translation from German (CF): ‘Gesellschaft konstituiere sich wesentlich 
durch Kommunikation’
 16 Translation from German (CF): ‘Wie jegliche Arbeit, ereignet sich auch 
Kommunikation immer nur als Produktion’
 17 Translation from German (CF): ‘Arbeitscharakter der Kommunikation’
 18 See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Raymond_Williams
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The task of this book is to present readings on specific works of selected 
 Frankfurt School thinkers and to thereby open up the discussion on cultural 
Marxism to new frontiers. These openings are the opening of Marxism to cul-
ture and communication, the opening of the way we read cultural Marxism 
from single, dominant texts towards alternative, less well-known works, and 
the opening of discourse in cultural Marxism from the focus on single thinkers 
towards a plural dialogue and unity in diversity. The chapters in this book can 
be read independently, but are also connected to each other. The conclusion 
aims to help the reader to connect the single chapters’ lines of thought. 
7.1. The Starting Point: Karl Marx
In the German Ideology, Marx discusses foundations of a materialist theory of 
culture and ideology. He stresses as a critique of the Young Hegelians Bruno 
Bauer, Ludwig Feuerbach and Max Stirner that the critique of religion and con-
cepts is not sufficient, but that rather also a critique of politics and the economy, 
i.e. a critique of capitalism’s political economy, is needed. Marx emphasises that 
materialism means in society that human beings living in particular social rela-
tions actively produce society’s social relations. Matter in society means social 
relations and the social production of reality. ‘By producing their means of 
subsistence men are indirectly producing their material life’ (Marx and Engels 
1845, 37). The means of subsistence not only include food, shelter and technol-
ogy, but also means of communication that humans use for organising their 
social relations through communication. Life involves ‘eating and drinking, 
housing, clothing, and various other things’ (Marx and Engels 1845, 47). Com-
munication is one of these various other key phenomena. 
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The production and communication of ideas is therefore for Marx not 
detached from material social life, but is itself material and social: ‘Men are 
producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc., that is, real, active men, as they are 
conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and of the 
intercourse corresponding to these, up to its furthest forms’ (Marx and Engels 
1845, 42). Culture is a social product of human social relations in society.
Marx applies this materialist concept of culture also to the world of ideology 
understood as a ‘camera obscura’ that makes humans and their social relations 
‘appear upside-down’ (Marx and Engels 1845, 42). Ideologies are not abstract 
ideas existing eternally outside of history. They are produced and reproduced by 
specific ideological workers such as consultants, managers, bourgeois journal-
ists and intellectuals, etc. Marx therefore speaks of a division of labour within 
the ruling class ‘so that inside this class one part appears as the thinkers of the 
class (its active, conceptive ideologists, who make the formation of the illusions 
of the class about itself their chief source of livelihood), whereas the others in 
this class have less time to make up illusions and ideas about themselves’ (Marx 
and Engels 1845, 68).
7.2. Georg Lukács: Teleological Positing
So Marx in this part of the German Ideology asks profound questions about 
society: how are the economy and culture related? What is the connection of 
labour and ideology? Georg Lukács in his Ontology of Social Being, the subject 
of this book’s second chapter, re-poses Marx’s questions. He felt that in his His-
tory and Class Consciousness he did not ask questions about the role of labour 
in society and focused too much on ideology. He therefore posed a founda-
tional question of cultural Marxism, namely the one about the relationship of 
culture and economy, in his final book. The ontological critical theory of soci-
ety that he worked out in the Ontology does not eliminate the ideology critique 
Lukács formulated in History and Class Consciousness. Ideology is a profound 
part of the Ontology. So one can say that the Ontology subsumes History and 
Class Consciousness and generalises Lukács’ critical theory of society.
Lukács argues that human production is a teleological positing with a pur-
pose, orientation and goal. This means that humans are inherently creative 
beings, who reflect on the potential outcomes before undertaking an activity. 
Marx formulated this circumstance of teleological positing in different words 
in Capital Volume 1’s chapter 7 (see Fuchs 2016, chapter 7):
A spider conducts operations which resemble those of the weaver, and 
a bee would put many a human architect to shame by the construc-
tion of its honeycomb cells. But what distinguishes the worst architect 
from the best of bees is that the architect builds the cell in his mind 
before he constructs it in wax. At the end of every labour process, a 
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result emerges which had already been conceived by the worker at the 
beginning, hence already existed ideally. Man not only effects a change 
of form in the materials of nature; he also realizes [verwirklicht] his own 
purpose in those materials. And this is a purpose he is conscious of, it 
determines the mode of his activity with the rigidity of a law, and he 
must subordinate his will to it (Marx 1867, 284).
So for both Marx and Lukács, humans are inherently active, creative, self-
conscious, anticipatory social beings. Lukács implicitly distinguishes between 
physical and information work when he argues that one type of teleological 
positing produces changes of nature, the other changes of the social. He also 
uses the term mental work in the latter context. 
There are also obvious parallels between Lukács’ Ontology and Raymond 
Williams’ Cultural Materialism. Williams stresses that all culture is material. 
He highlights the ‘material character of the production of a social and political 
order’ and describes the concept of the superstructure as an evasion (Williams 
1977, 93). Williams (1977, 111) argues that ‘[c]ultural work and activity are 
not […] a superstructure’. Cultural Materialism sees ‘the complex unity of the 
elements’ required for the existence of culture: ideas, institutions, formations, 
distribution, technology, audiences, forms of communication and interpreta-
tion, worldviews (Williams 1977, 138–139). Williams stresses that especially 
the emergence of a significant share of information labour in the economy 
requires rethinking the separation of culture and the economy: The ‘produc-
tive forces of “mental labour” have, in themselves, an inescapable material and 
thus social history’ (Williams 1989, 211). ‘[I]nformation processes […] have 
become a qualitative part of economic organization’ (Williams 1981, 231). 
Williams just like Lukács was interested in Marx’s question of what the mate-
riality of culture is. Both implicitly reached the same answer, namely that social 
production is the unifying human activity that creates all use-values, including 
cultural ones such as ideas, artworks, entertainment, advertisements and ide-
ologies. But whereas Williams lacked the elaboration of specific concepts that 
expressed this connection of culture and the economy, Lukács made Cultural 
Materialism more concrete with the help of the notion of teleological positing. 
Lukács stresses that mental work and ideology are not the same. He consid-
ers a subset of mental work as the labour of the ideologists that Marx speaks 
about that produce, reproduce and spread dominative ideas that justify class 
and domination. 
Lukács is not just interested in a theory of teleological positing, but also 
in the forms that such human activity takes on in class-based society. And 
here he connects the Ontology back to the concepts of reification and aliena-
tion that he first introduced in History and Class Consciousness. In class-based 
societies, humans are instruments for the dominant class’ achievement of 
advantages, power and profit. Exploitation turns human labour-power into 
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an instrument of class relations. Ideology tries to instrumentalise human 
thoughts by spreading ideas that justify exploitation and domination. Tele-
ological positing thereby is not oriented on humanity as end-in-itself, but its 
means and ends are reversed: in class-based society, humans become means 
and instruments for the privileges of a dominant class. In class-based society, 
there is the dominance of what Max Horkheimer called ‘instrumental reason’ 
and what Herbert Marcuse described as ‘technological rationality’. 
The Frankfurt School grounded these notions in Lukács’ concept of reifica-
tion. In the Ontology, Lukács generalises his analysis of reification into a critical 
theory of society. The struggle for a human society is the struggle for a nega-
tion of class-based society’s negativity. It is the struggle for a society, in which 
humans’ teleological positing, i.e. human production, is a self-determined 
end-in-itself, not an instrument that benefits the dominant class and domi-
nant groups. Such a society presupposes the abolishment of class, domination, 
exploitation, and toil. Lukács’ Ontology is not a substitution, but a dialectical 
sublation of History and Class Consciousness. 
7.3. Theodor W. Adorno: The Dialectics of Knowledge
Theodor W. Adorno had already died when Lukács’ Ontology was published. 
For Adorno, the term ontology was associated with Heidegger’s philosophy 
that he saw as a fascist, racist and anti-dialectical theory. He argued against 
Heidegger’s ontology for a dialectical theory of society. He may have disap-
proved of Lukács’ use of the term ontology, but certainly both Adorno and 
Lukács were interested in the creation of a dialectical critical theory of society. 
Adorno was not just a critic of the culture industry, but also a dialectical phi-
losopher. He rejected a linear and mechanistic theory of knowledge, in which 
knowledge reflects and is determined by the outside world. In his studies on 
Hegel, Adorno provides a dialectical-realist alternative to such mechanistic 
reflection theories. All knowledge production is based on a dialectic of human 
subjects and an external objective environment (nature, society). In the same 
essays, Adorno also theorises communication. Language is, for Adorno, a dia-
lectic of the individual’s naming and communication of an object. Adorno fur-
thermore stresses the dialectic of structure and agency and the dialectic of the 
individual and the group in the production of knowledge. 
Lukács’ Ontology and Williams’ Cultural Materialism help us to understand 
that modernity’s dualities such as culture/economy, communication/work, 
mind/body, ideology/labour, leisure/labour, consumption/production, private/
public, play/labour, society/nature, subject/object, etc. are not dual categories 
that are separate from each other or reducible to each other. In both readings, 
they are identical and non-identical at the same time: culture is part of the econ-
omy because there is cultural work, or what Lukács terms ‘mental work’ as a 
specific form of teleological positing, that creates cultural products. And culture 
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is at the same time separate from the economy because cultural meanings take 
effect not just in the economy, but all over society. 
Adorno adds to this analysis by his reading of Hegel. He helps us to under-
stand how culture is not just dialectical in relation to the economy, but is in 
itself a manifold dialectical process: Cultural production is based on dialec-
tics of subject/object, individual/social group, agency/structure, individual 
knowledge/social knowledge. Adorno is a negative dialectician. The structure 
of knowledge as negative dialectic can be described by the fact that the sub-
ject, the individual, agency and individual knowledge are never a pure identity, 
but non-identical with themselves: they are related to an object, a social group, 
structures and social knowledge. 
Adorno’s analysis does not remain abstract, but is a critique of the class 
structures of knowledge that try to make knowledge identical. Ideologies try 
to reduce the dialectic of knowledge so that the possibility that society could 
be different is hidden. Ideology tries to present class-based society as identi-
cal with society itself. It proclaims a false identity of subject and object and 
thereby denies the dialectical character of all social reality and all knowledge. 
Ideologies are for Adorno anti-dialectical forms of knowledge. His critique of 
the culture industry is a specific application of his dialectical critical theory of 
knowledge. The political task is then to deconstruct ideologies and to find ways 
in society that can strengthen the production of dialectical, critical knowledge. 
7.4. Herbert Marcuse: The Meta-Dialectic and the 
Dialectical Logic of Essence
Marcuse engaged systematically with Hegel’s dialectical philosophy and applied 
it to various phenomena of twentieth-century capitalism. Whereas Williams’ 
Cultural Materialism deals with the dialectic of culture and the economy, Mar-
cuse was in his general works such as Reason and Revolution concerned with 
how the dialectic works in society in general and in capitalism in particular. The 
very concept of this approach is certainly related to Lukács’ dialectical ontol-
ogy and Adorno’s dialectic of the subject and the object. The aim is a dialectical 
critical theory of society. Marcuse’s main philosophical concern was to ground 
a dialectic that is non-deterministic and non-mechanistic and thereby opposes 
and avoids the pitfalls of Soviet dialectics that turned into a totalitarian ideology. 
Marcuse was interested in a humanistic dialectic, a truly dialectical dialectic. 
He worked out a meta-dialectic of the subjective dialectic and the objective 
dialectic that stresses that capitalism and class-based society’s contradictions 
condition, but do not determine the future. It is human praxis that shapes the 
future, especially in situations of rupture and crisis in society. So Marcuse’s 
point is, paraphrasing Marx (1852,103), that humans make the dialectic, but 
they do not do so just as they please, but under objective, structural dialectic 
circumstances set in the past. 
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An example of how this meta-dialectic works: in the mid to late 1990s, lots of 
new Internet-based businesses were emerging. Many of them attracted venture 
capital investments and started being listed on the stock market. A substantial 
amount of them struggled to make profits and with continuous losses a diver-
gence between stock market values and real accumulation emerged. Financiali-
sation resulted in a structural antagonism between real and virtual economic 
values in the Internet economy. This financial bubble exploded in 2000 and 
caused the so-called ‘dot-com crisis’. According to estimates, this crisis resulted 
in a loss of US$5 trillion in stock market value on the NASDAQ stock exchange, 
on which many tech corporations’ stocks are traded.1 The structural force of the 
objective dialectic that resulted in the crisis compelled actors in the Internet 
economy to rethink and revise their economic strategies. In such situations of 
crisis, the future is relatively open and depends on the choices made. There 
would for example have been the choice that Internet corporations turn into 
non-profit co-operatives in order to reduce the digital economy’s crisis-prone-
ness. Especially in situations of crisis, collective human action as the subjective 
dialectical force matters in determining the future. But a chance was missed. 
The most common reaction was rather a new capital accumulation strategy, 
namely to foster social media businesses that are based on targeted advertising, 
which has created new economic contradictions centred around the question 
of how profitable targeted advertising can actually be (Fuchs 2014b).
Just like Lukács and Williams and to a lesser degree Adorno, Marcuse also 
studies the role of cultural work in society. He adds a psychoanalytic dialectic to 
the analysis by exploring the relationship of play and labour. In the age of pro-
sumption (consumption that is at the same time labour and production of com-
modities), the Internet and neoliberalism, the boundaries between play and 
labour have become blurred. Playbour has become a new management strategy 
and ideology. Examples are the Google offices that look like playgrounds and 
have entertainment and relaxation areas, which hides the fact that the employ-
ees work very long hours (Fuchs 2014b, chapter 6). Play has become subsumed 
under the logic of labour exploitation, i.e. class. 
Marcuse speaks of technological rationality as the attempt to turn con-
sciousness into a machine and an instrument that legitimates domination and 
exploitation. What Adorno based on Horkheimer’s concept of instrumental 
reason terms identity thinking is in Marcuse’s theory termed one-dimensional 
thought. Ideology reduces the complexity of reality’s dialectics to just a single 
dimension. 
Marcuse was particularly interested in grounding ethical foundations of crit-
ical theory. He did so with the help of Hegel’s dialectic of essence and existence. 
A state of affairs can only be true if its existence corresponds to its essence. 
Ideas that try to for example create the impression that reality and interests are 
different from what they are in essence are for example an ideology, the attempt 
to make reality appear different from its essence in order to justify dominant 
interests. The logic of essence in a more general understanding points towards 
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the potentials of what society could be, its not-yet. The logic of essence can 
ground a critical ethics of co-operation that allows people to politically ques-
tion domination and class as forms of alienation. In the world of Facebook, 
we are confronted with the social, whereas the commodity form is not imme-
diately visible to the user. We do not directly experience how personal data is 
traded as commodity. This inverse commodity fetishism hides the commod-
ity form behind the social. Communication’s essence appears as ideology that 
masks Facebook’s commodity form and the exploitation of users’ digital labour. 
In the world of corporate social media, exploitation is real, but tends to become 
invisible and only indirectly experienceable. 
7.5. Axel Honneth Revisits Lukács’ History and Class 
Consciousness: The Critical Theory of Recognition, 
Alienation and Reification
Adorno and Horkheimer’s notion of instrumental reason as well as Marcuse’s 
category of technological rationality have in the Frankfurt School mainly been 
used for analysing how ideology creates one-dimensional and identical con-
sciousness. The very idea that humans are turned into machines and instru-
ments that serve the particular interests of the dominant class is, however, of 
broader relevance and is also important outside the realm of ideology. It goes 
back to Lukács’ concept of reification that he formulated in History and Class 
Consciousness and that is based on Marx’s theory of commodity fetishism and 
alienation. Axel Honneth has explored the relevance of Lukács’ concept of rei-
fication for grounding a critical theory of recognition.
For Lukács, reification in very general terms means that there are social struc-
tures that treat humans not as real humans, but turn them into instruments 
serving particularistic interests by dominating, exploiting or trying to manipu-
late them. Honneth is interested in combining moral philosophy and critical 
theory. He does so in contrast to other contemporary theorists of alienation by 
reinterpreting Lukács’ concept of reification. Whereas Honneth in his earlier 
works tends to speak of love, rights and esteem as the three realms of human 
recognition in society, in his later works he identifies the recognition of needs, 
equality and the achievements of work. Reification is for Honneth forgetfulness 
of recognition. Whereas reification is the process that implements domination, 
alienation is the condition that results from reification. 
Honneth’s theory of recognition can be connected to the Marxian concept of 
social production and thereby also be related to Lukács’ notion of teleological 
positing: humans have the interest to engage with others and produce a social 
world in the economy, politics and culture because they aim to achieve recogni-
tion. Recognition is a key goal of humans’ teleological positings in society. They 
produce use-values, decisions and meanings as a social process not just in order 
to survive, but also in order to lead a good life, which includes to be recognised 
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by others and to recognise others. Such a distinction of three forms of recogni-
tion is based on a distinction among three realms of society: the economy, poli-
tics, and culture. Reification and alienation deny humans social recognition by 
fostering exploitation, control and exclusion. There are economic, political and 
cultural forms of reification/alienation. Each of them operates on three levels: 
the subject, intersubjectivity, and the object. Struggles against these nine forms 
of alienation are struggles for the appropriation of the control over the condi-
tions, under which humans socially produce their lives and society. 
A theory of alienation and appropriation that is grounded in and goes beyond 
the works of Lukács and Adorno is also connected to the works of Marcuse 
and Adorno discussed in this book: Marcuse is concerned with the dialectical 
logic of essence. If we assume that co-production and co-operation form an 
essential feature of humans in society, from which we can derive the ethico-
political right that humans should collectively control the economy, politics 
and culture, then this means that economic, political and cultural alienation 
are false conditions of society that negate human essence in society. Marcuse’s 
concept of technological rationality and Horkheimer and Adorno’s notion of 
instrumental reason can be interpreted not just at the ideological level, but in 
general as processes of reification in society that result in and reproduce alien-
ated social conditions.
7.6. Beyond Jürgen Habermas’ Critical Theory 
of Communication
Habermas has established the most influential critical theory of communication. 
Any critical engagement with communication must take Habermas as one of its 
starting points. But it certainly does not have to end with or stop at Habermas. 
Habermas distinguishes between instrumental and non-instrumental 
dimensions of society: work/interaction, system/lifeworld, system integra-
tion/social integration, instrumental rationality/communicative rationality, 
teleological action/communicative action, steering media (money and power)/
language. His theory is dualist and leaves the realms of the economy and cul-
ture separated. Such an approach is ontologically as unsatisfying as economic 
reductionism and cultural reductionism. Communication is not immaculate, 
unadulterated, authentic, immune, innocent, and sacred. It is not intrinsically 
morally good, enlightening, or liberating. 
The common ground of Lukács’ Ontology of Social Being and the cultural 
Marxist approaches of Lev Vygotsky, Valentin Vološinov, Ferruccio Rossi-Landi 
and Raymond Williams presented in chapter 6 is that humans actively produce 
signs, information and communicative relations. Communication is a domain 
of social production. Rossi-Landi and Williams suggest in a manner compara-
ble to Lukács that communication is a specific form of work, the production of 
symbols that are used in the production and reproduction of social relations. 
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7.7. Towards a Dialectical Critical Theory of Communication
What conclusions can we draw from the critical approaches in cultural Marx-
ism discussed in this book and its single chapters? 
Marx argues in the German Ideology that society is a ‘real process of produc-
tion’, in which humans engage in the ‘material production of life itself ’ (Marx 
and Engels 1845, 61). The material character of society is that it is a human 
realm of social production. Lukács characterises social production as teleologi-
cal positing: Humans do not just produce, but they produce based on their 
capacity to define specific goals and purposes of social life. And they do not do 
so in isolation, but together with others. Co-operation is therefore what Hegel, 
Marx, Lukács and Marcuse term the essence of society. The ‘production of life’ 
is ‘a social relation – social in the sense that it denotes the co-operation of sev-
eral individuals, no matter under what conditions, in what manner and to what 
end’ (Marx and Engels 1845, 48–49). The logic of co-operation contradicts the 
logic of instrumental reason. 
Social production takes place in the economy, politics and culture. Humans 
produce use-values, collective decisions and meanings. The economy and 
work are not limited to the production of physical goods. Also culture and 
politics are on the one hand part of the economy: humans produce and com-
municate meanings and collective decisions in social processes. But culture 
and politics are not identical with the economy. They are simultaneously part 
and no-part of the economy. Once produced, rules and meanings take effect 
all over society. 
Communication is a fundamental symbolic production process in all these 
realms of society that helps bringing about and reproducing social relations. 
We can learn from Adorno and Vološinov that communication and the pro-
duction and sharing of knowledge are based on dialectics of subject/object, 
individual/social group, agency/structure, individual knowledge/social knowl-
edge, internalisation/externalisation. If we look at the logic of development of 
society, all of its subsystems and knowledge, then a Marcusean version of the 
dialectic applies: development is neither mere necessity, nor mere chance, but 
a dialectic of chance and necessity, in which the objective structural dialectic 
conditions the possibilities for human praxis so that humans in the subjective 
dialectical process make history. 
Lukács and Honneth show that alienation and reification in societies struc-
tured by class and domination bring about structures that are not controlled 
by all humans, but by the particularistic interests of specific groups. Alien-
ated societies violate human essence in society. It denies humans recognition. 
What Horkheimer/Adorno call instrumental reason and what Marcuse calls 
technological rationality describes structures of alienation and reification that 
try to turn humans into instruments that are dominated, controlled, exploited, 
excluded and manipulated so that an elite controls society. An alternative is a 
co-operative society, in which humans appropriate the economy, politics and 
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culture, i.e. are in collective control of the social life they produce and repro-
duce in society. 
All human action is purposeful, which Lukács stresses by his category of 
teleological positing. Only specific purposeful action is instrumental action, 
namely action aimed at domination, exploitation, control, manipulation or 
exclusion. We can distinguish between instrumental action that aims at instru-
mentalising humans and society for fostering the domination of some over 
others and co-operative action that is based on the logic that actions benefit 
all. Communication as the symbolic process bringing about social relations 
all over society is embedded into structures of domination and emancipation. 
There are instrumental and co-operative forms of communication. 
Pegatron is a Chinese company that manufactures phones and computer 
equipment for Apple and other communications companies. In 2015, China 
Labor Watch released an investigative report about the working conditions in a 
Pegatron factory in Shanghai: 
With a median work week of 60 hours, workers typically accumulate 
70 to 90 hours of overtime a month, far in excess of the Chinese statu-
tory limit of 36 hours. One  worker even worked 119 overtime hours in 
September. […] Overtime is mandatory. A Pegatron staff member said 
that a worker who simply  wants to do an 8-hour, 5-day workweek “does 
not conform to our hiring practices”. […] Workers are paid the mini-
mum wage (about $1.83/hour), so they depend on  overtime to make a 
living wage. […] Labor intensity can be high. For example, CLW’s inves-
tigator worked on one unit  every 3.75 seconds, standing for the entirety 
of his 10.5 hours of daily work. […] Dorms are crowded, with anywhere 
from 8 to 14 people housed in one room. […] up to 40 people need to 
share the use of one toilet. […] Dorms are poor and unhygienic. Mold 
grows everywhere. Bed bugs have spread throughout some dorms. […] 
In pre-job training, nothing is mentioned of the toxic chemicals that 
workers may come into contact with during the course of their jobs or 
how to protect themselves. This is despite hazardous working conditions 
that may include coming into contact with substances like cadmium, 
lead, and mercury, and handling heavy industrial equipment. […] Pega-
tron fines workers for various behaviors, including crossing their legs 
or not  wearing their work ID. […] There was no apparent labor union 
observed at Pegatron. Pegatron’s trainer did not  know the meaning of 
the words “labor union” (China Labor Watch 2015, 8–9).
Amazon Mechanical Turk is Amazon’s crowd work platform. Workers earn-
ing their living on this platform have set up WeAreDynamo.org, a platform 
that documents working conditions and campaigns, for example publishing 
letters that these workers wrote to Amazon.com CEO Jeff Bezos. One ‘Turker’ 
describes her work the following way:
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The stark reality is, in the past two weeks, I’ve earned approximately 
$0.75 an hour (yes, that’s 75 cents/hr), however, that will be reduced by 
15.3% when I file my Federal taxes next year (Self Employment Tax), 
as for my state, I haven’t confronted that aspect as of yet. […] I know 
my family is fortunate to have health insurance, a roof over our heads, 
food in our bellies, and the choice to live where we want but that doesn’t 
mean I shouldn’t also be upset over poor wages, after all, this isn’t the 
19th century with sweatshops, robber barons, and no unions, although, 
it seems like it more and more with the richest 1% of the world soon 
to own 50% of the world’s wealth. One of my greatest fears is not being 
able to help my children go to college, especially for my oldest child 
who falls into the Gifted range. A mind is a terrible thing to waste, don’t 
you agree?2
How does a dialectical critical theory of communication help us to understand 
such phenomena? Such a theory sees the economy and culture as inherently 
connected and does not separate physical and mental labour. The workers in 
Chinese factories such as Foxconn, Pegatron or Quantat that assemble digital 
technologies are manufacturing workers. They conduct physical labour. Free-
lance workers on platforms such as Mechanical Turk, Upwork, TaskRabbit, 
Freelancer, PeoplePerHour, etc. tend primarily to be information workers who 
produce some form of information and make use of online freelance platforms 
(created by software engineers). Both type of labour have in common that they 
take place in the digital industry that is dominated by large transnational cor-
porations. Corporations such as Amazon.com and Apple do not just exploit 
one type of digital labour, but different ones: Amazon.com doesn’t just put a 
rent on freelance services via Mechanical Turk, it also sells physical goods such 
as the Kindle and paperbacks and intangible goods such as e-books. Apple’s 
primary income source is the sale of digital technologies such as Apple comput-
ers and the iPhone. But Apple also sells content via its iTunes store. Given the 
global and convergent character of transnational information corporations, it is 
not feasible to separate the physical and the mental labour conducting for these 
companies. Digital workers form a collective workforce. The phenomenon of 
cultural and digital labour shows that culture and the economy are not separate. 
The working conditions are as poor as described in the two examples because 
global information corporations are profitable businesses: Apple’s profits 
amounted in 2015 to US$53.4 billion3. Amazon’s profits were in the same year 
US$596 million.4 There is a class antagonism between information labour and 
information capital. These conditions can only be changed if the information 
workers of the world unite at the transnational level in order to challenge the 
power of information capital. Apple was in 2015 the world’s twelfth largest 
company, Amazon the 458th largest.5 The dialectic takes on a very political form 
in information capitalism so that class relations bring about highly exploited 
forms of labour. At the same time, many digital media companies have come 
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under criticism for avoiding paying taxes, which not just increases their prof-
its, but also deprives states of tax income and supports austerity measures that 
destroy the welfare state and threaten social security.
Information capitalism’s result is that humans are denied recognition and are 
alienated from society’s essence. Digital media are instruments and technolo-
gies of domination: many information and other workers are highly exploited, 
which fosters information corporations’ profits on the one side of the socio-
economic dialectic and precarity on the other. Surveillance ideologies and 
practices have erected a totalitarian system of control, in which citizens are 
categorically suspected to be terrorist and criminals. As a consequence, the 
Internet has in most parts of the world become a highly controlled communi-
cation network. In terms of culture, visibility and attention are highly stratified 
online and controlled by celebrities and corporations. Another aspect of digital 
culture are digital ideologies: digital ideologies not just celebrate digital entre-
preneurialism, but also justify digital media corporations’ reifying practices. 
Apple, in its Supplier Responsibility 2015 Progress Report, for example, prides 
itself by claiming: 
“Excessive work hours are a widespread and persistent industry prob-
lem. At Apple, finding a solution remains a top priority. We limit work-
weeks to 60 hours, except in unusual circumstances, with at least one 
day of mandated rest every seven days. And all overtime must be strictly 
voluntary. […] We tracked over 1.1 million workers on average per 
week in our supply chain and 92 percent of all workweeks were compli-
ant with our 60-hour maximum standard”. 
Given that the International Labour Organization’s conventions and recom-
mendations define the 40-hour week as a general standard, it is inhumane that 
Apple considers 60 hours to be an appropriate number of hours per week in 
the developing country companies that are part of its supply chain. Apple tries 
to create the impression that by monitoring working hours in its supply chain 
it really cares about workers. It tries to create the impression that a 60-hours 
working week is humane. Comparing these claims with international standards 
shows, however, that such attempts are manipulative and ideological.
Digital media, however, are not just technologies of domination, but to a 
certain degree are also part of struggles for a society, in which humans over-
come alienation and collectively control their conditions of life. We can find 
examples of online peer production that foster the digital commons instead of 
digital commodities. There are cultural co-operatives that question precarity 
and exploitation (see http://cultural.coop). There are progressive social move-
ments that use social media in protests (Fuchs 2014a). And there are platforms 
for co-operative work that foreground how people can work together instead 
of performing the individual self online. Alternative tendencies questioning 
 capitalism are certainly often much more precarious than the media world’s 
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corporate and dominative mainstream. They nonetheless show the desire for a 
world beyond domination and exploitation. The world of information technol-
ogy is one that is shaped by a dialectic of repression and emancipatory strug-
gles. Digital media are technologies of domination and liberation at the same 
time. These potentials are, however, not equally distributed. In a class-based 
society, we can always take the dominative use of technologies for certain, 
whereas alternative uses aiming at liberation are much more fragile and pre-
carious. Only political praxis can bring about humanity’s emancipation from 
repression. A critical theory of communication and society stands in solidarity 
with those who resist and oppose the corporationalisation, commodification 
and bureaucratisation of communication and the world. 
Notes
 1 ‘Fears of dot-com crash, version 2.0.’ Los Angeles Times Online, 16 July 2006. 
 2 http://www.wearedynamo.org/dearjeffbezos 
 3 Data source: Apple, SEC-filings, form 10-K for year 2015.
 4 Data source: Amazon, SEC-filings, form 10-K for year 2015.
 5 Data source: Forbes 2000, list for 2015.
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